



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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Friday
3 November 1989**

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Transport Links Conference Ends in Kinshasa

*AB3011204889 Dakar PANA in English 1836 GMT
30 Oct 89*

[Text] Kinshasa, 30 Oct (AZAP/PANA)—Five countries in east and central Africa have expressed the wish to improve the transport links between them. At a meeting held from 25 to 27 October in Kinshasa, officials from Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire, member countries of the Transit Transport Authority in the northern corridor said that they would establish the best conditions to ensure smooth transportation of goods.

A statement issued after the meeting asked the Secretariat to carry out a study on specific issues, mainly on customs constraints and ways to improve the infrastructures.

The participants at the meeting agreed to hold a fourth ordinary ministerial conference of the authority in July 1990 in Uganda. The meeting will coordinate transport issues in the corridor.

Speaking at the end of the meeting, Zairean minister of transport and communications, Mr Mokolo, noted that the meeting has enabled the formation of principles and proposals to overcome obstacles hindering implementation of the project.

Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire are landlocked countries which export an important part of their goods through the port of Mombassa in Kenya.

*** Paper Urges Closer Links in Central Africa**

*34000071a Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English
27 Sep 89 p 1*

[Text] Most African countries have in different ways been working to forge closer links aimed at fostering rapid development in the political and social economic fields.

Underlying these endeavors have been the efforts put into promoting good neighborliness as the springboard for development and co-operation on the basis of friendship and mutual understanding.

This indeed is the message that President Mwinyi has carried to Zaire where he has just ended a four-day state visit.

It is the same message which the Prime Minister and First Vice-President, Ndugu Joseph Warioba, has been delivering to neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi which he is visiting.

It is a welcome neighborly gesture that such visits take place, for the peoples of the region have over the centuries interacted extensively and thus share a lot in terms of culture and language.

Tanzania remains a major route for exports and imports to and from Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and to a growing extent Rwanda.

We are also engaged in regional co-operation ventures with Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda under the Kagera Basin Organization which aim at harnessing the great potential of the region to enhance the life of the people.

Among the major activities being developed jointly in the basin, are irrigation projects, hydropower generation, and transport and communications.

It is in the same vein—the tapping of mutual potential—that President Mwinyi has undertaken the Zaire trip.

The Tanzania-Zaire Joint Commission of Co-operation which met prior to the President's visit outlined areas of Co-operation which could be tackled immediately for the benefit of the two countries.

They include enhancing lake transport between the two countries, facilities to improve haulage of Zaire's goods both ways, and the security of the fishermen on Lake Tanganyika.

We are confident that if these and the many other potentially beneficial areas are tackled with determination, our two peoples will benefit immensely and enhance Africa's drive towards self-reliance.

It is also true that however much the desire by the people of the region to co-operate, they cannot do so effectively if they do not fight subversive elements seeking to destabilize them from each others' territories.

We hope that after the visits of our two leaders, we will see greater drive towards enhancing good neighborliness and co-operation for our mutual benefit.

Cameroon

* Doumba, Bandolo Vie for Party Secretary Seat

34190002B Paris LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT
in French 1 Sep 89 p 6

[Article: "Three Men in Race for RDPC Office"]

[Text] The RDPC [Democratic Rally of the Cameroonian People], a force that stays very much in the background of the country's political life, is trying to become more active now with its campaigns for "morality in public life" and workshops on "strategies to deal with the economic crisis." For Cameroonian leaders these initiatives also serve the purpose of mobilizing militants prior to the elections at the local level, which are scheduled to take place no later than the end of November. But no date has been set yet for those political elections, nor has the electoral method (lists versus independent candidacies) been established. The only thing that seems to be at stake in these elections is the post of party political secretary. The incumbent, Francois Sengat Kuo, has let it be known he would like to stay on until his term expires in March 1990. But he is being gently nudged toward the exit by Joseph Charles Doumba and Henri Bandolo, two challengers who—though friends of long standing—are pressing him hard.

Doumba, currently the organizational secretary, also heads SOPECAM [CAMEROON NEWS AND PUBLISHING CORPORATION], the powerful company that publishes the CAMEROON TRIBUNE. He served as party ideologist, first under Ahmadou Ahidjo's regime and then under Paul Biya. His main handicap is that he is powerless to mobilize the resources of CRTV [Cameroonian Radio and Television Office] to help him in his campaign.

Henri Bandolo, the minister for information and cultural affairs, who is also an acting member of the Central Committee, is chairman of the board of directors of both SOPECAM (which Charles Doumba heads) and... CRTV. Despite the relatively short time he has been in politics, Bandolo already has an image problem—at least in the eyes of the "Ahidjoists"—resulting from the haste with which he moved "bag and baggage" into Paul Biya's camp at the most critical moment of the struggle between the former prime minister and the "father of the nation."

Comment: The task faced by the winner of the race for political secretary of the RDPC will be complicated by creation of a central committee "secretariat for morality in public life." This super-secretariat, which falls under the responsibility of Jean Fochive, director general of the intelligence services, and Gilbert Andze Tsoungui representing the criminal investigations bureau (LC No. 92), will keep an eye on the debt retirement agency, the department of public lands, the customs service inspection unit, and parts of the government inspectorate (taxes, audits). So far the RDPC—whose Central Committee has never met since its creation in March 1985—has not yet shaken off its lethargy. Though President

Paul Biya issues communiques as national president of the RDPC, he makes no use of the organization's potential—unlike his predecessor, whose whole political strategy was built around the former UNC (Cameroonian National Union).

Chad

Communique Cites 600 Dead in Libyan 'Aggression'

AB0211124089 Paris AFP in French 1147 GMT
2 Nov 89

[Text] Paris, 2 Nov (AFP)—The Chadian Government announced today that on Monday, 30 October, its troops killed at least 600 combatants of the "Libyan Islamic Legion" and "destroyed a large military base" of that army "on the Chad-Sudan border." In a communique published by its embassy in Paris, the Chadian Government denounces "Libya's direct involvement" in these "acts of aggression" perpetrated against Chad by the Islamic Legion. It sees in this aggression a "violation" of the outline agreement signed on 31 August in Algiers. In the agreement, Ndjamen and Tripoli notably pledged their commitment to work for a peaceful settlement of their territorial conflict.

Describing the figure as "partial," the Chadian Government affirms that its forces counted 600 corpses and 187 wounded men from the Islamic Legion and seized, among others, 17 SPG-9 guns, 60 RPG-7 rocket launchers, and several 4-wheel drive vehicles. Without specifying where the fighting took place, the government adds that "searches are still under way in a particularly hilly region." According to specialists, this region may be Jabal Marrah, a high massif in the Darfur Province, in eastern Sudan, where Chadian government and dissident forces clashed on 16 and 17 October.

Among those killed, the communique mentions two names: Adoum Haggar and Mahamat Deleo, two Chadian military officers who had fled to Sudan after the foiled coup of 1 April 1989, which was led by Major Hassan Djamouss and his predecessor Idriss Deby. Adoum Hagar was the commander of the Mao military zone in the western part of the country, and Mahamat Deleo was the commander of the Mongo military zone, in the central part of Chad.

The Chadian Government states that "the arrogant, false, and fundamentally hostile comments of the Libyan official media" following the fighting "only helped to confirm the direct implication of Libya in this aggressive adventure."

The Chadian Government denounces "the massive and forceful recruitment of thousands of Chadian and Sudanese workers in Libya," who are later "sent to the Darfur." The government also denounces "the omnipresence" in that province bordering Sudan and Chad, of "several Libyan intelligence officers charged with supervising aggression maneuvers against Chad."

Ndjamena also points out that in the forthcoming days, it will provide "material evidence" showing that Tripoli supplied "a large consignment of vehicles, weapons, and all kinds of equipment" to the rebels and to the Islamic Legion based in Sudan.

Outside the search for a peaceful settlement of their territorial conflict, the Algiers Accord requested, in particular, that Chad and Libya refrain from "providing any political, material, financial, and military assistance to forces hostile to any of the two countries."

BBC Reports

AB0211164089 London BBC World Service in English
1615 GMT 2 Nov 89

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] For the past few days, there have been sketchy reports of clashes along Chad's border with Sudan, and suggestions that Libyan forces might have been involved. That would have put a big dent into the peace treaty between Chad and Libya signed only a couple of months ago. Well, now the Chad Government has issued a communique about the fighting. From Ndjamena, Abakar a Sidik telexed this report:

[Begin studio announcer recording] The Chadian Government communique states that on Monday of this week [30 October], the Chadian Army took retaliatory action against the sizable military base of the Libyan Islamic Legion. The communique did not specify the exact location of the battle, beyond saying it took place on the Sudan-Chad border. The battle lasted 12 hours, and the Chadian Government claims that the Libyan force was completely destroyed. A few Libyans escaped toward the Libyan region of Kufra. The Chadian Government claims 614 Libyans were killed in the battle, and more than 180 were wounded. Significant military equipment was also captured, including transport vehicles, artillery, and missile launchers.

In the communique, the Chadian Government accuses Libya of perpetrating military aggression against Chad, in violation of the agreement signed in Algiers between Chad and Libya. Chad also deplores the fact that the Libyan action comes in spite of the efforts of African and Arab countries to improve relations between the two countries. According to the communique, this incursion was long planned by Libya, which had mounted a massive conscription campaign against Chadian and Sudanese laborers working in Libya, who were then sent into the Darfur Region of Sudan after a short period of training. Chad claims that the Libyan Government also established a special support organization, and actions against Chad are coordinated by a Colonel (Masud Abdul Hasim). The communique does not make any accusations against the Sudanese Government. [end recording]

FANT Victory Reported

AB0211212989 Ndjamena Domestic Service in French
1900 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] The Chadian National Armed Forces, FANT, unequalled and living up to their legendary tradition as great defenders of the national sovereignty, have once again shown their mettle by dealing a severe blow to the group of adventurers comprised mainly of fighters of the Islamic Legion. The latter have learned the FANT's worth at their own expense by playing with fire. They have bitten the dust. The outcome of the fighting, which lasted only 12 hours, has demonstrated the efficiency and striking power of the FANT. The outcome of this fighting has been delivered to us by the Ministry of External Relations. Mahamat Ahmat Adam reads you the contents of this reckoning:

[Begin Adam recording] On 30 October this year, the FANT were obliged to engage in an action of reprisal and self-defense against a major military base of the Libyan Islamic Legion at the Sudan-Chad border. During the operation, which lasted for more than 12 hours, the core of the subversion—both equipment mercenaries—and was completely destroyed. The few survivors were forced to flee into Kufra Region in Libya, where camps have been put at their disposal at the places known as (Aponu) and (Maarten Bishalla).

The provisional result of this highly favorable action is as follows: On the Islamic Legion's side: 600 killed, including Adoum Haggat and Mahamat Deleo; 187 wounded; 17 new SPG guns captured; 4 Toyota vehicles equipped with 14.5 mm guns captured; 7 Toyota personnel carriers captured; 3 heavy-duty vehicles including a water tanker captured; 60 RPG-7 rocket-launchers captured; a large quantity of individual weapons captured; a large quantity of ammunition of all calibers captured; 4 transmitter-receiver radios captured; a powerful electric generator captured; a large consignment of medicine captured; a large mill captured. In addition, eight Toyota vehicles of which one was equipped with 14.5-mm guns were destroyed. We must recall that this result is provisional, and that the search is continuing in a particularly rugged zone.

The reprisal action in self-defense became inevitable following the numerous provocations caused by the Islamic Legion since 16 October. These actions were given wide coverage by the Libyan media. The arrogant, false, and profoundly hostile commentaries of the official Libyan media only confirm further the direct implication of Libya in this aggressive adventure, which the following facts corroborate:

—The massive and compulsory enlistment of thousands of Chadian and Sudanese workers in Libya, who were deployed to the Darfur Region after a very short period of training; the supplying of a large consignment of vehicles, weapons, and equipment of all kinds, of which the material evidence will be presented to the public in the coming days;

- The establishment of a Special Libya Support and Coordination Bureau directed by Colonel (Masud Abdel Hasi) from (Hurum) in (El Jufrah) Region;
- The omnipresence in the Darfur Region of numerous agents of the Libyan Special Service charged with supervising the aggression enterprise against Chad.

The latest events also make it possible to note the following: First, by falling into the trap of believing communiques of imaginary and surrealistic victories by the group of mercenaries in their pay, the Libyan authorities thought Chad had been weakened enough to enable Libya to cast off the mask and to acknowledge publicly, through its official media, the military aggression that it has carried out against Chad from the Darfur Region of Sudan. Second, the violation thus inflicted on the Algeria general Agreement shows that despite the efforts of brotherly African and Arab countries and the constant desire for peace of the Chadian Government which led to the signing of that agreement, the Libyan leaders have not renounced their original sin of betraying their word and commitments. Third, by using Sudanese territory at a time when that country is recovering with difficulty from the after-effects of the Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi regime, Libya has shown how little it cares for the sovereignty of neighboring countries, and it is seeking to foment artificial tension between the brotherly and neighboring Chadian and Sudanese peoples.

Chad, jealous of its independences, its territorial integrity, and its freedom, and resolved to firmly counter the hostile activities of Libya, once more calls on the leaders of that country to renounce the policy of terrorism, destabilization, and war, and to commit themselves sincerely and seriously to a peaceful, just, and lasting settlement of the border conflict between the two countries.

Finally, the government of the Third Republic, salutes once again the civic and moral courage of the fearless warriors of the FANT, which day by day keeps writing new pages of the history of the Chadian nation in golden letters, so that Chad may remain free, and calls on the Chadian people to continue to observe permanent vigilance and unfailing mobilization to crush any aggression and to overcome every challenge. [end recording]

Gabon

* Rabi-Kounga Discovery Delays Post-Oil Era

34190002A Libreville L'UNION in French
31 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by Dady Bouchard: "Rabi-Boom, Rabi-Miracle"]

[Excerpts] The discovery of the fields of "black gold" at Rabi and Kounga postpones the post-oil era.

Many writers have mentioned the socio-economic importance of Rabi and Kounga, two oil fields located not far from Ngowe Lagoon, which are tangible images

of our country's development. The oil men have once more proved themselves fully worthy of their reputation for perseverance and courage. And the result: we are now assured of at least 25 years of oil production, even as work continues to locate other concentrations of oil buried in the great forest. [passage omitted]

History will remember the date and time—16 January 1989, 0715 hours—when Rabi started producing. But this great event was preceded by feats of valor, as well as anxieties and apprehensions on the part of Shell, the principal operator, which owns a 42.5-percent stake in the venture (Elf and SNEA [expansion unknown] own another 42.5 percent, while the Gabonese Government owns the remaining 15 percent). During the "pre-Rabi" era Shell feared the worst. Production was very low, and exploration failed to turn up any encouraging signs. The company was perilously close to pulling out, with all the consequences one can imagine.

Environment....

And then came the miracle, in the form of a colossal discovery: one billion barrels, "the biggest oil discovery in the history of our country." [passage omitted]

So here we are. Rabi and Kounga are continuing to pump money out of the ground for the benefit of the Gabonese economy. The field's current production is 65,000 barrels per day; next month it will go to 80,000 barrels per day, and by April 1990 we will be producing 120,000 barrels.

So Gabon's future as an oil-producing country is assured. Now we can rest easy: the post-oil era has been postponed.

* Government Policy on Oil Exploration, Taxes

90EF0008C Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Aug 89 pp 115-118

[Article: "Oil Is a Great Adventure"]

[Text] Last 17 January, when work began on the Rabi-Kounga deposit, Gabon's position in the oil world was totally revitalized. Even in recent years, some oil experts and analysts tended, wrongly, to believe that Gabon was no longer an oil-producing country. And yet, as an associate member of OPEC in 1973 and a full member in 1975 and in spite of its relatively low level of production, Gabon has never failed to occupy a real position within the oil world. As secretary general, conference chair, and chair of the board of governors, Gabonese have not lacked places of honor (and action) within the organization.

Beyond the deposit itself and its size, Rabi-Kounga signals an oil renaissance. Samuel Dossou Aworet, the director general of hydrocarbons and an adviser to the president of Gabon, told us why: "Thus far, land research in Gabon has been inadequate. And for obvious reasons. Ninety percent of Gabon is covered by forests. It's very rugged, swampy terrain. Despite the discovery

of Gamba, which was a major discovery, no one had really guaranteed there could be major, large-scale, sustained work on land. So Rabi-Kounga is a pleasant surprise that sets off a new frenzy among oil men. Not just the established companies, ELF and Shell, which have been operating in Gabon for a long time, and, in this case, in Rabi-Kounga. We see a huge influx of new partners: Americans, English, Japanese, Chinese, etc. Everyone knows that, when it comes to oil, the probability of discovery is all the greater if your investment in exploration is a major one. This is even truer in Gabon, where the rate of discovery is much higher than the world average. So for us, Rabi-Kounga is an important asset. It is an asset in real as well as psychological terms."

To be sure, Rabi-Kounga is inconveniently located in the heart of the equatorial forest. To get the oil out, two pipelines had to be constructed, one towards the north, for ELF, the other towards the south, for Shell. For this, heavy investments estimated at more than \$700 million were needed.

But, Samuel Dossou Aworet told us, "the figures, by themselves, are not meaningful. What must be realized is the relationship between investment and the yield this leads to. If access costs truly are high when calculated according to the number of barrels produced, these costs are below those of many other fields."

There is one important factor: The Rabi-Kounga discovery has had a domino effect. Now there is much more prospecting in the onshore area. And the discovery of more marginal deposits could, in the future, result in efficient production, when one remembers that infrastructures have been put in place for Rabi-Kounga. Now this increased production (in 1988 Gabon produced 7,919,713 metric tons as compared to 7,725,068 metric tons in 1987—in 1990 Rabi by itself should produce 6 million metric tons) needs to be marketed. Gabon is an OPEC member. As such, it must abide by production quotas. This means freely agreeing to limit its production. Currently this solution is not an attractive one.

The authorities' official position is identical to OPEC's operating rule. "We are a full-fledged member of OPEC," Samuel Dossou Aworet told us. "It is obvious that if OPEC fights to set a ceiling on its production to stabilize the market, Gabon is affected and feels ready to make the required sacrifice."

Beyond the rhetoric, reality intrudes. At the moment, Gabonese production accounts for less than one percent of OPEC's production. It, therefore, has only a slight influence on price level. It is obvious, given the way things stand, that OPEC will look the other way if Gabon raises its current quota of 175,000 barrels a day to 300 or 400,000 [as published] barrels a day. For this there are also some strictly domestic internal reasons. As an official of the General Directorate of Hydrocarbons (DGH) pointed out to us: "In the subregion, Gabon was the first country to have had an established oil calling. We belong to an integrated area, the Customs and

Economic Union of Central Africa, which includes two other producers, Cameroon and the Congo, which do not belong to OPEC and which, for that reason, are not tied to quotas. The people of Gabon would not understand it if our country, with its oil potential and long standing as a producer, were to be limited to a production level lower than that of neighboring countries. If we were on an austerity program, political problems would certainly arise."

So here Gabon is, once again facing a rush towards black gold. And this means it has certain obligations. Some years ago, oil companies complained about a crushing tax system based on the official prices for crude while the sale of Gabonese products was being heavily discounted in relation to the official exchange rate. There were negotiations in 1987. They led to a more satisfactory situation.

Samuel Dossou Aworet provided further insight into this sequence of events. "The government's current policy seems to us to be a wiser one. Before, under set-up conventions, the oil company paid a royalty on the order of 20 percent and taxes on profits, generally at 73 percent. And this was the case no matter what kind of discovery there was, whether you had a big or a small deposit. This policy was all right when prices reached \$35 per barrel. Now that prices have declined, this is no longer true. So as a result we've instituted a new policy based on exploration contracts specifying shared production. These contracts are tied to each bloc. Each permit is a contract by itself and can be drawn up in accordance with the scale of the discovery. It's a more flexible formula, one which takes the market trend into account."

Furthermore, the creation of the DGH, in 1977, made possible a change in the way permits were granted. It also made possible a greater diversification of partners. Henceforth, permits will be granted after a call for bids has been issued. A fourth call was recently issued. The call will be open up until 30 November and covers about 10 on- and off-shore permits.

The preeminence of the DGH within oil circles is so strong that, effective December 1988, PETROGAB, the Gabonese National Oil Company, was dissolved. And life in the hydrocarbons sector did not suffer all that much as a result. Some official voices say that, all things considered, "we see no reason, given current events, to burden ourselves with a national company that didn't know how to start small and progressively grow larger." This disappearance is not the less lamented since Gabon currently earns more money through taxes than through sales of crude on the international market.

In the area of industry, now that the state no longer possesses all the assets it once had, the Gabonese authorities are now preaching a more pragmatic policy. "What matters to us," Samuel Dossou Aworet explained, "is for

the oil companies operating in our country to bring us their best technical know-how and the largest sums for investment."

"If, in fact, a sector proves to be very interesting, we ask the oil company to associate with a domestic firm, whether it is completely or partly owned by the state or by private Gabonese citizens who want to invest. In this joint venture, the oil company acts as a technical and financial partner and gradually it implements a 'Gabonization' training program, which will train Gabonese nationals in a particular high tech area." Training is a complex problem, even more so in a country with a population as small as Gabon's. Samuel Dossou Aworet explained: "Oil is a field requiring a high level of skills. In Gabon we have professionals who got their training abroad. But when they come back, they're very quickly snapped up by a system in which they can immediately assume key posts. They generally don't have the time to wait for the maturity that an apprenticeship in the oil industry requires."

"Be this as it may, for some time we've been proud of our progress. We now have excellent geologists and geophysicists. The chairman of the board of directors of Shell-Gabon is a Gabonese. For a long time the official in charge of the Gamba deposit has been a Gabonese as well. Things have really changed. The companies themselves bring us 'Gabonization' plans even though you do have to realize that our highly specialized labor pool is really a limited one."

So here Gabon is, about to return to production figures in excess of 10 million metric tons per annum. These are levels unheard of since 1974! Once again people may fear the terrible consequences of the oil phenomenon. If it occupies too big a place in the Gabonese economy, is there not the risk that oil will trigger new illusions and disappointments?

"We've learned our lesson," Samuel Dossou Aworet assured us, "and structures were put in place. Before, a project would be quickly accepted, without any prior in-depth study, because the promoters knew they would find the financing easily. Now, if a project is to be begun, a certain number of ministerial departments have to be consulted. Experts meet to look at every aspect of the problem. And the final green light is only given if a great many steps, very often technical ones, have been taken."

"Above all else, the problem is the judicious handling of national resources. As for me, I have my own cause. I want as much oil as possible. I would prefer to have Saudi Arabia's oil resources and only those resources rather than no oil and a lot of other production whose yield, in terms of national revenues, would be marginal."

"What's needed is for the state, using revenues generated by oil, to encourage other sectors, notably agriculture. The lessons of the past and the new structures that have been put in place (notably with the outside help of the IMF) lead me to think that even if there is an oil boom, we won't make the same mistakes again."

One essential element remains, the international cooperation that is at the heart of Gabon's policy in the hydrocarbons area. Recently the role played by Gabon within OPEC was emphasized (Marc Nan Nguema, who was the assistant director general of ELF-Gabon, was the OPEC secretary general in 1981). Gabon also belongs to APPA, the African Petroleum Producers Association.

"We are an OPEC member," Samuel Dossou Aworet told us, "but our problems are very different from Saudi Arabia's. On the other hand, we have the same problems as Congo, Cameroon, Angola, and Nigeria. We are part of the same subregion. We frequently have the same partners. In numbers there is strength. If we tackle our problems together, our chances of solving them are better. That is why we wanted to found APPA, which tends to be a special arena for us to exchange our experiences and develop genuine south-south cooperation."

Gabon cannot stop at just OPEC and APPA. NOPEC, or the non-OPEC oil-producing countries, is a part of the overall oil strategy developed by Gabon. "This is the real problem," Samuel Dossou Aworet emphasized. "Today the international oil scene is no longer occupied just by OPEC member countries. NOPEC as well as the consuming countries have to be taken into account as well."

"You can no longer look at the problem in terms of producers on the one hand and consumers on the other. Both must know that oil is still a major force in the world economy and that it is in no one's interest to want to have very high prices, which would cause the international community to suffer, or very low prices, which would make the oil industry suffer. Producers and consumers have to agree and to do that, they must systematically expand their dialogue."

* Rabi-Kounga Oil No Help to Local Businesses

90EF0008D Libreville L'UNION in French
14 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "Have Port Gentil Businesses Benefited From Rabi-Kounga? By and Large, Only During the Research and Drilling Period"]

[Excerpt] Several months after the official start up of the Rabi-Kounga oil field by the president of the republic El Hadj Omar Bongo, on Monday, 6 March 1989, we surveyed businesses in Port Gentil, particularly those in the paraspétrol sector most likely to take part in every step of the development of the fields in this deposit, the richest discovered thus far. Opinion is divided, but the heads of the businesses contacted all say that the Rabi-Kounga deposit, which was discovered in 1985 and today produces 65,000 barrels a day or somewhat more than one-half of its optimal production (about 120,000 barrels a day in 1990), has not contributed to the expected reinvigoration of oil-related economic activities in Port Gentil.

The crisis persists and businesses are closing or laying off employees. The explanation for the reasons given, say those involved, is the fact that most of the Rabi-Kounga contracts were signed abroad. This is so first, because the financing was found abroad and second, because lenders automatically required the use of foreign companies. This, in fact, is the way the game is played.

In addition to the companies, the retail trade has not benefited from this major on-shore discovery either, since the international businesses, be they American or European, imported everything tax free (even toilet paper, it is said).

On the other hand, some local businesses admitted that they only profited from Rabi-Kounga during the research and drilling as well as the production start-up phases. So at the end of 1987 and 1988, research grew with the return and the arrival of the oil companies, and commercial activity in Port Gentil kept up in relation to Libreville at this time of economic crisis. For example, in the case of mining companies, various types of materiel were supplied, particularly prospecting equipment. As far as maritime activity was concerned, the import of pipe sections to set up pipelines and of other merchandise accounted for most port activity and thus for most of the activity of businesses involved in warehousing, loading and unloading of freight, consignments, etc.

But overall, the start-up phase for production at Rabi-Kounga is an idle period for these businesses, whose sales figures have declined. These businesses are nervous because they see no other outlets after all aspects of production of the Rabi-Kounga deposit have started. What generated business for local Port Gentil companies, they say, was the drilling, research, and initial well production period. [passage omitted]

* PRC Aid To Repair Hospital, Supply Medicine

90EF0008E Libreville L'UNION in French
31 Jul 89 p 7

[Article by Claude Moussavou: "Gabon-China: Friendship Hospital on the Agenda; Trying To Solve the Landslide Problem Affecting the Franceville Hospital Complex as Quickly as Possible"]

[Text] Trying to solve the landslide problem affecting the Sino-Gabonese cooperation hospital in Franceville and having his first meeting with the Gabonese minister of public health and population, Doctor Jean-Pierre Okias, were what prompted the visit by the new Chinese ambassador H. E. An Feng Shi to the Ministry of Public Health. The Chinese diplomat proposed that his country finance these projects and expressed the wish that this work could be completed before the onset of the first rains, since the current cave-ins imperil the hospital building.

Furthermore, Doctor Okias' visitor suggested cooperation in the fields of traditional medicine and pharmacopoeia. This, he said, is a field that is of interest in

Chinese medical circles, judging from the extent to which acupuncture is practiced in the land of the Middle Empire.

The Chinese diplomat made another observation concerning the Sino-Gabonese cooperation hospitals, namely the age of the fittings and materiel in downtown Libreville. He, therefore, expressed the wish that this situation be looked into by the minister of public health, so as to facilitate the work of the aid workers and agents working there.

For his part, Doctor Okias gave the Chinese diplomat every assurance that his proposals would be quickly studied by the Gabonese public officials in order to maintain, if not increase, this most flourishing cooperation. The Minister of Public Health also promised that construction of housing for the Chinese aid workers would soon be completed.

In addition, the head of the public health department asked his visitor to increase the number of scholarships granted to Gabonese in China to study medicine.

Zaire

* Dutch-Aided Forestry Project Described

90EF0010b Kinshasa ELIMA in French
22 Aug 89 p 15

[Text] "The beautiful village you see is one of the achievements of the project, which, in my opinion, is a model for cooperative projects. For if all these performances were able to be achieved, and in record time, it is because of the perfect understanding between the administration, which always strove to eliminate the principal deterrents that might interfere with normal progress of the project, and the successful bidder, the Dutch company Holland Agro-Industry, which agreed to work faster, taking full advantage of the experience of the Kinzono Forestry Center. But it is also because of the perfect understanding between the monitoring organization, Zaire Trading and Engineering, whose sustained attention to all phases of the project did not waver, and the financing organization, which agreed not only to release on time successive loan issues for each phase, but also the additional 25 percent needed to purchase new materiel. Without conceit or unseemly smugness, you will agree with me that examples of projects whose goals are so remarkably achieved are somewhat rare."

The above comments were made by the state commissioner of Land, Environmental, and Nature Conservation Affairs (DAFECN), citizen Pendje Demodeto Yako, at the official inauguration of Mampu village on 29 July, 1989. HVA and its partner Auxeltra-Beton did, in fact, complete the magnificent village in less time than expected.

A Lasting Solution to the Energy-Wood Crisis

The 8,000-hectare forestation project on the Bateke Plateau is part of an attempt to find a lasting solution to the energy-wood crisis in Kinshasa city. Recent studies show that our country, Zaire, needs 40 million cubic meters of firewood a year. Despite 129 million hectares of forest, Zaire is already feeling worrisome pressure from the encroachment of agriculture, lumber and energy-wood production, brush fires, and even, to some extent, mining operations, etc. The serious and rapid retreat of forests around large population centers, particularly around Kinshasa, led the Executive Council to initiate reforestation work on the Bateke Plateau. The main goal is to supply Kinshasa city with firewood and charcoal. Thanks to financing from the Executive Council, the National Reforestation Service (SNR) has already planted 650 hectares of forest since 1977, during 8 years at the Kinzono Forestry Center (CFK) on the Bateke Plateau. The 650 hectares of the CFK and the 8,000 hectares of the HVA make up the first allotment of a total of 100,000 hectares that the Executive Council plans to plant on the Bateke Plateau.

Kinshasa, with its 4 million inhabitants, still has a very low rate of electrical-energy use. To improve the situation, electricity must be introduced as widely and quickly as possible. This is extremely difficult because of the enormous cost involved. According to predictions furnished by the 8,000-hectare project, one hectare will be able to produce 2 metric tons of charcoal. In fact, just a drop in the bucket of the country's immense energy needs. Even when the Executive Council's 100,000 hectares are all planted, they will only produce 200,000 metric tons of charcoal, or only 30 to 40 percent of the capital's demand for charcoal. Further efforts will be needed, to achieve more rational use of existing forests and to increase the number of initiatives for reforestation everywhere they are feasible.

HVA Company: Performances in Record Time

HVA Company realized very early on that it could plant, at top speed, about 2,000 hectares a year instead of the 1,222 projected in the proposal. So the project's officials proposed either to plant the 6,000 hectares initially planned in 3 years instead of 4, or to plant 2,000 additional hectares. Their request was granted. Between

10 December, 1987, when the first-tree planting ceremony was held and 29 July, 1989, when Mampu village was officially inaugurated, HVA planted 2,150 hectares, or nearly 3,000,000 plants. During the 89-90 campaign, HVA Company plans to produce 3,600,000 seedlings and plant 2,400 hectares. Moreover, that campaign will begin with the first rainfall, around October.

In fact, the Kinzono Forestry Center (CFK) had developed techniques for working on a large scale, and HVA succeeded in applying them. In that respect, they complemented each other perfectly.

Eighty percent of the seeds used come from the Kinzono Forestry Center, but also from Australia and India. Since the soil of the Bateke Plateau is poor, HVA has begun to use fertilizers in the [word illegible in original] bag. This makes it possible for the plants to grow very quickly. It is hoped that better quality and more resistant trees will be produced, but also that production of wood per hectare will be greater than projected at the start of the project.

To handle the volume of work described above, HVA has 8 farm tractors, 7 rotavators and 8 trailers, 2 160-KVA generators, and a supply of running water. All this equipment requires 19,000 liters of diesel oil monthly. The company has its own supply of 50,000 liters. Its staff is permanently assigned to tasks in which they specialize. There are tractors working 200 hours a month; some of them are up to 3,500 or 4,000 hours. The project has thus made it possible to verify the equipment aspect of the problem of large-scale reforestation projects. A dual system of fire lanes and antifire measures protects the vast concession already planted.

Mampu Village Inaugurated 29 July 1989

HVA and its partner Auxeltra-Beton built the magnificent village of Mampu in less time than expected. The village, inaugurated last 29 July, has all the necessary infrastructure: a dispensary, a 6-room school, a canteen-store, a system to supply drinking water with a well and a water tower, an electrical power plant with two 140-KVA generators, a repair shop/warehouse/work shop, and an administrative building. In addition, it has 3 houses for administrative managers, 7 executive houses, a 4-bedroom guesthouse, 30 houses for foremen, and housing for 128 workers. The new village of Mampu shelters about 1,000 people, including 269 salaried workers. It is accessed by a 20-kilometer road linking it to the Kinshasa-Kikwit road.

Djibouti

President, Somali Foreign Minister Hold Talks

EA0211100089 Djibouti Domestic Service in Somali
1700 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] The president of the Republic of Djibouti Al-Haj Hassan Gouled Aptidon held talks today with the Somali Democratic Republic [SDR] foreign minister, Abdurahman Jama Barre, who brought him a message from the president of the SDR Mohamed Siad Barre. Present at the ceremony were the Djibouti Prime Minister Barkat Gourad Hamadou and the minister for foreign affairs and cooperation Moumin Bahdon Farah. Earlier, the SDR foreign minister held talks with the Djibouti minister for foreign affairs and cooperation. The SDR foreign minister, who leaves for the U.S. tonight, was interviewed by Radio Djibouti on his visit:

[Begin recording] [Abdurahman Jama Barre] My visit was aimed at consolidating bilateral cooperation and the relations between our brotherly states in various fields and at consolidating security and sovereignty.

[Unidentified reporter] Mr Minister, your government has declared its willingness to have talks with the opposition. Can you elaborate further on this point?

[Jama Barre] Well, the government of the SDR has decided to invite all those who hold different views from ours to come and have talks with the government. All interested parties are invited.

[Reporter] Mr Minister, your government has also made known its readiness to have a multiparty system in the country. How far have you progressed toward the realization of that goal?

[Jama Barre] When it comes to a multiparty system, Somalia long before used to have a multiparty system. As you may be aware, before the revolution, there used to be 88 political parties in the country and that the country attained its independence through armed struggle against colonialists led by the Somali Youth League. This shows the multiparty system is not something foreign in Somalia. Now the government has decided to invite all those who wish to participate in the government to form their own political parties. We are now involved in amending the constitution in order to make provision for the formation of those parties and in establishing ways in which they can compete in elections. We are engaged in that process now. [end recording]

Ethiopia

Minister Rules Out Reconciliation Government

AB0211191489 Paris AFP in English 1818 GMT
2 Nov 89

[Text] Addis Ababa, Nov 2 (AFP)—Ethiopian Foreign Minister Berhanu Bayeh on Thursday ruled out the

possibility of setting up a national reconciliation government with opposition movements, dismissing the thought as "preposterous."

The question was put to him by Belgian Ambassador Michel Carlier following a briefing here by Mr. Berhanu for diplomats and heads of international organizations.

The foreign minister had called the meeting to inform the international community about latest developments in Ethiopia, where rebel movements in the north claim to have made big gains against government forces in recent months.

Looking calm and unruffled, Mr Berhanu replied that there was a constitutionally-elected government in place in Addis Ababa and that the question should not therefore arise.

He said Ethiopia had a Constitution approved in a referendum by the people and a popularly-elected parliament that had put the government in place.

"The people have decided to have this government," he said. "I do not foresee any possibility for a national reconciliation government."

The foreign minister later told reporters that he was "amazed" by the question which he described as "preposterous."

During the briefing, Mr. Berhanu informed the diplomats about the decisions passed Monday and Tuesday [30 October and 1 November] by the ruling Workers' Party Central Committee and the national Shengo, or parliament, on rebel activities in northern Ethiopia.

He accused rebels of the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) of "senseless violence" that, he said, had resulted in recent weeks "in enormous destruction and considerable loss of life" in the provinces of Welo and Gonder.

"Today, Ethiopia is left with no choice other than mobilizing its human and material resources to control the dangerous developments from spreading to other areas and to subdue the misguided perpetrators of bloodshed," he told the diplomats.

Parliament on Tuesday opted for the carrot and stick approach, ratifying mobilization for war in the country, but also calling for negotiations with the rebels.

It also approved a revision of the current budget of 6.5 billion birr (about 3.2 billion dollars) to permit the diversion of resources from development to defence.

Swedish Ambassador Birgitta Karlstrom-Dorph asked Mr. Berhanu the implication for development of the planned increase in defence spending.

Admitting that some projects would have to be scrapped, the minister said nothing was more important than the country's unity and territorial integrity.

Another diplomat asked the foreign minister whether the government had sent a delegation to Rome to attend preliminary peace talks on Saturday [4 November] with the TPLF, but the minister would not confirm or deny that Addis Ababa had or was sending a delegation, only saying that the information would be made public if and when necessary.

Berhanu on Peace Talks

EA0311085989 Addis Ababa in Amharic to Neighboring Countries 1600 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Comrade Berhanu Bayeh, member of the Politburo of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee and Foreign Minister, has stated that although the bandit group that calls itself the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] gives the misleading impression, in its constant and massive propaganda, of seeking peace with the government, its current campaign of destruction clearly shows that it is opposed to peace.

In a briefing he gave today to foreign ambassadors and representatives of international organizations on matters relating to the current situation in the northern region of our country, Comrade Bayeh said that although the TPLF group makes a lot of noise, stark reality shows that it does not want to resolve problems at the peace table.

He went on to say that the TPLF group recently invaded the northern parts of Welo and Gonder, wreaking massive destruction. In doing so, they created a dangerous situation in the country. Explaining the basic aims of the TPLF group, Comrade Berhanu said that the group was created to dismember Eritrea from her motherland, Ethiopia. He added that it was a branch of the Eritrean secessionist movement. It is also bent on bringing grave danger to this ancient country and its people, he said.

At a time when the government is making tremendous efforts to resolve the problem in the northern region of the country peacefully, the destructive campaign embarked upon by this bandit group clearly shows their aim. Comrade Berhanu said the government, in its firm desire to resolve problems peacefully, had made contacts to start talks with the group in Italy. Comrade Berhanu also said, recognizing the dangerous and alarming nature of the problem, the WPE Central Committee and the National Shengo of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia recently held emergency meetings and discussed issues relating to the defense of the country's unity and independence. Resolutions were passed.

Further Government Air Raids Reported

EA0311085089 (Clandestine) Voice of the Tigray Revolution in Amharic 1500 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] The fascist Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE], which has been reduced to further chaos and confusion by the devastating offensives of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the strong opposition of the masses, has continued its deathbed policy of causing havoc and destruction. Accordingly, the fascist

WPE sent 2 warplanes to raid [word indistinct] in (Afkel) District of Shire Province and destroy property. In the raid, carried out on 27 October, a couple were seriously injured and their house and property destroyed.

In a similar incident on 18 October 1989, the WPE's destructive war planes raided the town of (Siha) and its airstrip. Four fuel depots were destroyed in the raid. There were no other casualties.

*** Interview With EPLF Leader Isaias Afewerki**

*34000709b London ADULIS in English
Jul-Aug 89 pp 6-12*

[Text] The last two months have seen encouraging developments in the peace process. Initially, on June 6, 1989, Addis Ababa announced its acceptance—albeit as a “new” proposal and couched in contradictory language—of the ground rules for starting negotiations. The EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front], then clarified its position first through a press statement issued on June 8, and later in a Press Conference held by the Secretary General in London on June 29. The apparent readiness of both sides to start peace talks has been widely welcomed, generating substantial international interest.

To mark this turning point, Adulis held an in-depth interview with the EPLF Secretary General, Isaias Afewerki, on the broader details and prospects of the peace talks. Excerpts:

[ADULIS] Mr Isaias, the Addis Ababa regime has recently announced its readiness to start open talks without preconditions and in the presence of a third party. In the past, these basic requirements that were first put forward by the EPLF in 1985 were anathema to the regime. Does the new position reflect a change of heart and new commitment to peace by Addis Ababa?

[Afewerki] The real motivation or sincerity of the regime are not issues that preoccupy us at the moment. The essential task is to see that peace talks start and succeed. In this sense, we must gauge the various statements made by the Shengo and Ethiopian officials in terms of their impact on the success of the peace talks. The overriding aim should be to terminate the war and bring about a lasting end to the conflict. It would indeed be a great mistake were the opportunity misused for cheap publicity stunts or propaganda.

That said, one does not need a lot of imagination to determine the motivations of the regime. Our past experience and the timing of the announcement itself are indicative of its real intentions and probable action in the time to come.

For the last 15 years since it seized power, the regime has relied on the military option to crush the legitimate aspirations of the Eritrean people by force. The regime has persisted in this attitude despite repeated calls by the EPLF and the Eritrean people for a peaceful solution.

Without going into lengthy details, the numerous efforts undertaken in the past to promote peace failed because they were not reciprocated.

Indeed, if peace is being sought, as this regime has done in the past, only at moments of military weakness and shelved aside when the military fortunes are favorable, then there is no real commitment and there will never be a breakthrough, and this has been the approach of the regime to the question of peace. In spite of its numerous military failures in the last 10 years, peace has never been on its agenda. The regime preferred to escalate the war underestimating domestic and international opposition and rebuffing our repeated calls for peace.

Things came to a head when the growing opposition to the war and the isolated mutinies within the army culminated in a major coup-attempt in May 89. Immediately after this episode, the regime hastily convened the Shengo (National Assembly) and announced its acceptance of the requirements to start peace talks.

Now, these ground rules had been roundly rejected by the regime until that moment. There were in fact several initiatives by concerned parties in 1988. All came to no avail because the Dergue's regime persisted in its rejection of these ground rules. And we have to realize that these requirements are not preconditions; they are factors of a procedural nature which facilitate genuine peace talks.

If the regime has now accepted these requirements, the EPLF and the Eritrean people do not interpret it as an admission of defeat or a sign of its good will. What is of paramount importance is the commencement and success of the peace talks.

For our part, we will work for peace even if we believe that this regime is not seriously committed to peace. Our efforts in the past too were not hinged on the positive response or good will of the regime. Our approach remains to confront by force the regime's logic of force while simultaneously working to encourage and secure the role of the international community—which has a decisive role—in bringing about peace.

The international climate is today conducive to peace; the Dergue has been forced by circumstances to sing the tune of peace. Against this background, what is important to the EPLF and the Eritrean people is to ensure that the conducive international climate and the opportunities for peace produce concrete results; irrespective and independent of the intentions and motivations of the Dergue.

[ADULIS] As you pointed out in the press conference, there have been repeated statements by Dergue officials, from Colonel Mengistu downwards, that literally nullify the Shengo's declaration. (Colonel Mengistu insisted that "Ethiopia's unity is not negotiable", during a press conference on June 7th, and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Berhanu Baye recently stated that observers may only participate at some later stage of the talks). Can this forestall or jeopardize the peace talks?

[Afewerki] If we pin our hopes on the good will of the regime, we will be disappointed. Whether the regime is genuine or not in the search for peace is almost irrelevant. For a simple reason: if it does not accept peace talks, its survival will be at stake. The Dergue will be swept away by opposition—which is bound to increase—from the public and its own institutions. These are however broader issues which cannot be dealt with here.

In the peace talks, what is crucial is the role of the international community. The ambiguous pronouncements of the regime can be explained by its overall psychological state. The regime has now been forced to swallow things that it loathes because of domestic and international pressure. Consequently it is dithering between two poles: hesitating and wavering in its stance. Had circumstances allowed, it would not have given us a minute's breathing space; peace would be the last word in its vocabulary. This is one side of its predicament. The other side is its awareness that under the given circumstances, its survival, its continuity, is under threat. If peace talks do not start, public opposition to its war policy will grow, an army rebellion may occur, it will be isolated internationally; the combination of which may precipitate its downfall. So, at least in appearance, it has to accept and present itself as peace-seeking.

However, the regime is hesitating from taking concrete steps towards peace. Because it knows at heart that it would be the loser in genuine peace talks. The Eritrean people have been visited an injustice. They have not misappropriated, confiscated or robbed properties and rights that are not theirs by law and nature. Real peace can only be to their benefit. The ambivalence and wavering we see on the part of Ethiopian officials indeed derives from this reality. In this sense, we should not worry or be surprised by their predictable reactions.

[ADULIS] One of the requirements essential for the start of the negotiations is the presence of observers. Why is this necessary? What role do you envisage for observer third parties? What are the modalities of participation?

[Afewerki] The EPLF has a clear reason why it has been pushing for the presence of observers in the negotiations. In the first place, we do not consider peace talks as an instrument of maneuver or as temporary measure for buying time. In our view, negotiations should be serious engagements to terminate the conflict and secure a lasting peace. Within this framework, the presence of observers is essential both on grounds of principle and from our past negative experience.

In previous negotiations with Addis Ababa, one of the reasons that contributed to the failure of the peace talks was the partiality of the mediators. Our experience also shows that negotiations that take place between the two adversaries without the presence of a third party—that can serve at least as a witness—invariably wind up in deadlock.

What would be the actual role of observers? In our view, the third party will not be a passive observer. It will have a moral, ethical pressure. If the two adversaries are left

alone, one side may dwell on tenuous arguments; it may be difficult to make progress from entrenched positions. The presence of a third party creates, in itself, a restraining and positive climate. Spurious arguments and ludicrous claims would not be forwarded so much as it may happen in strictly bilateral talks. The side that obstructs peace would be exposed to the international public and posterity. Thus in this respect, the mere presence of a third party will enhance the peace process. And in the event that the peace talks end in failure, an impartial third party will be duty-bound to make the truth known to the external world. This will in turn generate moral and psychological pressure on the guilty party.

Of course, peace will ultimately obtain only through the consent of the two adversaries. However, in all conflicts between an aggressor and its victim, we do not know of peace reached without intermediaries. The multiple conventions, regional and international organizations that exist in our world have the task of facilitating and enforcing binding regulations that govern relations between states and peoples. Even at the individual level, two litigants normally reach reconciliation through the intermediary of a court or third body. This is so obvious that it should not have needed so much wrangling.

While these have been the major considerations from our side, it may be important to cite the reasons why the regime has been rejecting independent observers. The underlying logic was the argument that such a posture would reinforce the image of the Eritrean case as "an internal affair of Ethiopia". The Ethiopian regimes—both the previous and present one—have been sufficiently apprehensive of the legitimacy of the Eritrean question that they have gone to extreme lengths to block the issue in all international fora. In their dealings with states, they have frequently resorted to blackmail castigating those who support our cause as "meddling in (their) internal affairs". Their diplomacy has been rooted in soliciting, by all means, support for their annexation of Eritrea as a defacto reality. And according to this approach, they have to oppose the involvement of a third party in the resolution of the conflict to bolster the pillars of their diplomacy.

In addition, the reason why they prefer to conduct talks without the scrutiny of a third party is their awareness that their arguments do not have historical or legal substance. They realize that they would lose in negotiations based on documented history and according to accepted international norms. On the other hand, secret bilateral talks suit their purpose, allow them to obstruct real progress through sinister maneuvers, and ultimately declare—as they have been doing—that peace talks failed because of the other party as there would be no independent witness to set the record straight.

Of course what the Ethiopian regime should realize is that the international or internal nature of the Eritrean case cannot be subject to arbitrary labelling. Lies, distortion of historical facts, or blackmail cannot erase its solid juridical merits. It is a reality of history, as such not

subject to contention or argumentation. It cannot be linked with the peace process. It is a separate matter which cannot be changed by our whims or wishes.

Incidentally, the extreme obsession of the regime to make the world believe that this is "an internal affair" betrays its own disbelief in what it is preaching. Indeed such an elaborate diplomatic campaign would have been unnecessary had it been a clear cut internal affair of Ethiopia.

For our part, we have no time to squander in such unproductive arguments. The issue is closed. The presence of a third party is being solicited not to score points in sterile arguments but in order to contribute to the lasting peace we earnestly seek.

[ADULIS] The EPLF had issued a referendum proposal in 1980 to resolve the conflict peacefully. Would the EPLF be pushing to make the proposal accepted as a working paper—if and when the peace talks start? If yes, does this appear as a precondition in the sense that it already outlines the framework of solution?

[Afewerki] It would be premature to discuss here the proposals the EPLF intends to put on the negotiating table. What we are saying now is that both sides should accept the three requirements: i.e. to conduct negotiations that are without preconditions, open, and in the presence of observers as a third party. What proposals or working papers will we present in the negotiations—in the preliminary phase or substantive phase (as it will have several phases)—is something that will be made clear when the time comes.

In relations to the views of the EPLF on referendum, however, these points must be clarified. Referendum is not a specific proposal of the EPLF; it is simply an instrument that allows a people to exercise their right. In resolving the conflict, the issue that precedes other considerations must be the right of the Eritrean people, their political right, their right to self-determination. This is the central issue, the *raison d'être* of the struggle. This right cannot be denied; referendum is a democratic mechanism that guarantees the exercise of this right. It is not, in this sense, a new formula devised by the EPLF. It has universal application on a world scale as a means of asserting the wishes of nations, peoples and fundamental individual rights.

Even the rights of an individual in the society/state in which he resides are guaranteed by his inviolable right to express his views, through the ballot box, on matters that concern him—political, economic, social etc. The sense of full belonging and citizenship would be meaningless otherwise. Naturally, the Eritrean people have the right to express their views on matters that affect their destiny. Referendum has no other significance and is much more a recognition of this right rather than a mere proposal of the EPLF.

The war, the conflict that has dragged for three decades, is rooted on the denial of the basic rights of the Eritrean

people. Referendum is, in a way, a legal attempt to redress this injustice. The three options, (independence, federal association with Ethiopia, regional autonomy), reflect the range of possible and historical (including the government option) outcomes when this right is exercised. Can other options be added? Certainly, if it is felt that there are other viable solutions that can be put forward to the people. The bottom line is for all possible options to be decided by the people themselves in a free vote. Other options may also be added during the negotiations or when agreement is reached to hold the referendum.

But referendum as a concept cannot be subject to negotiations. It cannot be seen as a simple proposal of one side because it constitutes the fundamental rights of a people; the basic individual rights.

If the regime misconstrues the referendum as a precondition, it would in effect be ruling out serious discussions of any kind. Even in open-ended and flexible negotiations, universally accepted rights and norms cannot be a matter of argument and contention. Standard mechanisms that regulate the interaction between states and peoples cannot be termed inapplicable when it comes to our case. The Ethiopian regime cannot after all reject these commonly held notions and live in another planet.

[ADULIS] In some quarters, it is argued that the Eritreans should make substantial concessions to appease Ethiopia's legitimate interests, including access to the sea, once their right to self-determination is asserted. What concessions is the EPLF prepared to make?

[Afewerki] There are several complex issues that must be addressed here. In the first place, there is a limit to the mandate of the EPLF. The fact that the EPLF is a political organization that grew in the struggle as a reflection of the resistance of the people does not endow it with a free hand to decide all and everything on behalf of the Eritrean people. The issue is therefore what concessions the Eritrean people can make.

Whatever the issues may be—access to the sea, other arrangements concerning mutual security, economic cooperation—we must first realize that these decisions rest with the Eritrean people. Secondly, there is the question of timing or sequence in the order of things. Perhaps, the various conjectures being suggested may appear as viable compromise solutions. Many may find them realistic or logical. But the fact is that now is not the time to discuss the appropriateness or viability of concessions.

First and foremost, there is a fundamental issue that must be settled before we address subsidiary matters. To accept or reject certain concessions, one has first to assert one's political rights, once very survival. The Eritrean people must first obtain their political rights. Once this is secured, then they can freely enter into various pacts to enhance cooperation with other peoples in the region (and especially Ethiopia). These arrangements cannot of course precede but must follow the exercise of their basic rights. We cannot identify and

exhaust prior the arrangements that will be made in due course. If we try to put the cart before the horse, the outcome can only be negative and perhaps preclude arrangements that should come at a later date.

Consequently, it would be more fruitful if these prescriptions, benign as they may be, are laid aside for the moment. Indeed once the fundamental issue of rights is satisfactorily resolved the door would be wide open to tackle all these matters. We must also realize that in this increasingly interdependent world, the Eritrean people and the peoples of the region will have to establish—whether they like it or not—stable relations that promote their mutual interests and collective security.

Moreover, the Eritrean people would not only have a considerable stake in this type of relationship, but it is an objective to which they are actively committed. But at the risk of repeating myself, I must stress that these ideals can only materialize when the basic rights are secured. In the meantime all parties can give serious thought to the desirable and practical forms of association. Attempts to rush things will only result in placing obstacles on the peace process and forestall viable relationships among the peoples of the region which must develop at their own pace and according to their own dynamics.

The repeated argument about Ethiopia's absolute need of access to the sea is ludicrous. It does not stand serious analysis and is not justified by international law. Giving legitimacy to this kind of reasoning would in fact only plunge the world into endless wars. Because countries that are not satisfied with their given borders will be justified in invading their neighbors. This will destabilize the existing international political order and trigger endless conflicts.

We cannot, therefore, speak of legitimate concessions. We must remember that once one gives way to a policy of appeasement, there is no way of checking it. Concessions will not be confined to one side or to a specific region either. The yardstick will have ceased to be international law but the logic of might and force.

To promote the stability, peace and prosperity of the peoples of the region, the primary task should be to create conducive conditions; to start with confidence building measures that replace the atmosphere of suspicion and hostility by a sense of commitment to collective security and well being. As a first step towards this goal, the basic rights of the constituent peoples of the region must be respected. If we wish to encourage broad cooperation of the peoples of the region, we must first nurture a sense of trust and security. When the very survival of a people is at stake, all appeals of cooperation for the common good are meaningless. Thus when we say that the Eritrean people reject these concepts now it does not mean that they are beyond contemplation. At a time when we are talking about concrete possibilities and measures for peace, it would be better if arguments that confound the peace process are not raised.

[ADULIS] In your initial statement you stated that the EPLF does not have unrestricted mandate on all issues. Recently, the Ethiopian leaders seem to argue that they do not have a mandate to negotiate the "territorial integrity of Ethiopia". Are the two positions similar?

[Afewerki] The statements by the Dergue's officials are a mockery of fundamental principles. It is one thing to assert that any elected government, party or organization, needs to refer back issues of paramount importance to its constituencies or the public. This is a recognition of the fact that the mandate given to a governing party by the people during an election is not absolute and certain issues require public confirmation through a plebiscite or referendum.

We (the EPLF) are paying precious sacrifices, paying with our lives, to assert the rights of our people. But still, we are modest enough to know our limits; to recognize that we cannot make concessions and compromises on behalf of our people.

On the other hand, no external power has the right or mandate to determine the destiny of our people. When the Ethiopian regime argues that it has no mandate on matters concerning "the unity of Ethiopia", this is a ridiculous pretext. It is like a head of a family who robs his neighbor and then refuses to give back the stolen property claiming that he needs the approval of his family. His family are not a party to the crime; they can neither be punished nor associated in any way with the crime of the father.

Moreover, this regime does not have a mandate to govern let alone speak on behalf of the Ethiopian people although that is not the issue here.

[ADULIS] These prospects for peace in the Horn are occurring at a time when there is a reduction of tension and increasing rapprochement between the two superpowers. To what extent is the improved international climate influencing peace in our region?

[Afewerki] Whether we like it or not, we must realize that the superpowers have considerable influence in shaping developments in our region and elsewhere. We are not in a position to determine the role and influence of these powers. But once we accept this influence as a constant reality, then the scope for action constitutes one of these two possibilities. If their rivalry and competition is pursued at the expense of the interests of the local peoples, then we have no choice but to confront and oppose their policies. If, on the other hand, they exhibit good will and commitment to employ their influences and cooperation to resolve regional conflicts and promote peace, then this will be welcomed. Recent events show that it is the latter positive trend which governs international relations today. Perhaps one needs to be prudent and leave the final verdict for time. On available evidence, however, no body can deny the positive role of the superpowers at this particular point in time. Their cooperation has so far produced concrete results in various regions.

In our specific region, we cannot as yet talk of concrete steps taken by the superpowers. However, in the context of the improved international climate, the fact that we have not yet seen their concerted action concerning our cause or the absence of initiatives or practical measures to foster relations with us should not drive us to ignore the overall achievements towards world peace. We can only welcome the positive results elsewhere and endeavour to ensure that they employ their influences in our region constructively to bring about peace and stability. At the moment and in the absence of concrete indices, we cannot go beyond stating this general expectation.

[ADULIS] Have there been recent changes in the positions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Eritrean cause? Many observers in the international press argue that the peace calls by the Addis Ababa regime is the result of Soviet Pressure; that the Soviets have reduced their supply of weapons to Ethiopia? Do you agree with these statements?

[Afewerki] In regard to the first question, as stated earlier, we cannot be pessimistic if concrete action is not taken in our region when the overall international picture is positive. In addition, the U.S. administration has made it clear that it wants to see and would cooperate in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. We have not seen concrete measures so far but all the same we take this statement of good will as positive.

The Soviet role must be seen at two levels.

On the one hand, they have been openly saying that they support peaceful solution that they do not contemplate a military solution to the conflict. As far as statements go, this is also positive and welcome. In practice however, the story is different. Soviet support is the principal factor that has enabled the Dergue to indulge in extensive military adventures over the last ten years. The Soviets have a far bigger involvement in the conflict; they are responsible for the escalation of the war. In this sense, the Soviets possess a far bigger leverage than the Americans, if the political will exists, to promote peace.

Soviet behavior does not coincide, however, with their pronouncements and the repeated signals they are floating to imply that they are applying pressure on the Dergue. Since March 1988 alone, we have seen the introduction of new weapons in the war. Guided anti-tank missiles, helicopters, new multiple rocket launchers have been supplied to the regime in huge quantities. In 1989, we have seen intensive bombardments of our liberated areas—on a scale never seen before. These weapons have been supplied by the Soviets; weapons that may have been given by North Korea or some junior state are only marginal. What is keeping the Dergue's war machine running is without doubt continued unrestrained Soviet support.

In the face of this, what do we make of the stated Soviet good will? Some circles try to justify the contradictory Soviet behavior and its military assistance to Ethiopia in terms of an "agreement that has not yet expired". This

again is not plausible. The new weapons being supplied this time could not possibly have been included in the agreement that was signed 10 years ago. The military agreement does not contain clauses that bind the Soviets to escalate the war; and, at any rate they are incompatible and contradictory to the presumed readiness of the Soviets to put pressure on the Ethiopian regime.

If we are being told that military supplies will only be reduced when the agreement expires in 1990 or 1992, then this is again tantamount to asking us to postpone peace talks until that period. Credible pressure can only mean a real reduction in the supply of weapons. The Soviets cannot have it both ways. Nobody should be taken in by their empty statements of disapproval to a military solution, commitment to peace or willingness to play a constructive role.

It is of course within the means of the Soviets to help terminate the war and promote peace and prosperity in the region. These objectives could in fact be realized through concrete action; without much propaganda and diplomatic maneuvering.

As a result of all these factors we have, on our part, reservations on their real intentions versus their statements. This does not of course mean that we do not appreciate the overall conducive atmosphere or that we rule out any positive actions by the Soviets in the period ahead. But in our efforts to bring about peace, our judgement on the roles of Moscow and Washington can only be based on the realities of the day.

[ADULIS] Apart from the declaratory statements by both sides, have there been concrete steps by the EPLF or other concerned parties to start the peace-talks? Is there a time-frame in which we can expect negotiations to start?

[Afewerki] The initiatives that have been taken within this conducive climate are indeed numerous. A number of peace initiatives have been taken at the government level, organizations and individuals in the last few years. In the recent past in particular, we have seen a number of concrete steps from concerned parties to promote negotiations.

It would be unproductive and premature to disclose or be explicit at this period on these initiatives. All we can say at the moment is that one of these concerned intermediaries has secured—and this has been communicated to us—the agreement of both sides on the requisite technicalities to start negotiations at a given venue. Taking this development into account, and in the context of other supportive initiatives, it can be reasonably predicted that peace talks—at least the first phase—will start within the next month or two.

[ADULIS] The EPLF delegation has been touring a number of countries in the last two months. What is the outcome; are there any significant breakthroughs?

[Afewerki] The principal objective of the tour was to solicit support for the peace effort. In this we are satisfied; we have observed that there is a wide awareness and interest to bring about peace. And this encouraging interest will obviously have a positive bearing on the outcome of future negotiations.

Kenya

Paper Comments on BBC Kenyatta Day Reports

EA3011133489 Nairobi SUNDAY TIMES in English
29 Oct 89 p6

[Article by Philip Ochieng under the rubric "From my Point of View" and headlined: "Murang'a Arrest: BBC Hit Us Below the Belt"]

[Excerpts] Even in the most perfect of all governments—though these exist only in a fairyland called utopia—there lurk some extremely high-handed officials and agents. Yet whenever an agent of a Third World government perpetrates something really stupid—even when that act obviously goes completely against the grain—representatives of the Western press are sure to look at themselves with a knowing wink. [passage omitted]

And, sure enough, that's what happened after the contretemps on Kenyatta day when a tin god in the guise of a Nyayo chief arrested tens of Wananchi [citizens] for failing to attend a political rally at Murang'a's Ihura Stadium. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) went to town with it after its Nairobi correspondent had read the story in the "NATION". In a lengthy report, the semi-official medium left no doubt at all in the minds of listeners that what the chief had perpetrated was the government's policy.

Had the BBC stopped there, Kenya may have been inclined to overlook this manner of reporting since, indeed, the act was that of a government official in uniform, and one, to boot, who enjoys immense powers through the chiefs act.

I make that remark with a certain amount of sarcasm, however, because the government has frequently stated its position on this issue most lucidly. Only less than a month ago it interdicted a district officer for this self-same disregard for the normative postulates of the rule of law. So the BBC correspondent—though, as is often the case, he may have been acting merely as the myrmidon of his editor back home—was quite familiar with the correct official position and must have reported the way he did only with malicious glee.

What can a poor African or any other Third World country do to get redress when the world's most experienced and the best equipped broadcasting station—one which claims complete objectivity, into the bargain, persists in distorting other people's image through its extraordinarily powerful lenses? For if the correspondent were not familiar

with Kenya's policy—and I choose to believe the contrary—he had every opportunity as a self-respecting journalist to check with the authorities whether they had sanctioned the chief's curmudgeonly behaviour.

But, as I say, the BBC did not stop at the misreporting. It went on to tell one of what U.S. humorist Mark Twain used to call a "silent-assertion lie" against Kenya of the most ludicrous kind. What's a silent-assertion lie? It is a lie which is told without having to utter a single word. Such unspoken lies—as Mark Twain shows in "My First Lie", a mordantly sarcastic criticism of our social hypocrisy—are actually more numerous and more dangerous than the spoken ones.

Well, in the Murang'a case, how did the BBC's silent-assertion lie against Kenya manifest itself? As in most other cases, through the conscious refusal to allow Kenya its right of reply through the same medium—a right which the BBC and its London kindred always make a fetish of when it suits their own interests.

How did this show itself? Well, at least two exceedingly high-powered spokesmen for the Kenyan Government lost no time in putting the record straight as soon as they read the "NATION" story. A permanent secretary in the president's office, Mr Hezekiah Oyugi—who handles internal security and the provincial administration—and his top-most representative in Central Province, Mr Victor Musoga, laid it squarely on the line. Not only did they feel compelled to restate the government policy as succinctly as possible, they also proceeded to take a series of actions against our "village tyrants"—as Dennis Hills recognizes them in his "White Pumpkin." [passage omitted]

The upshot of Mr Oyugi's statement is that neither the ruling party nor the government it has formed has ever set out to force people to attend political rallies of any kind. [passage omitted]

Moreover, the government did not stop at making statements to reassure the public, especially our political magistrates in the Western capitals, that Kenya continued to be committed to the rule of law. It went on to punish the chief who had perpetrated the dastardly act, suspending him and pledging to boot him down under as soon as an official probe into the hideous affair has been completed. [passage omitted]

We know, too, that the government has acted to reverse court decisions on most of those who were arrested and registered a nolle prosequi concerning those who had decided to plead not guilty to the charges. Which brings me back to the silent-assertion lie told by the BBC against the Kenyan Government. It is that after it had claimed that it is government policy to compel people to attend rallies, it should also, as a self-confessed objective news medium, have felt compelled to publicise with equal gusto the government's public reassurance.

It should have felt constrained by the norms underlying the right of reply to carry with equally fervid commitment the series of actions which the government took

against those who had trampled underfoot the civil rights of other Kenyans. The BBC [words indistinct] activities, a fact which can only mean that its original story was merely a yarn SPLA for the purpose of [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Tanzania

* Wakil Decries Corrupt Practices in Nation

34000071b Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English
26 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Union Second Vice-President Idris Abdul Wakil said yesterday corruption is an evil which must be stamped out as it deprives governments of public support and "kills a nation's ideology."

Opening an international workshop on investigation and prevention of corruption in Arusha, Ndugu Wakil said corruption alienated public devotion of governments aims.

He said: "Corruption is evil. It perverts justice. It tends to lower the efficiency of the public service as a whole."

Ndugu Wakil, who is also Zanzibar President, said corruption had a devastating impact on national economies as it led to loss of revenue for the government.

He told the law enforcing officers from about 10 African countries that world-wide there was no profession or section of society that was not affected by corruption.

Referring to Tanzania, the Second Vice-President said there was ample evidence that corruption had increased drastically "at all levels over the years."

He said corruption was taking place in the form of thefts, misappropriation of funds fraudulent conversions, misuse of public office, commissions and bribery.

Corruption has generally been explained to be a by-product of deteriorating real income of employers in government and public institutions.

But, Ndugu Wakil warned that this negative situation should not warrant continuation of corruption practices.

He said: "The Party and Government are very keen and serious on the issue of eradicating corruption from our society. Corruption is high in the agenda in both Party and Government deliberation."

The very existence of the anticorruption squad in Tanzania, he said, was a clear manifestation of Tanzania's desire to "rid itself of this cancerous disease."

He said since the inception of a Community Relations Department within the Anti-Corruption Squad, there has been an upsurge in public awareness about the evils of corruption.

"I have been told that there is now a steady and growing flow of information to the Anti-Corruption Squad and

the police from the public reporting corruption practices by public officers," Ndugu Wakil said.

The five-day workshop is attended by delegates, from Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania. It is being held under the auspices of the Anti-Corruption Squad of Tanzania and Crown Agents of Britain.

*** Government Urged To Check Waste, Theft, Drugs**

34000072a Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English
23 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Mussa Lupatu]

[Text] The Tanzania Youth Organization (VIJANA) has called for measures to check public waste, thefts and drug trafficking.

In a message to Party Chairman Mwalimu Nyerere at the end of the Uhuru Torch race here yesterday, VIJANA said deterioration of economic services, corruption, theft of public funds, public waste, banditry as well as questionable contracts threatened national stability and security.

On the same level were the use of drugs by some youths and their involvement in trafficking, which the organization said weakened their ability for national development, affecting social stability.

The message to the CCM [Revolutionary Party] Chairman was made immediately after being handed the Torch at the Kambage Stadium by the leader, Lieutenant Moshi Kitindi. An estimated 60,000 people attended the colorful ceremony.

VIJANA said one way of fighting drug abuse is to consolidate primary education and provide vocational training to give the youth skills for self-reliance. VIJANA will open youth camps.

Tanzania and other developing countries, the message said, should prepare to enter the 21st century without problems of food shortages, inadequate housing and poor infrastructure.

Cooperation in the area of trade, economy and science and technology among developing countries is more called for now than before, the message said.

Even the rich countries have started to lay foundation for closer cooperation "We need unit and solidarity more than the rich nation," it added.

VIJANA commended Government efforts towards the consolidation of economic cooperation with SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference] and PTA [Preferential Trade Area: Eastern Southern Africa] countries as well as efforts by the South Commission.

During this year's Torch race, 1,130 Party branches hosted it during which 232 foundation stones were laid for development projects with 352 buildings being opened.

During the ceremony lasting two hours, Mwalimu presented shields and certificates to Singida and Shinyanga regions for hosting the start and end of the race.

Six youths, Ndugu Moshi Kitindi, Waziri Ako Panga, Nurdin Babu, Ismail Kiweri, Mohamed Haruna and Juma Abdallah Juma were also given certificates for successfully racing the torch.

Arusha, South Pemba, Lindi and Tabora regions, were presented with 200,000/- each for winning the first position in their zones in the Torch Race competition.

The second position of cheques for 100,000/- went to Dar-es-Salaam, North Pemba, Mtwara and Mbeya regions. Tabora was overall winner and took an additional 50,000/-.

Meanwhile, two veteran youth leaders, Ndugu Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru and Ndugu Nyelwa Kisenge were yesterday each awarded a medal for outstanding leadership.

Both were described as to have been faithful to the Party and the country.

Ndugu Ngombale-Mwiru is the NEC [National Executive Committee] Secretary for Ideology, Political Education and Training and served as youth leader in the early years of TANU [Tanganyika African National Union].

Ndugu Kisenge is the Shinyanga Regional Party Secretary. He joined TANU as a youth immediately after school.

*** Government To Maintain Coffee Support Prices**

34000072b Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English
25 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] The producer price of coffee will remain at 126/- for a kilogram of Arabica and 55/- for Robusta despite a fall in the market price.

The Minister for Local Governments, Community Development, Cooperatives and Marketing, Ndugu Paul Bomani has directed the Coffee Marketing Board and Cooperatives to pay farmers the same price despite the 30 percent fall at the world market, Maelezo reported.

The Minister said in Dar-es-Salaam over the week end that the rift between coffee producers and buyers in July had caused the removal of the quota system. Consequently coffee is now sold at the international open market, something that has resulted in a flooding of the market pushing down prices.

The price of Tanzanian Arabica coffee at the international market dropped from 340/- to 240/- per kilo while that of Robusta fell from 218/- to 174/- per kilo.

Ndugu bomani instructed the Coffee Marketing Board and cooperatives to suspend some of their projects and cut down costs to ensure that prices for the farmer remained at their current level.

Cooperatives will have to take loans from financial institutions to purchase coffee insecticides from the Board, but will, in turn have to sell them to farmers on cash basis.

The Minister hoped that farmers would understand that the new system had been necessitated by the difficult situation.

He, however, stressed the need for farmers to use insecticides for a better crop and good prices.

Uganda

Museveni Dismisses Talk of Political Upheaval

LD0211211989 Kampala Domestic Service in English
1900 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] President Yoweri Museveni has reiterated that there will be no political upheaval in Uganda because the scale of organization by the NRM [National Resistance Movement] is unprecedented in the history of Uganda.

Closing the NRC [National Resistance Council] meeting, which has been debating the new economic measures introduced by the finance minister, Dr Kiyingo, over a week ago, at the national assembly this evening, Mr Museveni assured the nation that nobody will outflank the NRM politically because of the movement's correct political line.

The president was replying to some distinctive talking spread among the people to worry the population about stability in the country. He said that some rebel organizations, which hoped to overthrow the NRM by force of arms, will not go far, adding that if you think you can win a people's war through a backward platform of sectarianism, then you are deceived.

He told those who are talking of a military coup that nobody can overthrow the NRM administration because it is a revolutionary movement. He told the NRC members that what took place in Uganda in January 1971, was not a coup but a mere farce. He, therefore, attributed all this talking to shallow thinking.

Turning to those who say the detractors can collude with foreign countries to invade Uganda, President Museveni reiterated that the only thing such people will be doing is just to endanger their allies in those countries. He made it categorically clear to them that Uganda is not a punch-bag, adding that the business of using neighbouring countries for the hope of causing political change in Uganda is an illusion.

Mr Museveni, therefore, appealed to the NRC members to stem this form of sabotage by informing their constituents that all this is mere empty talk by the (?traitors).

Fire at Army Headquarters; Investigation Starts

EA0111073289 Kampala Domestic Service in English
1000 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] The office of the minister of state for defense wishes to inform the general public that, due to reasons yet to be established, the ministry and Army Headquarters, commonly known as Republic House, caught fire around 2130 on Monday night. Due to the heroic performances by the fire brigade the fire was stopped on the third floor. The top floor, where the fire started, was heavily damaged. The rest of the building was saved. The extent of other damage is yet to be established. An investigation committee has been formed to establish the actual cause and extent of damage. It is composed of the chief of staff, the director general of the internal security organization, the chief political commissar, the director of military intelligence, the director of legal services, the commanding officer of military police and the CID.

The public, especially those who live or work near the building, should not be alarmed but keep off the building until further notice. All the employees of the ministry should report to the General Headquarters canteen.

Several Dead in Rebel Grenade Attack

AB3011200189 London BBC World Service in English
1615 GMT 30 Oct 89

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Several Ugandans have died in a grenade attack on a house in Kumi District this weekend and it seems Ugandan dissidents were responsible as Esther Ebonge reports in this telex from Kampala:

[Begin studio announcer recording] The incident took place in the Elgonia suburbs of Kumi town at about 9 o'clock on Saturday [28 October] night. A grenade was thrown into a private house where a party was being held. Seven people died immediately while 13 others were taken after to a hospital, where 3 are in a critical condition. The dead include four students of Wegen Secondary School and a midwife from the Kumi Health Center. According to the government newspaper NEW VISION, the attackers wore civilian clothing. The house which was attacked was the setting for a party for Mr Adjore Malinga who was celebrating the successful completion of his police training. Mr Malinga comes from (Anguinos) subcounty, but could not have his party there due to rebel activity. The attackers were described as rebels who invaded the party and demanded to be given a radio-cassette player which was playing the party music. One of the party members refused and the men took it by force. As they ran away with the radio tape machine, they fired shots indiscriminately, and then a grenade was thrown. Neighbors rushed to the scene where they found the injured and dead, who included Mr Malinga.

De Klerk Comments on Reported SWAPO Incursions

*MB0211154589 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1528 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Text] Pretoria Nov 2 SAPA—The "necessary means" would be placed at the disposal of the administrator-general of Namibia to carry out his responsibility of maintaining law and order in the region, South African State President Mr F.W. de Klerk told an SADF [South African Defense Force] parade at Voortrekkerhoogte on Thursday.

Discussing alleged plans by large numbers of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] fighters to infiltrate Namibia during the elections, Mr de Klerk said the South African Government had a direct interest that the elections should proceed peacefully and fairly.

He added: "In the meantime, it is comforting for all of us to know that our security forces are prepared for any eventuality."

Mr de Klerk did not explain what he meant by "the necessary means".

Technical specialists were investigating the origins of the alleged intercepted UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] message about SWAPO's activities, in view of the denials about their authenticity, Mr de Klerk said. They had however been broadcast on "identified frequencies".

There had also been other sources of information that PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] members intended carrying out irregularities during the election. "SWAPO's hands are everything but clean."

Too much was at stake for South Africa and all southern African countries to allow the peace process to collapse because of "mischievous actions" by SWAPO or whichever party, Mr de Klerk said.

"The South African Government has a direct interest that the election in Namibia next week should proceed peacefully, openly and fairly.

"The administrator-general (Mr Louis Pienaar) is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the necessary means (nodige middele) will be placed at his disposal so that he can fulfil his responsibility."

Mr de Klerk said it was a fact that SWAPO elements were north of the Namibian border, where they were not supposed to be. This had been admitted by the UN's special envoy, Mr Martti Ahtisaari.

"We therefore expect him to ensure that UNTAG fulfils its duties to ensure those elements will not constitute a threat."

The South African Government was doing everything possible, also along diplomatic channels, to stabilise and normalise the situation.

Mr de Klerk called on all parties to contribute to the successful completion of the election, and not to allow themselves to be intimidated by anybody.

Makes 'Policy Statements'

*MB0211184789 Johannesburg Television Service
in English 1800 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Text] In important policy statements today, the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, has scotched allegations of a rift between the government and the security forces, has placed the onus on the ANC [African National Congress] to show that it can be trusted to sit down with all other parties to plan a new South Africa, and has stated that there is too much at stake to allow the collapse of the peace process in South-West Africa/Namibia.

Addressing a military parade in Pretoria in his capacity as commander in chief of the South African Defense Force, Mr de Klerk said South Africa could not afford a wedge to be driven between the government and the security forces, and emphasized that the government would continue to maintain a prepared defense force and police force.

He said it was nonsense to deduce that the defense force had been singled out with regard to possible cut-backs in expenditure, and rejected what he termed insidious stories about the so-called securocrats.

Mr de Klerk said the government could not unban the ANC while it remained committed to violence, but called on all South Africans to refrain from doing anything that could jeopardize the fragile trend towards peaceful solutions in South Africa. He referred specifically to events over the past week.

[Begin De Klerk video recording] Last Sunday [29 October] such a meeting took place in Johannesburg. It ended peacefully, but unfortunately there occurred what appears to be contraventions of existing laws by way of pronouncements and the display of flags and symbols. Just as in other cases of alleged contraventions, these occurrences will be investigated by the South African Police. The police will then submit whatever evidence they may have gathered to the attorney general for consideration as to whether prosecutions should follow or not. As soon as the occurrences of the past week have been studied and evaluated, and as soon as decisions based on these evaluations have been made, they will be made known.

Law and order will be maintained. It is, however, within this general climate of relatively peaceful and orderly progress that the majority of South Africans have shown that they can adapt to changes which of necessity must take place in any endeavor towards negotiated solutions. Therefore, I appeal to those who feel threatened by events of recent weeks not to allow their fears to override the need for initiatives towards peaceful solutions.

Simultaneously, it is important that everybody—and specifically the released security prisoners—should operate within the ambit of prevailing laws. They must guard against themselves being misused by those seeking continued confrontation. They would also be wise to steer away from inflammatory rhetoric. Demonstration, protest, and symbolic actions are the easy parts of politics. The difficult part, the part that requires statesmanship and self-control, is the process of responsible, substantive political dialogue, political dialogue which can lead to workable solutions. It is this style of leadership that is now required.

The government cannot allow the process of renewal and reform to take place without due observance of the laws of the country. I therefore call upon everybody not to do anything which might destroy the tender but positive trend towards peaceful solutions emerging in our country.

From many quarters, calls are being made upon the government to lift the banning of the ANC, to lift the state of emergency, to release prisoners, not to proceed with prosecutions, etc. The impression is being created that as soon as this had been done, peace will descend upon us, and we will all be able to sit down and discuss our future. But why was the ANC banned? It was not banned because of political activities; it was banned when violence erupted. While violence is being rejected all over the world, it is strange that the ANC remains committed to terrorism and violence. It is furthermore hard to understand why they do this, when they themselves and everybody else knows that it has brought them nowhere, that there are no prospects of it ever bringing them anywhere.

I want to emphasize one single, simple fact. The government cannot unban the ANC while it remains committed to violence. The onus is thus on the ANC to demonstrate, by its actions, that it is committed to a process of peace, and that it can be trusted to sit down with all other parties to plan the new South Africa. The government will proceed and fulfill its commitment to make it possible for organizations committed to peaceful solutions to become part of the political process. It will also look for ways and means of enabling leading individuals committed to peaceful solutions to, in their own right, become part of this process. [end recording]

Referring to South-West Africa/Namibia, Mr de Klerk said there was too much at stake for all the countries of southern Africa to allow the collapse of the peace process by SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] or any other party. The South African Government had a direct interest in next week's election proceeding fairly and peacefully. Mr de Klerk referred to denials that UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] had been the source of messages about suspect SWAPO activities.

[Begin De Klerk video recording in Afrikaans] The fact is that these messages were sent, and that they contained disturbing reports. Technical experts are, in the light of

denials, busy determining the origin of the messages because it is a fact that messages are transmitted over the air on identified frequencies. It would have been the height of irresponsibility to conceal this information made known by my colleagues, particularly in light of events of 1 April this year.

In any case, there are other sources of information which indicate that former PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] members planned irregularities during the election. SWAPO's hands are everything but clean. It is also a fact that there are SWAPO elements north of the border, where they ought not to be. This has been admitted by Mr Ahtisaari. We therefore expect him to ensure that UNTAG fulfills its duty and takes steps to ensure that those elements do not form a threat.

In the meantime, I would like to give the assurance that the South African Government will take all possible steps to stabilize and normalize the situation through diplomatic channels. The South African Government is not, however, the only party which has interests in such a normalization. Therefore, I call on all the parties and countries involved to make their cool-headed and reasonable contributions toward the successful completion of the election, and not to let themselves be intimidated by anyone.

In the meantime, it is comforting for us all to know that our security forces are prepared for any eventuality. [end recording]

Botha Notes Possible Namibian Vote Intervention

MB0211063289 Johannesburg Television Service
 in English 0500 GMT 2 Nov 89

[From the "Good Morning South Africa" program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The chief of the defense force, General Janie Geldenhuys, says the threat of a SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] offensive in South-West Africa/Namibia should be dealt with by diplomatic rather than military means.

Gen Geldenhuys was reacting to the disclosure yesterday by Foreign Minister Pik Botha of internal UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group] messages which had indicated that SWAPO was present on the border in violation of resolution 435 on the eve of the elections. [passage omitted]

Our representative in Windhoek, Ozzie Gibson, filed this report on the latest developments in SWA/Namibia:

[Begin Gibson recording] The special representative of the UN secretary general, Martti Ahtisaari, says the messages referred to by the foreign minister did not emanate from any UNTAG source. Mr Ahtisaari says UNTAG is still unable to confirm the presence of PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] combatants in southern Angola.

All the allegations will be referred to the joint commission's newly functional verification body. The joint verification mechanism, consisting of representatives of the administrator general of SWA, Angola, and UNTAG, who have been invited to take part, will visit the border area today. The administrator general of SWA, Mr Louis Pienaar, says he views the statement by Foreign Minister Pik Botha in a serious light, and, for this reason, he has instructed his representatives to conduct a thorough on-site investigation.

The response of the minister of defense, General Magnus Malan, was rather muted. He pointed out that the defense force is ready for any eventuality without having to adopt an aggressive stance. Gen Malan pointed out that the defense force was an instrument of the South African state and did not act of its own volition.

The chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, Mr Dirk Mudge, said if the report were true, it would signal the end of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] in SWA/Namibia. However, vague reports and rumors only serve to strengthen intimidation of voters by SWAPO.

SWAPO's election director, Mr Hage Geingob, said allegations of a planned incursion were plainly untrue. The SWAPO command structure had been dismantled, and its officers were working in the election campaign. At a news conference in Windhoek yesterday, questions were asked about South African troop movements in the Walvis Bay enclave. A spokesman for the Administrator General's Office said these movements were no more than regular trooping and that there had been no buildup of troops. [end recording]

[Announcer] And now, we are in telephonic contact with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Pik Botha. Good morning, Mr Minister.

[Botha] Good morning to you.

[Announcer] Mr Minister, if Mr Ahtisaari denies that messages were sent between UNTAG units regarding SWAPO forces in the border area, where did these messages emanate from?

[Botha] That is exactly the question that exercises my mind. As far as I am concerned, our experts assured me that these messages were genuinely sent from UNTAG personnel to certain UNTAG stations. They have what they call a call sign and, of course, a certain frequency.

But, to me, the important matter is not whether we are right or wrong. I would gladly accept that I am wrong on condition that I am then wrong; that means that SWAPO would not again cross the border and cause the reaction that they caused when they infiltrated on 1 April this year.

To the South African Government, the main issue is to stop whatever plans SWAPO may have, and we cannot take these messages lightly. I think it's a very serious matter, and as far as I am concerned, whether it is denied

now or not, that is not the important issue. What is important is to ensure that SWAPO does not engage in the same activities of aggression and violence in which they engaged on 1 April.

[Announcer] Does this development, in fact, affect the election next week in any way?

[Botha] It could. It could seriously affect the election, because if we do not clear this up, and if assurances cannot be given, credible assurances, reasonable assurances, then I am afraid there will be no purpose in holding an election because it would not be free and fair.

[Announcer] So, would the South African Government then intervene to stop the election? Is that what you are saying?

[Botha] We will have to consider to do exactly that. I trust that we would not reach that serious situation. I hope that the matter could be resolved. We are working at it through other governments as well. I sincerely hope that we could avoid such an almost catastrophic result.

[Announcer] Thank you very much, indeed, for your time, sir.

[Botha] You are welcome.

[Announcer] Good day to you.

[Botha] Bye.

SADF Chief Discusses SWAPO Activities

*MB0111192089 Johannesburg Television Service
in Afrikaans 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89*

[Excerpts] South African security forces have been placed on alert. Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha says this step follows UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] messages which indicate that SWAPO is involved in large-scale activities in the north of South-West Africa/Namibia. Mr Botha was addressing newsmen in Pretoria this afternoon, following which he answered their questions. [passage omitted]

Earlier today the chief of the South African Defense Force [SADF], General Jannie Geldenhuis, said several thousand SWAPO terrorists are south of the 16th parallel in Angola, in violation of the settlement plan. He was in Walvis Bay, where he gave a confidential briefing to military correspondents on the security situation in South-West Africa/Namibia. Following the statement by Foreign Minister Pik Botha this afternoon, it was decided to release some of the information Geldenhuis had provided.

Gen Geldenhuis told correspondents that several SWAPO elements are to be found along a 200-km-wide stretch just north of the border. Some of these SWAPO units are equipped with tanks and are in some cases as close as 10 km north of the border. At Ongiva about 1,000 SWAPO terrorists have gathered, along with 14

tanks. Several SWAPO units have gathered at other towns, particularly since the start of October.

In Zambia, just north of Katirra Mulilo and Kongolo, there are also about 1,200 SWAPO terrorists, and he said a serious situation is building up on the eve of next week's election. He said, however, that everything possible is being done to prevent SWAPO from acting in violation of the settlement plan.

Foreign ambassadors in South Africa had been informed of the matter last week, while a joint information committee of South Africa and Angola had been set up to investigate any possible violations of the settlement plan.

Mr Louis Pienaar, administrator general of South-West Africa/Namibia, who was also at the briefing, said if South Africa is compelled to take action, it would like to do so with the cooperation of the international community.

He said South Africa is also dissatisfied with the manner in which SWAPO's activities in Angola are being monitored by UNTAG. He noted that in contrast with the more than 200 observers in the territory, there are only 20 UNTAG observers in Angola.

SWAPO Warned of 'Devastating Response'

*MB0311054589 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Station commentary]

[Text] The prospect of another military adventure by SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] poses a direct threat to the democratic independence process under way in South-West Africa/Namibia. Judging by the detailed accounts of a large, armed SWAPO presence north of the border, the organization appears to be preparing to stage a violent confrontation if the election results next week do not give it the majority it seeks.

That would not be merely a repetition of the illegal incursion on April 1st. It would be a cynical display of indifference to the democratically expressed wishes to the electorate.

As such, SWAPO's actions are also a direct challenge to the United Nations and those governments that have participated in devising a peaceful independence settlements for South-West Africa/Namibia.

That challenge cannot be shirked by professing ignorance of what SWAPO is up to, as UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] has been doing. Such a tactic puts at risk the entire plan for a peaceful and democratic process leading to independence for the territory.

The onus for preventing this is on the monitoring body, the United Nations, and on the Western Governments that originally drafted Resolution 435 and have since helped to bring about the settlement based on it.

The position of South Africa, recognised under Resolution 435 as the administering authority until independence, is clear. Its duty is to maintain law and order and in particular to deal firmly with any attempts to derail the independence process or undermine democratic procedures.

As with previous crises, including SWAPO's April incursion, every attempt must be made to neutralize this latest threat through diplomatic channels. Such efforts are already under way, with contact having been made with the UN secretary general, Western governments, and members and observers of the joint commission.

But it should also be clear that South Africa stands ready to take other action, if necessary, to protect the settlement plan and uphold its provisions for a democratic advance to independence.

South Africa, as the original mandate authority, has been entrusted with the task of administering the territory to ensure adherence to the terms of Resolution 435. During the last 7 months, its commitment to that task, and to a democratic outcome for South-West Africa/Namibia, has been demonstrated time and again. There should be no doubts about its determination, on the eve of the election, to act firmly in countering any attempt to thwart the democratic process.

SWAPO especially should harbor no illusions; its latest denial of the charges against it do not convince. It has too long a record of blatantly denying incontrovertible evidence of behavior by which it has violated the terms of the settlement plan. More to the point, its leaders must be made fully aware that any armed violation at this stage would elicit a devastating response.

Constitutional Development Minister Interviewed

*MB0211202089 Johannesburg Television Service
in English 1835 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Interview with Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen by Clarence Keyter and Pekhwane Mashuvane; from the "Network" program; date and place not given—video recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] It's generally accepted that South Africa is on the threshold of a particularly important stage of its history. The government hopes that the negotiating process which is currently under way will lead to black participation in central government, along with the other population groups. In this negotiation process, all parties will have to make certain compromises. Fears will have to be put to rest, while aspirations will have to be met.

Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen speaks out in this interview with Clarence Keyter and Pekhwane Mashuvane.

[Mashuvane] Minister, let's start this program with something almost rhetorical and ask: What does the government want to achieve with the whole process of negotiations?

[Viljoen] Well, I think, in essence, the negotiations are aimed at establishing a generally acceptable new constitution, a new constitution in which all South Africans will share in the political power at all levels. And this in particular means that black communities, which are at present excluded from participating in the central governmental structures, will become part, fully part, in the sharing of political power in our country. This is the essence of the reform object.

[Keyter] Doctor, as we understand it, the negotiations are there to create an equal society. Can we accept that when the negotiations start, the people sitting around the table will be equal at that point in time?

[Viljoen] In a sense, yes, that each of them will be fully entitled to speak his mind, to make any inputs into the discussion—or to put it differently, we consider it to be an open agenda. There are no preconditions about the proposals for a new constitution to be acceptable for inclusion on the agenda. And in that sense, all participants in terms of their contributions and their proposals they wish to make, would be equal. Equal also, I think, in the sense that we foresee an ultimate result which will not be based on a head counting or a vote counting, but which would be, as far as humanly possible, based on a broad consensus amongst the majority of the people of South Africa.

[Mashuvane] Doctor, white, colored and Indian leaders are almost known—let's not say they are almost; they are known. But how is the government going to carry out the whole process of identifying black leaders, because recently the rumored referendum to identify these leaders has almost died in utero?

[Viljoen] I think that is a very essential part of the whole approach to finding a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution. We must be sure that those people who participate in the negotiating process really have the authority of the support of their people behind them. And now, as you said rightly, it is true that the white, the colored and the Asian communities have participated actively in electing their own representatives to the present constitutional structure. White people, colored people and Asian people are therefore in a position that they have clearly identified their leaders. And while it is true that black communities have participated in electing leaders on a level of the self-governing territories or local government urban councils, they've not been able to do so on a wide, comprehensive South African basis. And I believe that ultimately the best test to make sure that the participants are really the representative leaders, really have a mandate or an authority from their people, would be by way of some kind of election. There are differences of opinion of how such an election should be structured, but I believe that part of the prenegotiations, about what has optimally been called talks about talks, would be to determine the methods and the conditions, according to which such an election for black people, who are not represented in the present Parliament, should take place.

[Keyter] But how sure is the government that they are going to a negotiating table on behalf of all the whites, despite the outcome of the election, especially if one thinks of what has happened over the last few days from the right wing?

[Viljoen] Well, one can never, I think, really satisfy all the people. Political choices have to be made, also, in constitution making. And the best one can achieve is to arrive at a decision where the broad majority from the different main population groups are in agreement. Although obviously there will always be groups that are not in agreement, political organizations that are not in agreement, the achievement of a broad consensus among the majority groups, majority representatives in the main groups, I think, is of essential importance.

At the same time, I would be quite open to a reasonably flexible constituting of a negotiating forum. If there is need for including groups who have perhaps not been successful in elections, but who nevertheless have a meaningful contribution to make, I am prepared to discuss and to negotiate that also with the interested parties. Let me, however, make one important point. I think there is a serious misunderstanding among many observers of the South African situation that the more militant and the more radical black groups are the only serious political factor in this country. In a sense, some people misrepresent the situation, as if there is only the government on the one side, and the militant and radical black organizations on the other side. I think it is important to emphasize that in past years black leaders both in the self-governing states and in the urban situation have come forward, often at great risk to themselves, to participate in the available political processes. They submitted themselves to the democratic process of election. They have been tested, as it were, by popular feeling, and they have also built up a lot of experience.

[Keyter] Doctor, you refer to the radical left, and the fact that—let's call them by name—the ANC is not the only other party at the negotiating table with the government. But yet it is accepted both in South Africa and outside South Africa that it is a key pin in the success of negotiations in the future. And, linking that to what you said about open agendas, yet both the government and the ANC have preconditions, prerequisites, before they can go to the negotiating table. Don't we see a stalemate here?

[Viljoen] There is a potential problem. In fact, an actual problem. It is quite true that the ANC and related organizations have quite a list of preconditions. However, in contrast to that, I would like to emphasize the position of the government, which is a position of trying to be as inclusive rather than exclusive as possible; trying to be as comprehensive in bringing together meaningful potential political participants in the negotiating process. And the government has only one precondition—namely, that all participants or all organizations or individuals participating should commit themselves very clearly to a peaceful road towards a negotiated solution. Peaceful negotiations, that is the key word.

We believe that you cannot really have negotiations unless people are committed to the peaceful process and, by implication therefore, have disassociated themselves from the use of violence.

[Keyter] But, Doctor, isn't it of the utmost importance that you negotiate with your enemy?

[Viljoen] An enemy can also take part in the negotiating process if it is a political enemy. We do not suppress different political views as such. That is why the agenda is open. We do not say: You may not be socialist, or you may not be this or that, in the proposals you make for a new constitution. In fact, there are some basic and fundamentally opposed views in, for instance, the view of the government that apart from having a national unitary concept in the constitution, one should also recognize the legitimate claims of the different groups, especially the minority groups in the population, to have a meaningful participation in the political decision-making process.

On the other hand, there are those who simply want a one-man, one-vote head count, according to a common voters' roll, which we believe will not work in the present situation. So there are very strongly opposing views, and the government accepts that these different views should be accommodated. But the process in which the debate, the negotiation, takes place, must be a peaceful one.

You cannot have negotiations in the real sense of the word, which implies a free meeting of minds, and a voluntary and a free decision being made after discussions. You cannot have that sense of negotiations if some people have behind their back or on the floor, under the chair, or just outside the door, some kind of violent means which they will use, to which they will fall back the moment that they cannot get what they want in the negotiating process. So negotiation, by definition, implies a peaceful process and the rejection of violence.

[Mashuvane] If we were to land in a stalemate situation, what would be the way out?

[Viljoen] I think it is likely that we will more than once in the whole process of negotiation come to a point where we can't find mutually acceptable solutions and we shall have to be patient with each other. We shall have to agree to go back to the planning table, go back to drawing board, go back even to the backroom planning setup, and form new solutions and new suggestions if those that are on the table do not meet with sufficient general support.

And that is why I am hesitant that there should be no time limits prescribed. There should be no timetable set for us, that we should do this within the next 3 months and that within the next 6 months. We have a very complicated problem. We have points of view which are diametrically opposed to each other. We have a history of confrontation. As the state president said, there is a big gap of mistrust amongst groups which we have to bridge, and that is going to take time. We have to build up confidence amongst each other and our experiences

in achieving successes would assist us and help us in tackling again those areas where we might initially not be successful.

So, I do not pretend in a sort of a airy-fairy, romantic way that we are not going to have problems, that we are not going to have, sort of, stalemates, but we will have to exercise the necessary patience with each other, come back again, and ultimately find the solution ourselves.

[Keyter] What I find very strange, Doctor, is that you make a plea for patience, but yet very recently at the NP [National Party] congress in Pretoria, you said that the dragging of feet could not be afforded anymore, because the people were getting impatient. Yet on the other hand, you say that you don't want to bind yourself to any time schedules. Now, how do you match these two views?

[Viljoen] Well, let me say in the first place that I think that there must be a balance between sensitivity for the urgency of the matter. There is an urgency about this matter; but on the other hand, this should be balanced with the need to provide sufficient time for building up the confidence for bridging the gaps of misunderstanding, for communicating effectively and then ultimately, achieving results. We must find this balance.

The area where I think people are impatient is that they feel that leaders should now commit themselves at least to the prenegotiating process, to discuss with each other, without preconditions, how the actual negotiating process should be structured, who should participate, how they should be elected, how they should meet, what procedures they should follow, in what way an acceptable chairman should be found, and so on and so forth. We have to iron out these matters so that the real process can begin.

[Mashuvane] We have got a dichotomy here, Mr Minister. We are against dragging feet towards the negotiating table. At the same time, we don't want to accept time schedules. How do we measure the pace? By 5-year plan, perhaps?

[Viljoen] The NP has, like all the other parties in the recent election, put forward a plan or a manifesto, also for constitutional reform within the context of the 5-year period for which this parliament has been elected. I personally believe we will have to have made quite considerable progress in achieving real, tangible results that are not only on paper, but that are also being implemented and starting to work in this period. And by the end of the 5-year period, a number of tangible results will have to be produced in order to convince the voters that a meaningful beginning and a meaningful progress has been made.

[Keyter] Having said that, Dr Viljoen, you talk about the balance between the pace and the intricacy of the negotiations. Yet in papers which have been delivered, you refer to, if I may quote, to a possible declaration of intent, as far as possible on freedom of association. Doesn't one, or am I right if I say that one could read some degree of vagueness

in this whole spelling out of what is to become negotiations? And couldn't South Africa, the government then, be seen as a government not really committed and trying to keep a back door open?

[Viljoen] No, the [pauses] shall I say the qualification of a possible this or a possible that must be tied and brought into context with the fact that we try to avoid unilateral prescriptiveness, and we like to think that we are going to achieve, through negotiation, a large measure of consensus. And that is why we leave the matter, as far as possible, rather open in definition, because this has to be negotiated. This of course creates problems for supporters of the government or even potential negotiators with the government, who want to have more detail. They want to see more meat added to a skeleton, as it were. But if you negotiate, then obviously you must be prepared for a process of give and take; and if you are too prescriptive in what you lay down, you may create the impression that you are in a sense preempting the whole negotiating process. We want to be open for negotiation, the agenda must be open, although we, as the NP, have spelled out in broad outlines the basic lines of approach that we would like to take and which we believe are such that we can make a strong case in debate and in discussion with other people who have different views. And we believe that we can persuade them to find something that is mutually acceptable.

[Keyter] According to your view, there are a lot of potholes on the way ahead still. But you seem to be fairly positive about the way in which you want to take the negotiations. Yet, since Sunday, there have been accusations that the government is not in control of the security in South Africa at the moment. Do you agree with that?

[Viljoen] I don't agree with that at all. I think it is a very simplistic view that control of security can only take place through visible, strong-fist measures. I think the influence that the government has exerted to achieve the result of a big mass meeting taking place in an orderly fashion, and a number of protest, political protest marches taking place in a generally orderly fashion, is evidence of the fact that the government is handling the political situation—which is a very risky one—with such finesse and such success that the expression of political protest and of political opinions opposed to that of the government takes place without a disturbance of order, without a disturbance of law and order, and without creating infringements of other people's rights.

I think that this is a very considerable achievement because, as the state president said, we accept that ultimately you cannot suppress political ideas. The people and the different groups in the population must have the right to formulate their own political ideas, to express their political ideas, and to organize themselves politically, provided that this happens in such a way that it does not undermine the basic process of a political debate. For instance, by resorting to violence, by assaults, and by unrest, by intimidation. That is why the government lays down the one basic prerequisite for the

whole restoration of normality in the South African security situation, and in the South African political situation, and that is that all participants should commit themselves to the peaceful process of negotiated solutions, and thereby dissociate themselves from violence.

[Keyter] That may be so as far as the radical left is concerned, but are you convinced that you will be able to handle the growing discontent from the right wing?

[Viljoen] The right wing has no case to point to where there has been a serious disruption of order without the government taking control of the situation. Should this occur, should there occur any serious disorder or sedition or public violence, the people of South Africa can rest assured—and they know it, on the strength of the record of this government—that it can control such situations. It has the ability, it has the manpower, it has the instruments to do so. And in that respect, I think our reputation has been untarnished.

It is true, as the minister of law and order recently said, that some aspects of the rally over the weekend—for instance, the open display of the communist flag and other actions, and some things that have been said are a bit ambiguous in terms of whether they fall within the ambit of the law. Therefore, this matter is being investigated by the authorities and, if necessary, steps will be taken about it.

At the same time I think it is important that, for instance, the ANC be exposed for what it really is—namely, an organization which openly flaunts its association with the Communist Party. And what is the Communist Party? It is a party which uses, which, I would almost say, rapes, the word democracy, for purposes which have nothing to do with democracy; which has a totalitarian system; which suppresses the freedom of the individual; which has an economic system that is increasingly being proved throughout the world to be a total failure, and which has been rejected in several African countries where it has been tried experimentally.

And it is this Communist Party which is almost an advertisement of failure which the ANC is now associating itself with. I think this puts a big question mark under the credibility and reliability of the ANC as a political organization. The fact that it has been possible for leaders of the ANC to express their views, and at the same time for the public to see in what way this organization—which continuously was protected by some people that it is not communist-associated—is actually mixed up with the Communist Party, I think, is a healthy clarification of facts in the South African situation.

[Mashuvane] Let's take a closer look at the rally, Mr Minister. Was there any connection between the rally and the ANC? And if yes, were there any negative effects of that on law and order?

[Viljoen] The overall goal of the government is to try and normalize the whole political process. Provided it is not in conflict with the law, it does not cause disorder and

disruption, and actually clarifies political issues—for instance, the issue of the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party, which I think is a healthy process—we believe that this should be handled in a careful and a calculated way.

[Keyter] I accept that, Dr Viljoen, and the fact that you may have allowed the rally on Sunday to create the climate for possible negotiations with all parties concerned. But in the process, the people who have to look after law and order—senior police officials, according to media reports—are threatening to resign because of this. How is the government going to handle that?

[Viljoen] Well, I wouldn't like to express myself on matters regarding the South African Police, because that falls under a different minister. I would like to point out, however, that the commissioner of police, General de Witt, clearly stated that he has no knowledge of any senior police officers threatening to resign. It is true that the government owes it to the officials, also the members of the services who have to act within the ambit of its policy, to explain to them where there have been changes in policy. Because it is quite clear that under the government of State President de Klerk there is a greater openness to accept risks involved in allowing political, public political meetings, public political protest actions, and public political marches or demonstrations.

The conditions have been clearly laid down, and in each case the matter is discussed with and clarified to the organizers concerned. If there is any transgression of the conditions, if matters get out of hand, the South African Government has a good record of how to act immediately and efficiently with such disorder and getting out of hand of matters.

[Mashovane] Doctor, the South African Government has all along been criticized from both international and domestic front, of topsy-turvydom on racial harmony. Is that indicative of the fact that the government is unable to contain, accommodate, match and marry, the aspirations on the part of blacks, and fears on the part of whites?

[Viljoen] I think we have in South Africa a real fact which many black leaders—even some of the most radical black leaders—acknowledge and recognize, and this is that there is this contrast and threatening confrontation between, on the one hand, the aspirations of blacks, especially in the political field to achieve rights and status which they have not enjoyed in the past, and on the other hand, the concern about their security as a minority groups, on the part of whites in South Africa.

Any new constitutional solution will have to accommodate both these factors. I think no one less than Chief Minister Buthelezi has repeatedly stated this. There must be a democratic solution, but a democratic solution which deals with both the realities of the concerns of whites—you could even say the fears of some of them

with regard to their security as a minority group, culturally but also politically—and the legitimate expectations of blacks for a just and equal dispensation.

Any government has to deal with both these sides. Whereas, perhaps in the past, the government had laid more emphasis on the concerns of the whites, and perhaps not being successful enough in devising new structures to accommodate the aspirations of the blacks, I think it has now quite clearly come to a point where it accepts the sharing of power within basically the same political structure between whites and blacks in this country, which is a great change from the older, strict, separate and apartheid policy of earlier years.

This is a difficult change, but I believe that the policies which the government has spelled out in its plan of action are such that they are likely to lead to a workable and a practical solution to accommodate both these issues.

[Keyter] Doctor, the state president, you, and Dr Stoffel van der Merwe have on several occasions called for a change of heart in South Africa, and I take it that it was thrown out to all the people. But the bottom line is that the majority of South Africans who will also be going to the negotiating table is that they still have to get up at 0300 in the morning to get to their jobs because they live where they have to live. How can you accept, or expect them, to change heart if that it still the situation?

[Viljoen] There are, of course, many inequalities and unacceptable situations in South Africa that have been identified and that should further be identified, and I think one of the big reasons why it is urgent that there should be a new constitution with blacks sharing in the political powers is that they will be better able to look after their own interests than anybody else, and that a new constitutional set-up will have the effect of identifying, dealing with, and eliminating unacceptable and unfair or unjust situations, both socially and economically in the South African situation. If people first want, as it were, a complete reform of the while situation—first want utopia to assert itself among us—then we will never have a beginning of negotiations, and we will never have a practical result. We must start somewhere, and that somewhere is part of the imperfect reality of present day South Africa.

[Mashovane] Finally from me, Mr Minister, wouldn't you say without hesitation that the pressure that has been exerted on the South African Government has really succeeded in making the government move?

[Viljoen] The pressure, in many ways, has also had a counterproductive effect, in the sense that it has instilled in the minds of many people the view that, whatever we do, we get no recognition from outside; the pressure just goes on, so we might as well do nothing and stick to things as they are. The pressure has also had a counterproductive effect in the sense of adversely affecting the economic growth rate of the country, and therefore also the revenue base of the central government, and thereby

retarding the socioeconomic reforms that are necessary: For instance, in the area of improved education and schooling for all, especially for the blacks; in the area of accelerated urban development and better housing opportunities for all, particularly the blacks; better health opportunities; better development of industrial and agricultural job opportunities. Because in the end, job opportunities are vital to a good quality of life.

All these things have been adversely affected by pressure from outside, and this retards the pace at which reform can take place. So, though it is true that the outside pressure has perhaps increased the sense of awareness that we have to deal with an urgent situation, it cannot be denied that the outside pressure has also had a retarding effect in both respects that I have just mentioned.

[Keyter] We have had a long discussion, and eventually the government hopes to take a lot of people to the negotiating table. But surely you must have some time schedule in mind; otherwise, you will be at the end of your term of 5 years, the present government, without having sat around the negotiating table.

[Viljoen] Well, I would say that in the course of the next months we should reach a stage where some of the basic questions about the preconditions, about the talks-about-talks, about the way in which the ultimate real negotiating forum is to be structured, will be ironed out and will be answered. We cannot allow uncertainty to go on too long. You referred earlier in our discussion to my remarks about people dragging their feet. We cannot allow the dragging of feet to delay the beginning of real discussions for too long.

I would personally say that one might reach a stage where you feel that we have now given everybody a reasonable opportunity, we have given everybody a chance to participate, but it has not been used generally by all, so we have to move on now with those who want to move. That would be a possibility. We cannot indefinitely postpone the need for some fundamental reform in order to broaden the basis of democracy by including in the central political structures of the country also the black people.

[Keyter] Dr Viljoen, thank you very much.

[Viljoen] You're welcome.

2 Nov Press Review on Current Problems, Issues
MB0211101589

[Editorial Report]

THE CITIZEN

Police Uncertain of Laws on Protest Marches—"The police do not know where they stand—and what is expected of them in the new period of Pretoriaströika when laws are broken, yet Ministers claim they aren't really broken, so long as chief magistrates give permission for protest marches or mass rallies and there is no violence," remarks Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in

English on 2 November in its page 6 editorial. "This attitude is not good enough, because the law itself is being brought into disrepute." "The governments should now say whether the laws concerned no longer apply, in which case they should be repealed, or see that they are applied. We don't think the Defence Force is any better informed about its own position than the police are." "No government, particularly in this country, can afford to lose the support and confidence of the armed forces or of the police."

THE STAR

Instruction To Cut State Expenses Welcome—Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 2 November in a page 18 editorial welcomes the alleged cabinet instructions "to all departments to cut expenses 'to the bone'." It is "interesting that Defence seems scheduled to take the biggest cut." "The most compelling reason to cut all costs is that the Government has run out of other options. The tax goose cannot lay more eggs; taxpayers are being sucked dry by high taxation and inflation; living standards have dropped steadily for nearly a decade. The best way to arrest that drop and to reduce taxes and inflation is through drastic cuts in State spending."

BUSINESS DAY

Military Budget Cut Welcome—"The military and quasi-military pre-emption of resources—to invade Angola, to manufacture armaments, to produce or stockpile military requirements of fuel, to develop nuclear technology, and to sweep up cannon fodder by conscription—very nearly brought this country to its knees," observes a page 10 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 2 November. "If it is true, as has been suggested, that the military budget is to be cut, and the military caste reduced to an appropriately humble standing in society, and military ambitions constrained by economic realities, then there is truly reason to think this country is changing for the better."

CAPE TIMES

'Serious Intent' From ANC, State for Talks—Referring to the rally held at Soccer City to welcome the seven released political prisoners, Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 31 October in a page 8 editorial congratulates the South African Police and the rally organisers "on the arrangements for what will be seen in years to come as an historic event." "Another big hurdle on the road to negotiation has been overcome, vindicating President F.W. de Klerk's careful, step-by-step policy of relaxation of restrictions on rights of assembly and free expression." However, CAPE TIMES points out how Walter Sisulu's speech at the rally indicated "a critical difference between the prospective negotiating parties on how to set up the constituent assembly which would draft a new constitution. Mr Sisulu rejects an ethnic election of blacks to choose a black leadership team. The ANC is proposing a non-racial constituent assembly elected by universal adult franchise. Yet there is evidently a serious

intent to talk developing on both sides, which hardly makes sense unless there is some scope for compromise."

TRANSVALER

Prisoners' Release 'Test' for ANC—"Has there been a de facto lifting of the ban on the ANC?" asks a page 6 editorial in Johannesburg TRANSVALER in Afrikaans on 31 October. "Is that the interpretation one must give to the fact that its flag or emblems are displayed during protest marchers, apparently without any restrictions?" TRANSVALER concedes the "government's handling of the ANC matter is slightly ambiguous at the moment." But the release of Sisulu and the other political prisoners was "a calculated risk. It was intended to test the water, and to determine whether ANC involvement in the political process can take place in a peaceful and disciplined manner. Only a naive person would expect Mr Sisulu to sit home with folded arms and not say anything. That was also not the intention. He was released to do precisely what he is doing now—so that it can be ascertained whether it is safe to take the next step."

DIE BURGER

Peace Commitment 'Litmus Test'—"The peaceful mass gathering in Soweto over the weekend that was addressed by recently released ANC leaders showed further progress on the path of a peace process that is taking shape in South Africa," affirms Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 31 October in a page 14 editorial. Nevertheless, "if the ANC does want to participate in peaceful negotiations, it will have to comply with the only litmus test the government sets as its precondition: parties that want to participate must commit themselves to peace. There is no escape from this test."

BEELD

Conditions Not Beneficial for Talks—Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 1 November in a page 1 editorial says "the ANC must not believe he [Nelson Mandela] is the only black representative" in any future talks. "There are various other groups that will want to appoint their own leaders that will contribute to the talks and will guard their interests. But Mass Democratic Movement leaders have strongly opposed the proposed election of 'representative blacks.' They 'seek a 'colorless' general election that will at once elect the new government.'" This "looks too much like a new condition," and like "an attempt to eliminate any group representation from the constitution table—an approach that will not benefit the negotiation process. It would be more sensible to take advantage of the broad channels the government is opening for political participation."

3 Nov Press Review

MB0311115589

[Editorial Report]

CAPE TIMES

Call for ANC Unbanning—"Government's next step in its progressive relaxation of curbs on free political expression should be the unbanning of the ANC and all other restricted political organisations," declares a page 6 editorial in Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 1 November. Government should "end the ridiculous pretence" that the political rally held at Soccer City was "not an ANC rally." "The prevailing alternative is sowing great confusion on the requirements of the law, and creating difficulties for the police in implementing it. There is only one solution: The ANC must be legalised, and the sooner, the better. At the same time it is to be hoped that government is not going to be tempted to play short-sighted games by unbanning the ANC while maintaining the ban on the South African Communist Party."

TRANSVALER

'Elements of Hope' in Soweto Rally—Referring to the rally in Soweto to welcome the release of seven political prisoners, Johannesburg TRANSVALER in Afrikaans on 30 October says: "There was raw emotion, challenging speeches and views on the 'liberation struggle', and on civilian disobedience, which to say the least, will make whites uneasy." But "there were also specific elements of hope" such as the fact that the rally proceeded "relatively peacefully." Also, despite Walter Sisulu's "controversial remarks" he did "not rule out the possibility of eventual talks between the ANC and the government." "The fact is that no white who wants to ensure a peaceful and quiet future for himself in this country will be prepared to concede the present conditions of the ANC." But the "historic meaning" of the Soweto rally is that "a shift, however little, is reflected on the chessboard."

DIE BURGER

Call for Lifting of Media Restrictions—The rally in Soweto welcoming the release of political prisoners "sharply highlighted the media's dilemma in relation to the emergency regulations and other security measures," remarks Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 30 October in a page 8 editorial. "The minister of Law and Order said only last week the ANC remains a banned organization—and by implication with all the accompanying restrictions placed on media reporting of the event." "In practice the Soweto rally was nothing other than a public display of the ANC—but a legal one. Some people even interpret this as de facto recognition of certain activities of the organization." Therefore, DIE BURGER would welcome "a relaxation of restrictions that hamper newspapers from doing their work."

'Failure' To Save SWAPO Hide—"The failure of so-called non-aligned African countries to pass an anti-South African resolution on South-West Africa in the UN was a further blow for SWAPO," remarks Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 1 November in a page 20 editorial. "In their attempt to save SWAPO's hide, certain African countries were prepared to deviate

from the internationally accepted settlement plan for South-West Africa where the role of the administrator general was also clearly stipulated. The fact that the five member countries of the UN Security Council dug their heels in and diluted the resolution to a large extent, is a compliment for the administrator general and for South Africa. By implication the Security Council says it is largely convinced South Africa is complying with the demands of settlement plan."

BEELD

Criticism of Sisulu Economic Sanctions Call—A page 14 editorial in Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 31 October remarks on Walter Sisulu's "call for economic sanctions," saying "a sort of 'liberation before development' approach applies. That view is a serious mistake. Apparently it is believed economic development and growth can be turned on and off indiscriminately. There is no understanding that an economy is built up through decades, and that confidence plays a key role. It is, therefore, not understood that just as economic success feeds on itself and can bring more success, economic regression can also feed on itself."

THE NAMIBIAN

RSA 'Bias' Toward DTA—A page 7 editorial in Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English on 27 October says "there is much talk of bias, and the main accusations in this regard are levelled against the United Nations by certain groups, but there is a tendency to ignore South Africa's obvious preference for the DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance]. The latest refusal by the auT5Xlvis Bay, is an example in point." "The least that Government could do, during these very crucial elections for Namibian self-determination, is to open up Walvis Bay to the various groups campaigning in these elections, in order to allow them equal access to all the voters. If they refuse to do this however, they should turn down any party wishing to campaign in the enclave."

Urge for Greater Ballot 'Clarity'—A second editorial on the same page urges "greater clarity as far as the ballot itself is concerned. On what is acceptable and what not." "We request clarity for the sake of over half the eligible voting population and for the sake of the future of Namibia itself."

* Proliferation of Firearm Ownership Noted

34000070a Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 8 Sep 89 pp 50-53

[Text] South Africans love their guns. There are rifles for collectors and hunters' AR-15s for border farmers and insurgents; handguns for homeowners—and those looking to rip off homeowners. "SA [South Africa] is a gun-nut nation," says Lukas Potgieter, who writes on firearms. "You could say it's the rifle nation of the world."

In 1988, alone the police approved 123,465 firearm licenses out of 130,856 applications, rejecting less than 6

percent. Convicted criminals, drug addicts, alcoholics and the mentally ill faced rejection—if they were spotted in the investigation—as did people who would not be able to store the weapon safely.

Still, by the end of last year, 1.1m South Africans held 2.76m licenses. It's estimated that one in two white households have a firearm; Afrikaners are believed to have 60 percent of the total.

"It's not too difficult to get a weapon," says Lloyd Vogelmann, a lecturer in psychology at Wits. "That's one of the problems in SA. Guns are part of the social and political culture. They're seen as fine, appropriate and necessary."

The Rambo mentality of meeting force with even more force—mixed with a healthy dose of alcohol—only leads to arms escalation in a country where violence is a given. "The more violence there is, the more people feel threatened," says Vogelmann, director of the Project for the Study of Violence. "They sense an increase in crime and they want to defend themselves. The cycle is very difficult to stop. The level of violence is escalating."

In 1987, 1,088 people, including 913 blacks, died from assaults with firearms and explosives, excluding police actions. "The biggest demand (for firearms) is among black people," says Potgieter, who owns a gun shop in Johannesburg. "They're really in danger."

Police say statistics are not kept on the number of blacks who apply for firearm licenses, or whether they are granted or rejected. But the standards are stricter: black applicants must include letters of recommendation from their employers, ministers or other character references.

"Race is an important factor," Vogelmann says. "Blacks feel discriminated against. They feel they need guns. Whites being armed and blacks not being armed breeds resentment."

From the Minister of Law & Order down, the SA law enforcement line is that they don't want to keep firearms away from law-abiding citizens, they just want to control the abuse. "There are not too many guns," says Leon Mellet, Law & Order spokesman, "there are too many people who are careless. Those are the people that concern us."

Rightfully so. Every licensed firearm reported missing or stolen—there were 7,525 in 1988, down from a high of more than 10,000 in 1986—becomes yet another potential murder weapon on the street.

As the availability increases, so does the number of children who find guns carelessly left in unlocked cupboards or under daddy's pillow. A game of "cops and robbers" can easily escalate into manslaughter. And how many people—especially teenagers in a blue mood—yield to the temptation of the easily available gun when contemplating suicide? In 1987, 641 people, including 557 whites, killed themselves with firearms or explosives.

Law enforcement officials brag about their strict gun laws which are intended to weed out psychotics who might go hunting for humans. However, it should be remembered that more than 2.5m firearms were in private hands before the regulations tightened up last October.

In the meantime, there seems to be no end to the illegal weapons that deluge SA borders and land in the hands of people who will never have to find out if their licence application has been approved.

* Police Image Among Reforms Needed

34000070b Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 22 Sep 89 pp 28-30

[Text] The crisis in the police force presents President F.W. de Klerk with a key challenge—for how he deals with it could make all the difference between the success and failure of his reforms.

Arguably, he's made a good start. In the past week he has orchestrated a dramatic change in police tactics from iron fist to velvet glove. A major problem lies in communicating this to the ranks—so the line of delegation has been through Law & Order Minister Adriaan Vlok, who has stated in parliament that government will not tolerate police action that exceeds accepted norms. The message was repeated during personal visits to police units in the western Cape where the crisis is most visible.

Critics believe it is far too soon to say whether this about turn is strong enough to be sustained and enforced. They say there is still no clear distinction between political activities, with which the police have no right to interfere, and crime prevention. The cops don't yet know the difference, they charge.

There are starkly juxtaposed perceptions of policemen within our racially divided society. The protector of the white community is often the oppressor in the townships. Simply, this is because policemen are often compelled to be the ideological watchdogs of the NP [National Party] instead of law enforcers of the nation. The much-vilified black policemen—50 percent of the 64,000-strong force—are in a particularly invidious position.

But the crisis has also arisen thanks to decades of political neglect which has left the SAP [South African Police] undermanned, under-equipped, underpaid and overworked. In years past SAP generals tried to impress their political masters by keeping within budget or even showing a saving at the end of the day. For which they got an allocation for the following year which was down in real terms while the cost of running the force was up. In spite of above-average increases for the past two years, the current generation of generals is paying a high price for their predecessors' misplaced frugality.

They have inherited an inadequate infrastructure and an occupation with such unattractive long-term prospects that policemen are now leaving at a rate of more than six a day.

Compounding the crisis, SA [South Africa] is widely perceived to be in the grip of a serious crime wave. Armed robberies, particularly of banks, are almost a daily occurrence—and the terrifying violence in parts of natal seems completely beyond police control. And an apparently inordinate number of policemen are being arrested for serious crimes.

In the townships, the SAP is widely perceived as a State agency charged with "keeping blacks in their place." Some criminologists believe this us-and-them syndrome contributes significantly to high township crime rates and a reluctance to cooperate with police investigations.

Blacks can't be blamed for cynicism. A political philosophy that for years regarded them as second-class citizens at best and, at worst, hounded them mercilessly because they broke racially-based laws, fostered this.

Suddenly the crisis has reached a head. Critics in the Afrikaner establishment no longer hesitate to speak out. There are other important factors, of which the apparent failure of the NP's anti-MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] strategy in the election was one. There was widespread condemnation of police tactics against defiance campaigners, particularly in the western Cape, and official alarm at the dramatic increase in clashes between police and township dwellers. There was a lot of "negative" publicity abroad.

Criticism also came from unexpected quarters. N.G. Kerk moderator Johan Heyns effectively called for the acceptance by government of the right to peaceful extra-parliamentary protest. Respected columnists in the NP-supporting Sunday newspaper RAPPART criticized police tactics against protesters' and the outspoken criticism of the riot squad by rebel SAP officer Gregory Rockman won strong support from fellow officers and men—and the public.

All this contributed to a further plunge in the image of the police at home. The propaganda war had long been lost overseas where allegations of police atrocities are generally accepted as fact. The latest example was the death of at least 23 people in the western Cape on general election night. The police don't deny they shot some—but claim they were forced to open fire on attacking mobs which hurled petrol bombs and other flaming missiles at policemen guarding polling stations. They have video material of some of the action. But that's not the story that went out on September 7.

To a large extent the police have themselves to blame. Emergency regulations make it virtually impossible for journalists to report first hand on unrest and official information is sketchy and slow in getting out. Unofficial accounts (in most cases as biased as the police versions) are quickly and easily accessible and make dramatic reading.

The police also have an unfortunate history of being involved in politically unacceptable actions, such as forced removals, pass raids, Immorality Act investigations and violence against detainees. There is also a

perception that the SAP doesn't try as hard as it might to solve crimes—including assassinations—against leftwing activists.

The cumulative result is a widely held and growing perception that something is seriously wrong in the SAP.

De Klerk and Vlok have a lot to do to overcome these suspicions—and see that policemen become allies in the reform process, not obstacles. After all, the current SAP will form the core of a post-apartheid police force. The new political era must herald a new policing era.

This assumes, however, that NP leaders are capable of learning the same lesson themselves—and of allowing the development of an open democratic system which the SAP will be expected to uphold. It also assumes a shift away from "total onslaught" philosophy and a clear demarcation between political opposition and criminal activity.

Vlok assures the FM he is well aware of the situation and is confident the SAP will make the necessary contribution to "the new SA."

To illustrate his commitment, he had last week's policy speech telexed to every station commander in the country with a request to distribute it among the lower ranks. In it Vlok stressed government's resolve to fight "radicals and revolutionaries" but made it clear he would not tolerate police action that exceeds accepted norms. CID [Criminal Investigation Division] chief General Jaap Joubert has been appointed to investigate the election night deaths and allegations by Mitchells Plain cop Gregory Rockman of unacceptable violence by riot policemen against protesting scholars in the town. (Calls for a wider judicial inquiry into police action have been spurned.)

Vlok is aware of the need to depoliticize police duties. This he believes will be achieved through De Klerk's reform programme. And he hopes a move toward successful negotiations with extra-parliamentary forces will end protest and politically motivated violence—which would relieve the SAP of overtly political tasks.

But Vlok remains firmly convinced of the "revolutionary onslaught" against SA which includes the "manipulation" of many extra-parliamentary leaders and organizations, trade unions and the media. Even so, the bottom line remains a political solution.

Vlok concedes that some criticism of the SAP is justified. He accepts, for instance, that policemen have at times resorted to unacceptable levels of violence against demonstrators and that sometimes their attitude towards township residents in particular is not as respectful and courteous as he expects. But he believes much of the other criticism is unfair. Serious crime is in fact not increasing dramatically (see table); and less serious crime tends to go up as the economy goes down.

Vlok says crimes by policemen are always a bitter disappointment to the SAP, but have not increased dramatically when viewed against a 50 percent increase

in the size of the force in recent years. In nearly all cases, he says, criminal acts by policemen have been discovered and successfully investigated by fellow policemen.

He accepts that the financing of the SAP is inadequate and is committed to fighting for more money. There are severe budgetary constraints on all State spending. But public awareness of the needs of the SAP—and the backing of both opposition parties in the House of Assembly—may make it easier for government to increase significantly SAP spending next year.

DP Law & Order spokesman Tiaan van der Merwe says it must be assumed that the SAP comprises ordinary South Africans who want to do a job and do it well. "But they are placed in a position where they must bear the brunt of every wrong policy decision made by the politicians. They also have to carry the can for a government that lacks legitimacy—and on top of that they are undermanned even by international standards."

He says the 300,000 private security personnel in SA reflect the private sector's response to the level of protection an undermanned SAP is able to offer. "Unfortunately, only the wealthy are able to afford private security and, while ordinary whites suffer from lack of adequate protection, ordinary blacks suffer infinitely more due to the far higher crime levels in black areas."

Van der Merwe says government's political programmes—not least of all the "total onslaught" theory—have exerted enormous pressure on the SAP. "Government creates an atmosphere, particularly at election time, for purely political propaganda purposes. It links peaceful protest with acts of violence, and then expects a young, inexperienced policeman to make a distinction that the politicians themselves can't make."

Two areas of SAP operations concern him in particular: the riot squad and the security branch. In many cases riot squad members "clearly operate more viciously and with less discipline" than other units. The situation brutalizes the men, but is no excuse for unacceptable violence. He reckons there is a fundamental fault in training and discipline. For example, he argues that it is wrong for the SAP to use the Maleoskop training base in the north-eastern Transvaal for both counterinsurgency and crowd control training because of the conflict in perception it may create in trainees' minds. While counterinsurgency is an aggressive military function against a military opponent, crowd control is essentially a peace-keeping action among civilians often engaged in generally acceptable political action.

He says the overtly political role of the security branch is resented not only by members of the public, but also in some SAP circles. Security policemen essentially spy on government's extra-parliamentary political opponents and perceived enemies of the State. They feed information up to politicians who then feed orders for action based on the information down a different channel. Incorrect decisions are often made, he says.

Van der Merwe agrees that additional funding for the SAP is an urgent priority, but also feels that the more efficient use of existing resources would help in the short term. And policemen need better channels of communication through which to raise and solve problems, and should have the right to unionize (though not to strike).

Van der Merwe is optimistic that the situation can be turned around fairly easily—if government has the political courage to take the necessary steps. "They must be

given a crash course in what people's rights are. This must go hand in hand with the lifting of the State of Emergency because in terms of the emergency a policeman's discretionary power is virtually unlimited."

The fickle nature of politics makes it relatively easy for politicians to flow with the tide—as De Klerk is now doing. To alter fundamentally the image and outlook of an organization like the SAP is a monumental task. But it has to be done.

Not Exactly Mr Plod

SA Crime Rate

Offenses	1987	1988	% change
Illegal strikes	56	23	-58.93
Public violence	1,973	1,368	-30.66
Illegal possession of arms and ammunition	5,409	4,698	-13.14
Explosives Act	305	280	-8.20
Rape:			
(1) White victims	770	819	+6.36
(2) Non-white victims	17,375	18,549	+6.76
Total:	18,145	19,368	+6.74
Assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm	120,779	125,571	+3.97
Murder:			
(1) White Victims	313	302	-3.51
(2) Non-white victims	9,487	10,329	+8.88
Total:	9,800	10,631	+8.48
Housebreaking:			
(1) Business premises	53,451	49,687	-7.04
(2) White residential premises	140,835	88,936	-36.85
(3) Non-white residential premises	41,406	44,131	+6.58
Robbery:			
(1) Under aggravating circumstances	25,957	25,941	-6.06
(2) Other robbery	20,331	19,906	-2.09
Shoplifting	40,833	40,477	-0.87
Theft—motor vehicle	59,936	57,851	-3.47
All frauds, forgeries, appropriations and embezzlements, etc.	32,560	37,032	+13.73
Arson	4,466	4,882	+1.28
Malicious damage to property	70,427	74,399	+5.64
Insolvency Act	753	604	-19.79
Driving under the influence of alcohol	29,299	25,682	-12.35

Angola

Foreign Minister Views Cease-Fire Agreement

MB0711203689 Luanda ANGOP in French 2001 GMT
2 Nov 89

[Text] Lisbon, 2 Nov (ANGOP)—In Lisbon on 1 November, Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister Pedro de Castro van Dunem said that the Angolan peace process must not be characterized by systematic cease-fires.

The Angolan foreign minister said this during a news conference he held jointly with Joao de Deus Pinheiro, his Portuguese counterpart, at the end of his 2-day visit to that country.

Asked about reports that the signing of a new truce for Angola is imminent, the Angolan official noted that efforts are under way to implement the cease-fire of Gbadolite, Zaire, and the adoption of a document certifying that the two parties want to cease hostilities. This document must be signed by the Angolan Government and by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola].

Angolan Foreign Minister van Dunem said that it is necessary to produce such a document, adding that some efforts have already been made in that direction. He said that Angola must have the guarantee that such a document meets with the approval of both sides.

The Angolan official also said that a mechanism for verifying the implementation of the cease-fire will be necessary, but he added that not all sides had agreed on it yet. To this end, he suggested that this mechanism should be tested so that all sides are assured that it functions correctly.

Asked about the possibility of direct talks with UNITA, Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro van Dunem said that the Angolan side has always expressed the desire that the two parties reach a stage of direct contacts so that they fully understand the conditions and adjust their viewpoints to their common goals. The Angolan minister noted, however, that the two sides had not yet achieved that when UNITA abandoned the talks.

We are going to have to sit down and talk about our problems, but so far the mediation process has not allowed us to reach that stage, the Angolan foreign minister stated. He also recalled that almost immediately after the cease-fire accord, UNITA conducted a military campaign that allowed it to occupy parts of Angolan territory. Moreover, the Angolan official did not exclude the possibility of another political party in Angola after peace has been restored.

The Angolan official did not attach too much importance to Jonas Savimbi's projected visit to Portugal, adding that he did not go to Lisbon to pressure the Portuguese authorities into not receiving him. We are

sure that Savimbi will not receive the kind of treatment he has received elsewhere, the Angolan foreign minister said.

Savimbi Criticized for Serving U.S. Interests

MB0111210589 Luanda ANGOP in Portuguese 1930 GMT
1 Nov 89

[Commentary: "Unparalleled Loyalty"]

[Text] [No dateline as received] The head of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has informed his followers following his return from his recent promenade to the United States that his "friend" George Bush "does not accept exiles, integrations, or clemencies."

By saying this, Savimbi sought to justify his reiterated desire to continue the war and ignore all the principles stipulated at the historic African summit of Gbadolite that was based on the peace plan presented by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

As has been stressed by the eight African heads of state from central and southern Africa on previous occasions, notably in Harare on 22 August this year, an agreement was reached in Gbadolite whose principal points aimed at restoring peace and national reconciliation in Angola.

These points are respect for the Constitution and the principal laws of the People's Republic of Angola, the end of foreign interferences in the internal affairs of Angola, the integration of UNITA elements into the Angolan institutions, a cease-fire, and the end of hostilities inside Angola's territory with effect from midnight, 24 June 1989.

The acceptance of a voluntary and temporary exile by Jonas Savimbi and the formation of a commission to define the modalities for implementing the plan aimed at reconciliation, under the mediation of Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, are some of the other principal points stipulated in the Gbadolite agreement to end the war so that the Angolan people can devote themselves to the country's development.

The UNITA chief's habit of retracting his undertakings is not something new. Jonas Savimbi approved the Gbadolite agreement in the presence of 18 heads of state. Jonas Savimbi is responsible for various acts of murder in Angola for not ordering his followers to end acts of banditry and for publicly denying what was agreed upon at the summit.

As a matter of fact, Savimbi's entire attitude toward the major African summit on peace in Angola exposes the UNITA chief's contempt for life and the well-being of the Angolan people (which he claims to defend) and his treacherous nature in relation to the liberation cause of the African Continent, as is proved by his alliance with the apartheid regime.

To express his gratitude for the financial support from Washington, Jonas Savimbi now quotes the words of the White House chief, which are clear evidence of the policy of interference in Angola's affairs practiced by successive U.S. Administrations. The UNITA chief tries to conceal his loyalty, or shall we say his submission, to this policy.

As a matter of fact, by continuing the war in Angola and ignoring the Angolan people's desire for peace and the African contribution that resulted in the "African solution," Jonas Savimbi is upholding his role as a servant of the U.S. policy to prevent the normal development of Angolan society.

Fortunately, the Angolan people understand that the peace process does not depend on U.S. opinion. The peace process in Angola corresponds to the aspirations for peace of the Angolan people, as is proved by the recent return to Angola of former leaders of the defunct National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

UNITA Commentary Urges Dialogue for Peace

MB0311071089 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0500 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Station commentary: "Further Confusion Should Not Be Added to an Already Enlightened Mediation"]

[Text] The well-known crisis [words indistinct] regarding the mediation of the Angolan problem. Relations between UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and founding President Mobutu Sese Seko, mediator of the Angolan conflict, were difficult, not to say bad. Today, relations between Presidents Mobutu and Savimbi are good, permitting a new approach to the question of a peaceful solution to the war in Angola.

The mediation problem has been solved within the context of the three principles outlined in the Gbadolite declaration, namely peace and national reconciliation, a cease-fire, and a joint negotiations commission under the mediation of Zaire.

The Nice meeting has served to resume the negotiations. The Zairian president is the sole mediator, and it was in this capacity that he told those attending the Nice meeting on 16 October 1989 that he would finalize negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] with the aim of signing a cease-fire. A draft document on the cease-fire was given to President Dr Savimbi. In practice, this is the same document that had been negotiated between the two delegations (?involved) in the Angolan conflict, namely UNITA and the MPLA. As expected, the mediator is the right authority to convey documents to be considered by both sides involved in the conflict. The MPLA has received the draft document on the cease-fire and should give a clear answer.

It is expected that the mediator, in view of the support that both the MPLA and UNITA have given him, will convene a meeting between the two sides to finalize the cease-fire document, which would then be signed so that concrete steps can be taken toward peace and national reconciliation. National and international public opinion now expects the Angolans to hold an urgent meeting under the chairmanship of the mediator to finalize the document, thereby ensuring an end to armed confrontation.

All other forms of approaching the Angolan conflict, such as conferences involving various heads of state intent on creating a collective mediation, are not only contrary to the spirit of mediation but also complicate the solution of the Angolan problem. If measures are not taken to ensure that the existing mediation is kept on the right track, other problems of a secondary nature and which do not concern Angolans will prevail, thereby confusing international public opinion.

The powers interested in peace in Angola, namely the United States, an ally and a friendly country, should contribute to the resumption of negotiations and the signing of a cease-fire. Moreover, President George Bush has played an important role in bringing Presidents Mobutu and Savimbi together.

The MPLA is one of the leading forces in the Angolan conflict. It cannot use any excuses or hide among heads of state to play the role of judge of the Angolan conflict. It is the MPLA and UNITA which should reconcile themselves, and the mediator should permit the Angolans to find peace and national reconciliation. As for the African countries, which are eager to see a free, independent, and reconciled Angola, they could contribute toward a suitable atmosphere for negotiations.

Long live genuine peace and reconciliation! Long live Africa!

*** MPLA/UNITA War of Words Intensifies**

90EF0001a Lisbon JORNAL DE O DIA in Portuguese 5 Sep 89 p 2

[Text] The aggressiveness of the language used by the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers Party] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in their many mutual accusations has gradually mounted in recent weeks, with the two rivals not sparing any adjectives that could belittle the other side.

Although right after the Gbadolite summit, "the traitor Savimbi" became "Dr Savimbi" and the "group of pawns" became the "organization," now the UNITA leader has again fallen in status and is being called a "swindler and an incorrigible cheap-talker."

Even before Gbadolite on last 22 June, the attacks launched by both sides never attained the current aggressiveness.

UNITA propaganda is not lagging behind, and in a recent broadcast of the voice of the "black rooster," an editorial entitled "Out With the Hucksters" was read. The principal government leaders were the target of the commentator's insults.

Describing the entire party and government leadership as "corrupt," the broadcaster went much further and on the day of the president's 47th birthday, accused "the Sao Tome wing of Government House [Futungo de Belas]" of jeopardizing the peace, asking that "it let Angolans resolve things among themselves."

The "appeal" requested the head of state to "return to Sao Tome and Principe," in a reference to the maternal origins of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and made it clear that "the Number One in the regime is not Angolan."

"Incorrigible Cheap-Talker"

In its Sunday edition, *JORNAL DE ANGOLA* published one of its most virulent attacks ever on UNITA and Jonas Savimbi under the title "However He Blusters and Swaggers." "The unhappily famous chieftain of the 'black rooster,' persona grata to some of the most reactionary secret services of the century (the former PIDE/DGS [International Police for Defense of the State/General Directorate for Security, Portugal], the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency, United States], and the BOSS [Department of National Security, Republic of South Africa]), confessed traitor of the liberation struggle in Africa and the obedient ally of apartheid, a blood-thirsty demagogue dividing the popular forces, an incorrigible cheap-talker with considerable resources and unconfessable ends, a bungler whose mistakes have repeatedly been revealed..."—the *JORNAL DE ANGOLA* called Jonas Savimbi all of these things.

In another passage, the editorial added: "In view of his ambitious and opportunistic nature...a traffic policeman with anti-Angolan interests, a protege of colonialists, a puppet of Pretoria's racist regime, and an internationally indicted criminal who manages his criminal organization using methods similar to the most dreadful terrorist plots..."

"A gangster and unrepentant liar, Savimbi deceived the African heads of state present at Gbadolite, his own friends..." the editorial went on. "What interests him (Savimbi) is power and the possibility of exercising it to his own exclusive advantage. And this (which may be true) the Angolan people are not going to allow to happen, losing the historic conquests of their revolution. However he blusters and swaggers, the destiny of the rooster is once again isolation."

In view of what ideologists from the MPLA and UNITA are saying, a reporter cannot help wondering whether "some process of national reconciliation is not actually going on now."

* Results of UNITA Congress Analyzed

90EF0015a Lisbon *EXPRESSO* in Portuguese
30 Sep 89 p 16

[Article by Maria Teresa Guerreiro: "UNITA Adopts 'Flexible Firmness'"]

[Text] UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] will head into new negotiations with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] with a program of peace and reconciliation and a flexible attitude, as a result of the second extraordinary congress which took place in Jamba between Monday and Thursday [25 to 28 September]. But as Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, said, while speaking to journalists on the afternoon of the last day of the meetings, the flexibility of his movement is tempered by what is "reasonable," and, if the MPLA remains inflexible, then UNITA will remain firm.

This congress was convened following last month's summit in Harare, in which eight African chiefs of state supported the interpretation given by Luanda to the Gbadolite agreement, as having adopted the MPLA's peace plan. Even before the final vote, the congress, which was held in an open-air pavilion in an atmosphere of festivity and expectancy, had already adhered persistently and emotionally to the words of command: "Exile— never, never" and "We want democratic elections."

Voting by secret ballot, which lasted all of Wednesday night and into Thursday morning, the 3,000 delegates (a number officially confirmed by Savimbi on the final day) went on record in favor of the plan proposed by the movement's leadership with just 1 vote against and 14 "abstentions."

"Abstentions" is in quotation marks because the voting system was unusual. Faced with a list of 12 questions—many of which could not be answered with "yes" or "no"—the delegates had to go on record with a bloc vote, after Savimbi explained to them that, in their totality, the questions simultaneously constituted support for UNITA policy and repudiation of the MPLA position. Anyone who absolutely agreed should, during the night, put a piece of paper with the UNITA flag on it—red and green striped and with the image of a black rooster superimposed over the rising sun—in the closed ballot boxes, which were set up in temporary tents.

"First" Vote

Anyone who agreed but with some reservations, or, as Savimbi put it, "less than 100 percent but more than 50 percent", should place a ballot with the photograph of the movement's leader in the ballot box. And anyone who agreed less than 50 percent or who disagreed should use a piece of blank paper as a ballot.

The voting, even though it was a crude system, met with the people's liking, and they patiently lined up even as early as 0530 hours. A soldier who was on duty at the Jamba base told *EXPRESSO* that, when told that the

voting had begun, he hurried to the pavilion because he did not want to miss out on voting—"Because I had never voted..."

The plan that the delegates voted on was presented right at the beginning of the opening session, not by Savimbi, who made the opening speech, but by Jorge Valentim, who is responsible for UNITA information and is the leader of the delegation of negotiators in the Gbadolite process, who presented a communique to the congress.

An African Force

The plan, which consists of five points, calls for democratic elections at the end of an 18-month period starting with the signing of a cease-fire, through direct negotiations with the MPLA, the formation of a transitional government—whose priority task will be to revise the constitution—and supervision of the cease-fire by an African force.

Later, Savimbi would name as possible participants in this force "Morocco, Nigeria, Togo, and others", and would tell EXPRESSO that is was also within this context that there could be some participation by Portugal. The UNITA leader would also tell EXPRESSO that, even though the plan (which is otherwise similar to the one that guided Namibia's transition to independence) has been worked out with a period of 18 months in mind, the flexibility of his movement would allow it to be postponed in case this should prove necessary to consolidate the concept of multiple parties and the process of national reconciliation itself.

According to the UNITA plan, this process is to begin with the setting up of the government of national unity and transition.

Conciliation and Firmness

The outstanding note of this congress was the contrast between Savimbi's conciliatory tone and the firm position and strong language used by Jorge Valentim and by many base delegates who spoke out throughout the day on Tuesday and Wednesday.

Conversations with delegates and high UNITA officials in the days preceding the Congress clearly point to the existence of a hard line that does not look kindly on any attempt at working things out. Some of these individuals would even prefer to continue the military option.

Savimbi's line at this moment is entirely conciliatory, although it is clear that he is trying to maintain a balance between the two positions, without being accused of betraying either one of them.

Speaking to journalists on Thursday, Savimbi would say that the military solution is not a realistic possibility. His opening speech contained very clear references and warnings to the hard liners. UNITA's leader said, for example, that the movement could never place itself in the position of being accused of constituting an obstacle to peace in Angola.

At another point in his participation in the opening of the congress, Savimbi stated that UNITA had to commit itself to accepting the results of the elections, even if it were to lose. And anyone who wanted to continue the war should not count on him. "I am not a bandit," he stated.

At the same time, in the lengthy and detailed explanation that he gave the delegates before the beginning of the voting, as well as at the news conference on Thursday afternoon, Savimbi stressed that intransigence on the part of the MPLA would be received with intransigence on the part of UNITA, which would know how to continue to fight until the MPLA yielded to serious talks.

Put an End to "An Eye For an Eye"

UNITA's leader also announced that he had asked the director of the rebel radio station Voice of the Black Rooster [Voz do Galo Negro] to stop immediately the most flagrant and insulting propaganda attacks directed at Luanda and, specifically, at Jose Eduardo dos Santos, which he himself had had occasion to hear in recent days. "Let's put a stop to all this stuff about 'Sao Tomean' and 'puppet'," he said. "Let's stop this eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth business."

UNITA is now hoping that the peace process will be accelerated, and, for that reason, it wants to ask for more direct involvement by the United States in the Angolan process. In fact, the congress ended one day earlier than planned to allow for Savimbi's departure for Washington on Thursday night.

The evening before, the team of UNITA negotiators had departed for the American capital. It was composed of Jorge Valentim; General Wanbu, chief of services of military intelligence; Jeremias Chitunda, the movement's vice president; Colonel Jara Jamba, who is responsible for education; and Colonel Elias Salupeto, a member of the board of directors and the man responsible for agriculture. According to rumors that were circulating here in Jamba, there would also be a meeting in Washington of General Franca Ndalu, apparently accompanied by a delegation from the MPLA that would include Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Venancio de Moura. Should this rumor be confirmed, it would be difficult to interpret their presence there as a coincidence.

There is widespread speculation in Jamba on the possibility that informal contacts between the two parties in the Angolan conflict may take place in Washington. As he would state at the closed meeting that signaled the official end of the congress, Savimbi went to Washington "because of a question of necessity and not for tourism." He was accompanied there by his wife and by economist Fatima Rogue.

Botswana

Government To Host Frontline State Meeting

MB3010151689 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1345 GMT 30 Oct 89

[Text] Gaborone Oct 30 SAPA—Botswana will host a Frontline inter-state defence and security meeting in Gaborone from Tuesday [31 October] to November 3, the office of president Dr Quett Masire announced on Monday.

The BOTSWANA PRESS AGENCY, BOPA, reports the meeting will discuss security-related matters of mutual interest and concern. It is held every six months.

Apart from Botswana, members from the Frontline States of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe will also attend.

Mauritius

Prime Minister Offers To Host RSA Talks

MB2310175989 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1100 GMT 23 Oct 89

[Text] Mauritius has offered itself as a venue for talks between the South African Government and opposition black leaders.

The offer was made by Mauritian Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth at the Commonwealth summit, in Malaysia.

Sources say this is not the first time Mauritius has offered itself as a venue for talks on the South African issue.

Despite its strong economic links with South Africa, Mauritius is a stern critic of apartheid.

* Interpol Suspects Businessman of Drug Dealing

90EF0025A Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French
27 Sep 89 p 12

[Article by Harish Chundunsingh: "Interpol Watching Activities of Mauritian Businessmen: Suspected of Running International Drug Trafficking Ring"]

[Text] Interpol [International Criminal Police Organization] is looking into the activities of a Mauritian businessman suspected of being involved in an international drug trafficking ring, we have learned from police sources.

Interpol headquarters recently tasked the Mauritian branch of the organization to verify a number of details about the businessman.

He is suspected of being part of an international network operating out of Madagascar. According to our information, Interpol has one of his visitor cards and has given the information on it to the Mauritian police.

According to the same source, the businessman has nothing to do with a heroin trafficking ring broken up last month by French authorities. Another Mauritian national, originally from Port Louis, was involved with that network. He had been living in France since 1976.

On 21 August French police questioned one Pakistani and two French nationals riding in a Peugeot. A careful search of the automobile led to the discovery of 2.3 kilograms of heroin. During interrogation the three mentioned the name of the 35-year-old Mauritian. They told investigators they frequently bought the drug in Amsterdam and transported it to the Mauritian.

The Port Louis native was arrested, and Interpol called on the Mauritian police to carry out a full investigation.

* Air Ocean Indian Denied Landing Rights

90EF0025B Port Louis LE MAURITIEN in French
25 Sep 89 p 5

[Article by Habib Mosaheb: "Jugnauth Says No Landing Rights for 'Air Ocean Indian'"]

[Text] Victoria—Sir Anerood Jugnauth [SAJ] said yesterday morning that Mauritius will not grant landing rights to Air Ocean Indian. Jugnauth, concluding a 4-day official visit to the Seychelles, made the announcement at a press conference at the Mahe airport shortly before returning to Mauritius.

"We believe that certain big shots are behind the Air Ocean Indian project, and they want to cut the ground from under our feet. The countries of the region and members of the COI [Indian Ocean commission] were not consulted. They were not even informed about it.... We have in our possession documents that clearly show that certain individuals are actually out to destroy us, while trying to convince us they want to help us solve our problems," SAJ said.

SAJ said he had called a meeting with promoters of the project to inform them that Air Ocean Indian would not be authorized to land on Mauritian territory or overfly Mauritian territorial waters. "The Air Ocean Indian project is unacceptable. Every country in the region is a sovereign state; we each have our own airline and our own planes and must promote those interests.... We can't let them go around behind our backs," he said.

SAJ also said the government will continue to demand the return of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which is counting on a lot of help from "all our comrades" as well as international public opinion. He noted in this connection that the English have always publicly said that the Chagos archipelago (including Diego Garcia) will be returned to Mauritius when the West no longer needs those islands for "its defense."

"We hope that they are going to keep their word and will not try any dirty tricks," the prime minister said.

The 'Duval Obstacle'

SAJ said he believes that the recent relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers and progress in disarmament negotiations will make it possible, within a relatively short time, to hold an international conference on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, a conference which should have taken place years ago.

He also said the departure of Sir Gaetan Duval from the government has to some extent facilitated the rapprochement between Seychelles and Mauritius. He added, however, that he has always been a friend of President Rene. We have had political, economic, and social problems, and in the last few years we have focused our efforts on trying to resolve them, he said, but now we are in a better position to "look outward." "We are not blaming everything on Duval, but it is obvious that the latter was an obstacle in relations between Seychelles and Mauritius," SAJ said.

The prime minister also noted that regional and bilateral cooperation has finally gotten off the ground and from now on should "advance more rapidly."

In response to questions from Seychellois journalists, SAJ asserted that the drug scourge has almost been eliminated on Mauritius, thanks to the government's courageous actions. "We have enacted very strong laws to combat the drug menace, including the death penalty. There was opposition to that. I had a very hard time getting those bills passed, and at one point I thought the government was going to fall. Certain people resorted to threats, but I said it was now or never, and those who want to leave the government were free to do so," he said.

Regarding the environmental degradation that rapid industrialization has brought to Mauritius, SAJ said that it has not yet reached the point of no return, and measures have been taken in time to remedy the situation. The prime minister admitted that the government has not paid enough attention to environmental problems in the last few years, explaining that its first priority had been to solve the serious socio-economic problems the country was facing.

* Industrialization, Economic Growth Detailed

34200005 East Berlin AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT (No 34)
in German 23 Aug 89 p 3

[Text] The island nation of Mauritius has demonstrated dynamic economic growth since 1983. It can be attributed primarily to an economic policy that is suited to the country's unique conditions.

The economic reform policy introduced by the Government in 1983 was directed principally at eliminating the economy's previous extreme dependence on sugar exports. Significant measures to achieve this goal were the mobilization of domestic and foreign sources of

investment, as well as the expansion of an industrial export zone (Export Processing Zone, or EPZ).

There was progress in many areas in the following years:

The gross domestic product (GDP) grew in the period from 1984 to 1988 at a real annual average of just under 7 percent. In 1988 it was about M 25.12 billion (about \$1.9 billion) at current prices. The per capita GDP reached more than \$1,700.

The engine for growth was the industrialization process, which was assisted by favorable investment conditions for domestic and foreign capital (including a low wage scale). It was concentrated on a few export-oriented branches of light industry, mainly textiles, clothing, and to a much lesser extent the jewelry, watch, and leather industry.

The share of the processing industry in the GDP increased from 15 percent in 1983 to 25 percent in 1988. The expansion of the EPZ (Export Processing Zone) was a major contributing factor. Gross production of the Zone has grown annually by an average of more than 25 percent since 1983.

Between 1985 and 1987 registrations of foreign investments in the EPZ totaled more than M 370 million, mainly from Hong Kong, France, the United States, Taiwan, and Great Britain.

Foreign trade since 1983 also shows great increases, with the average annual growth rate of imports (30 percent) being higher than that of exports (26 percent). This can be attributed to the heavy dependency of imports on export production and tourism. The need for imports is particularly high in the case of intermediate products, foodstuffs, petrochemical products, and machinery and equipment for export production. Importation was broadly liberalized, but is still subject to approval. Certificates of origin are not required.

The export structure has changed radically from 1983 to 1987. Products from the textile and clothing industry increased their share from 21 percent to 48 percent. In contrast, the share of sugar and honey dropped during the same period from 62 percent to 37 percent.

The trade debit balance was more than compensated for in recent years by the credit balance of services, so that the [overall] balance showed a surplus each time. Income from tourism has tripled from 1985 to 1988. In 1988 it amounted to about \$188 million.

In June 1988 currency reserves were estimated to be M 4.8 billion. That is the equivalent of the value of imports for about 3 months.

The debt service rate is relatively low, at about 10 percent (1988).

Unemployment, estimated to be about 30 percent in 1983, has been totally eliminated through the creation of new jobs in the export industry. Currently there is actually a labor shortage.

Need for More Structural Changes

The economic growth phase of the last few years has also highlighted some problems, which place new demands on the flexibility of the economic policy. For 1989-90 the prognosis was for a weakening of growth in foreign trade and tourism. The inflation rate will probably rise to 15 percent. At present, clear limits are beginning to be seen in some areas of the infrastructure and in construction capacity, as well as the emerging effects of environmental pollution from industry and tourism.

Since ecological problems endanger the continued expansion of tourism most of all, the government has passed an environmental protection program for a period of 5 years, with the financial support of the World Bank (cost: \$93 million).

State development planning is concentrating for the coming years on expanding food production, especially through irrigation projects, on developing the communications network as well as infrastructure projects, and on building a major highway, and rebuilding bridges.

The one-sided orientation of export production toward the textile and clothing industry in the EPZ is hampering development. The poor competitive ability of many small operations and rising wage costs are pushing developments in the direction of increased mechanization in the industry and improving product quality. At the same time closer interlocking between the domestic and the export market and/or diversification of foreign markets is becoming urgent. In the past, about 60 percent of textile and clothing exports have gone to France and the United States.

The state is promoting investment in other branches of the processing industry in order to diversify export production. Trends indicate increased capacity and the construction of new production facilities for leather goods, including shoes, jewelry, film, precision tool products, and electronic and electrotechnical consumer goods. Two joint ventures for computer software have been formed with British and French firms.

Plans for Intermediate Trade and Offshore Banking

The trade, financial and capital relations of the country are largely directed toward the EC and East Asian countries. About one-third of the imports in 1988 came from EC countries (principally France, Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy), 9 percent to both the United States and the Republic of South Africa [RSA] and about 30 percent from the Asian and Southeast Asian region, the principal partners being Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, South Korea, and Singapore. More than 70 percent of exports go to EC countries. (As an associate member of the EC, Mauritius has duty-free access to this market.) Relationships with African countries, besides the RSA, concentrate on Kenya, Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

Mauritius has set itself the goal of developing in the next few years into a mediator for economic and financial ties between Africa and Asia, involving Europe. To this end, the harbor of Port Louis is to be expanded into a free port by 1991, in order to develop intermediate trade between the Far East and African countries, but also to European countries, including socialist countries.

In 1988 Mauritius began to establish itself as an international banking and financial center. The Bank of England is providing advisory service. The first foreign banks to be granted a license in 1988, some of which were already operating in Mauritius, are the Credit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris, Barclays Bank, the Indian Bank of Boroda, and the Malayan South East Asia Bank. More banks are to follow in the current year, along with insurance companies and intermediary firms.

With French technical support, there is a plan to develop a securities exchange market, in order to stimulate savings and investment activity even more. This planned forced development of the financial and capital market could, in the long term, favor credit companies and capital investment in the East African and South African area. At present it is mostly Asian countries/territories such as India, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, which are competing with Japan in the search for new opportunities to expand, that are showing open interest in investment activity and capital relationships with Mauritius.

Namibia

Pienaar Spokesman Comments on Botha Allegations

MB0211151589 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1457 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Windhoek Nov. 2 SAPA—South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha did not contact Namibia's administrator-general [AG], Louis Pienaar, before he called a press conference on Wednesday [1 November] to air allegations that SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] military forces were massing on the Angolan border.

Administration spokesman Eberhard Hofmann said at the AG's press conference in Windhoek on Thursday the messages used as evidence by Mr Botha were relayed to the AG's office "more or less simultaneously" with the press conference in Pretoria.

The transcripts of the messages did not pass through the AG's office on their way to Pretoria.

Mr Hofmann said the messages—Mr Botha claimed they were intercepted from UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] communications, but UNTAG denies they emanated from any UNTAG source—did not "to our knowledge" come from any intelligence gathering exercise attached to the colonial administration. The AG had no idea how or where they were obtained, he said. Despite Mr Botha saying the SA [South African] security

forces had been put on "red alert," Mr Pienaar did not think it was "touch and go" whether the election next week would go ahead.

Earlier Thursday he issued a statement to assure the public and government officials that preparations for voting were going ahead.

Mr Pienaar is due to address the public on television and radio at 8pm Thursday.

The AG was not unduly alarmed by Mr Botha's allegations of an imminent PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] invasion, but he had ordered steps be taken to investigate the matter, Mr Hofmann said.

He said Mr Pienaar had not given instructions that whites be put on alert, and civil defence units which were preparing for an emergency were doing so at their own initiative.

Mr Hofmann said attempts by the joint commission at Oshakati to establish whether Mr Botha's allegations were true would probably yield an answer late on Thursday night or early Friday morning.

Verification Committee Ends Meeting in Oshakati

*MB0211195189 Windhoek Domestic Service
in Afrikaans 1900 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Text] The joint verification mechanism's subcommittee on information of the joint commission between South Africa, Cuba, and Angola has decided after its meeting at Oshakati to meet daily, if and when it is deemed necessary.

In a joint statement issued after its meeting, the subcommittee said future meetings will be held daily at Oshakati and weekly in Windhoek. The subcommittee was formed during the joint committee's meeting in Pretoria and Johannesburg last month.

Ambassador Alberto Ribeiro, a subcommittee spokesman and head of the Angolan observer team in South-West Africa/Namibia, said at Oshakati that the committee's task is to take note of and investigate all allegations of violations of the settlement plan for the territory, as contained in the 1988 New York agreements and the international independence plan for South-West Africa/Namibia.

Today's meeting was called following South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha's statement on the presence of armed PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] members south of the 16th parallel in Angola. Mr Cedric Thornberry, the director of the UN special representative's office in the territory, said at Oshakati he is not prepared to amend in any way the UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] statement issued last night in reaction to the allegations. He said UNTAG stands by its declaration that it is not aware of any infiltration or of messages from its military contingent intercepted by South Africa.

He was assisted at today's talks by Mr (Amatousou), UNTAG's communication liaison officer. The UNTAG delegation attended the meeting as observers under Colonel Farouk, its chief military observer in the north, and Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, the UNTAG police commander in Ovambo.

Mr Kobus Bauermeister, the head of the administrator general's delegation, said the talks took place in a friendly spirit. The details of the discussions were not revealed.

Pienaar Assures Public on Security Situation

*MB0211195689 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1925 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Excerpt] Windhoek Nov 2 SAPA—The administrator-general of Namibia, Mr Louis Pienaar, said on Thursday the alleged UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] despatches released by South African Foreign Minister Mr Pik Botha earlier this week constituted no new data and confirmed previous information in his possession, reports SWABC [South-West African Broadcasting Corporation] Television news.

Mr Pienaar was reacting to allegations by South Africa of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] military activity north of the border with Angola.

"It would be irresponsible of me, and of the police, to not make provision for any eventuality. And I want to assure the public that our preparations for such eventualities are in order. It does not mean to say that anything would happen, but we have to take into account all possibilities."

Mr Pienaar said he believed all the political parties wanted to see results in the election. As things were before the allegations, and as they were presently, he did not think they should be unduly concerned over intervention of the nature of April 1 this year.

Mr Pienaar was referring to the incursions of PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] fighters into Namibia soon after the peace process formally got off the ground.

"The election will go ahead in the present climate of calm and peace which already exists. In Ovambo and other parts of the north, I have been assured by police on the ground that intimidation has dropped off. Violence is out. It is not happening anymore," said the administrator-general.

Mr Pienaar said he thought it was "more a psychosis than an actual threat". [passage omitted]

SWAPO Military Activity Reports 'Hoax'

*MB0311111689 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1106 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Pretoria, Nov 3, SAPA—It is being speculated in Pretoria that a "crackpot" in the Windhoek area may have been responsible for the radio transmissions which

the minister of foreign affairs on Tuesday [31 October] said were UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] inter-base transmissions purporting to reveal increased SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] military activity on the eve of the Namibian elections.

Mr Pik Botha alluded to the "crackpot" possibility at a municipal by-election meeting in Johannesburg on Thursday [2 November] night.

A government technical team is expected to report to the South African authorities on Friday on the findings of an urgent investigation it has conducted in Namibia into the messages.

If the messages are found to be a hoax, it could be a severe embarrassment for the SA [South African] Government, although Mr Botha said on Thursday night, "whether it is a crackpot or UNTAG who sent the messages is not important. what is important is that we don't want a recurrence of the April 1 bloodshed."

He said if the information had been true, it would have been the height of irresponsibility not to tell the public.

"And if it is false, then it is an irresponsible act by the person or party which sent the information in the first place."

The UN has asserted that the messages were "phony," while the U.S. has said it has found no evidence of imminent large-scale SWAPO military incursions across the Namibian/Angolan border.

Grenades Explode at Home of DTA Official 3 Nov

*MB0311070989 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0708 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Windhoek Nov 3 SAPA—Two RGD-5 handgrenades of Soviet origin detonated at the home of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance's [DTA] vice-president, Mr Mishake Muyongo, at Katima Mulilo in Caprivi early on Friday.

Police spokesman Chief Inspector Kierie du Rand said in Windhoek the grenades thrown at Mr Muyongo's home exploded in the garden, causing minor damage.

The house was not occupied at the time. The grenades exploded about 2am.

Said 'Plot' To Discredit SWAPO

*MB0311099789 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0834 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Oshakati, Nov 3. SAPA—The bombing early Friday morning of the house of the vice-president of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA], Mr Mishake Muyongo, was a DTA plot to discredit SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], according to the director of SWAPO in Oshakati.

Mzwee Simon Kaukungua told SAPA here "someone" who was privy to the bombing operation was sympathetic to SWAPO and had given SWAPO this information on Thursday [2 November] night.

Late on Thursday night Mr Kaukungua told SAPA:

"The DTA are planning to bomb one of their own houses belonging to one of their leaders and then to pin the blame on SWAPO...this is just another tactic in the overall plan to sabotage the election."

He said the plan was to bomb Mr Muyongo's house while he was out and then create the impression SWAPO was responsible.

Meanwhile police spokesman, Chief Inspector Kierie du Rand, said in Windhoek the grenades thrown at Mr Muyongo's home exploded in the garden, causing minor damage.

RSA-Cuban-Angolan Body To Monitor Borders

*MB0311102889 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0930 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Windhoek, Nov 3. SAPA—The joint commissions [JC] intelligence committee is to monitor the Namibia-Angola border on a regular basis, a spokesman for the administrator-general's office, David Venter, said in Windhoek on Friday.

The intelligence committee, which includes officials from the joint commission member countries, South Africa, Cuba and Angola, met at Oshakati in northern Namibia on Thursday [2 November] to discuss the alleged military activity by SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] fighters in southern Angola.

Mr Venter said the committee had decided to monitor certain points along the border and to meet regularly.

The role of the joint commission is to oversee regional peace accords in south-western Africa and the decision to set up the intelligence committee was taken at a JC meeting in Johannesburg last month.

Perez de Cuellar: UN Messages 'Forgeries'

*MB0311085989 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0849 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Windhoek Nov 3 SAPA—South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha has been sharply criticised for his statement on Wednesday [1 November] that SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] was massing troops on Namibia's border with Angola to invade the country and cancel next week's elections.

Communications of the United Nations referred to by Mr Botha to substantiate his claims were forgeries and South Africa was aware of it, the UN secretary-general, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, said in New York.

Senior UN spokesman here, Cedric Thornberry, attended Thursday's [2 November] meeting of the joint monitoring committee at Oshakati to investigate Mr Botha's allegations.

Mr Thornberry said afterwards he was not prepared to change earlier statements by UNTAG [UN Transition Assistance Group] that the UN had no evidence to confirm Mr Botha's statement.

The chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA], Dirk Mudge, said Mr Botha would have to explain to Namibia if his allegations proved to be unfounded.

Mr Botha's announcement amounted to intimidation of Namibian voters days before the UN-supervised elections, Mr Mudge said.

"He sowed suspicion which did the country and the DTA a lot of harm," Mr Mudge added.

SWAPO dismissed the claims as "naive and childish".

The administrator-general [AG], Louis Pienaar, said he thought the alleged imminent invasion by SWAPO guerrillas was "more of a psychosis than an actual threat".

A news report on Friday said Mr Pienaar was considering resigning from public life for the way in which Mr Botha told South African media about the alleged massing of SWAPO troops, without first informing the AG's office.

Mr Pienaar said speculating about his resignation was "much exaggerated" but declined to elaborate.

In editorials on Friday THE NAMIBIAN newspaper wrote Mr Botha made "a major faux pas" on Wednesday about a poised SWAPO presence on Namibia's border with Angola.

"Was he set up and if so by whom and for what purpose?"

Various theories have been forwarded for this rather surprising behaviour: That he made the shock announcement to take the attention away from internal (South African) problems, in the form of increased problems within the South African Police for his government to take a yes or no stand on the ANC's [African National Congress] legality.

"If ever there was a country that could be set on fire by rumour and gossip, it is Namibia, and Mr Botha happily fuelled the conflagration," the newspaper regarded as sympathetic to SWAPO commented.

A columnist in the TIMES OF NAMIBIA (pro-democratic Turnhalle Alliance) wrote "Pik lied once too often".

The columnist noted Mr Botha had also "overplayed his hand" when he visited Windhoek two week ago.

Mr Botha dismissed contentions that internationally-agreed constitutional guidelines for Namibia were an important issue, yet the United States and the United Kingdom in this week's UN Security Council session insisted the agreement reached in 1982 should be honoured in full, THE TIMES wrote.

West Urged To Help Solve Namibian Problem

MB0211062089 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Station commentary]

[Text] This morning, just 5 days before the historic elections in South-West Africa/Namibia, the whole independence program hangs in the balance.

Namibian independence, so long awaited, has once again been placed in jeopardy by the deceit of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], which, in public, supports free and fair elections but, away from the media spotlights, plots armed aggression. On 1 April came the treacherous armed invasion by SWAPO units that nearly derailed the independence train: Yesterday, 7 months later, came the disclosure of another armed SWAPO threat to a peaceful transition to Namibian independence.

This disturbing development follows another disturbing development this week when the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution that once again placed a question mark over United Nations impartiality.

In the resolution, South Africa was accused of not complying fully with all the provisions of the independence program. The accusations center on three issues: discriminatory legislation, the South-West African Territory force, and the former Koevoet counterinsurgency unit.

The resolution called for the immediate repeal of such restrictive and discriminatory laws and regulations as inhibit the holding of free and fair elections. All discriminatory legislation that affects broad general issues in South-West Africa/Namibia has, in actual fact, been repealed.

Certain provisions remain that can be construed as discriminatory, but these are of a technical nature and will have no influence on whether the election is free and fair.

For example, ethnically-based, second-tier administrations still exist. These institutions have, however, been depoliticized with the resignation some months ago of all political office holders. Their continued operation by civil servants is ~~unacceptable~~ for the smooth running of government structures until a new administration takes over on independence.

Similarly, both the South-West African Territory Force and Koevoet have long since been disbanded. Problems that were raised in this regard by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, UNTAG, were of a technical nature and have now been resolved to the satisfaction of UNTAG.

The inclusion of these technical matters in the Security Council resolution resulted from pressure from Zambia and Zimbabwe, in response to representations from SWAPO. The fact that the Security Council has once again kow-towed to SWAPO's destructive approach to the independence plan raises renewed concern about the impartiality of the United Nations.

The Security Council also left in the air the question of the majority required for the constitution of an independent Namibia. A 1982 agreement provided for an independence constitution to be passed by a two-thirds majority.

SWAPO is now agitating for a simple majority, but the provision for a two-thirds majority must be viewed as an essential ingredient of the independence process that must be honored by all parties.

The independence program is this morning being threatened by armed units of SWAPO, and, at this hour, South African security forces are on alert to resist, if necessary, the SWAPO threat. But, the government has made it clear that it seeks a diplomatic solution.

The onus of responsibility in this regard is now on the United Nations and the Western powers that helped put together the settlement plan.

South Africa's responsibility is to the people of South-West Africa/Namibia and to ensure that they obtain independence in a peaceful, free, and fair manner. It is a responsibility that can neither be diluted nor abrogated.

Swaziland

King Mswati III Returns From World Tour

MB2810175789 Mbabane Domestic Service in English
1600 GMT 28 Oct 89

[Excerpt] His Majesty King Mswati III has returned home after an historic trip abroad that took him to two African states, the United States of America, Malaysia, and the Republic of China. [passage omitted]

Zimbabwe

Zambia's Kaunda Arrives in Country 3 Nov

MB0311090489 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0825 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Harare, Nov 3, SAPA—Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda arrived here on Friday morning for a meeting of the Zambia/Zimbabwe Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

He was met at the Harare International Airport by President Robert Mugabe, ZIANA reports.

President Kaunda was accompanied by his foreign affairs minister, Luke Mwanashiku, finance minister,

Gibson Chigaga, and power, transport and communications minister, Enos Haimbe.

* Commentary Urges Party Cooperation, Unity

34000060a Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE
in English 15 Sep 89 p 4

[Commentary: "Now Is Not the Time To Jeopardise Unity"]

[Text] There are disturbing reports that relations between Zanu(PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front] and PF Zapu [Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union] are somewhat strained at present, with one participant at a business conference in Harare this week claiming that a collapse of the unity agreement was imminent.

We sincerely hope that the reports are an exaggeration of an understandable period of adjustment that is taking place as the congress at which the united party is to be actually created draws near.

The accord reached so far has been of obvious benefit to the two parties, to the supporters and to the country. Anyone who has not visited Bulawayo during the past two years would be pleasantly surprised at the buoyancy and optimism of commerce and industry, which has led to the creation of a wide range of employment. The city has thrown off its pessimism and morale is high. The same can be said for the rural areas in the two Matabeleland provinces.

No one, surely, can contemplate a return to the open animosity of a few years ago, which had such a disastrous effect on Matabeleland particularly, on the post-Independence hopes of the Zimbabwe Government and people.

The merging of two parties into one was never regarded as a simple exercise of exchanging membership cards. It must be a gradual progress towards a shared view of Zimbabwe's future and a sharing of power to effect plans and policies. Political and personal considerations are complicating elements in this process, but should never be put before the national interest.

There is talk that some of the younger members of PF Zapu are unhappy at the agreement made by the senior leaders of the party. There is also a resistance to the obvious fact that PF Zapu will lose its separate identity. But those who wish to retain a separate status must also consider the benefits of a unified party; many of which are already very evident. There are PF Zapu members in the highest ranks of government, who have considerable influence on the way in which Zimbabwe is governed. This presence also extends throughout the administration of the country.

This influence would not be possible if the two parties were to revert to their completely separate identities, for in a democracy the winner takes all the prizes. This simple point should be pondered by those who might be

contemplating ending the present important and valuable cooperation between the two parties.

Zanu(PF) must also be conscious of the fact that while it will be the dominant partner in the new party, it must avoid the arrogant use of its majority position. There must be a willingness to not only listen to alternative views but also to modify policies to take account of other perceptions of the country's future.

Nor will it serve any of those within the two parties to ignore their obvious tribal affiliations. This is a fact of life, regrettable though it may be. From this background there arise cultural and historical perspectives that determine quite different attitudes to current economic and social policies. This need not necessarily be regarded as a divisive influence, as long as there is sympathy for different viewpoints within the corridors of real power in Zimbabwe.

This comment may sound like a defence of a one-party system, a concept with which we have always disagreed, but at this time in the country's history, when the benefits of bipartisan cooperation are so evident, anything that threatens political peace is to be condemned.

Those who might put personal political ambition and power before the best interests of the country need to reconsider their position most carefully. The consequences could be very grave for Zimbabwe.

Continued political cooperation now, to ensure that the nation can enter its second decade without a costly and unnecessary division of talent and resources, will help to ensure that amendments to the constitution to impose a one-party state will not be necessary now, or in the future.

*** New Teachers' Union Prompts Mixed Reactions**

34000060b Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English
27 Aug 89 p 2

[Text] While some teachers have expressed their support for the newly-formed Zimbabwe Teachers Union (Zitu), the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association (Zimta) has strongly opposed this development.

The president of Zimta, Cde Rangarirai Masarira, described the formation of the union "as an untimely, divisive move intended to confuse teachers, the Government and the public".

"The formation of Zitu would be a direct contravention of the 1987 Education Act, Section 61(1) which states that...the minister shall recognise one national association of teachers which shall represent all teachers in Zimbabwe," said Cde Masarira in a statement.

He said the idea to form a union had been discussed and shelved during Zimta's annual national conference in 1986 and 1988. This idea had been advocated by the new Zitu chairman, Cde Felix Mafa.

He accused the Zitu chairman of being a disgruntled back-bencher of Zimta whose frustration had led to the abortive formation of splinter groups not confined to Zimta alone.

He said Zimta participated in the national joint council monthly meetings where civil servants' conditions of work were continuously reviewed with a view to improving them.

Answering allegations on why the association was not providing legal representation in courts to fight members' cases, Cde Masarira said: "Zimta cannot and will not harbour or protect such unprofessional miscreants because it has its professional and trade union reputation and the child to protect, and it has proper channels to follow when any of its members has been genuinely aggrieved or legally injured."

On collective bargaining, he said the establishment of the machinery between the Public Service as the employer and the three staff associations representing all civil servants in Zimbabwe was already in progress.

"Zimta supports in principle the teaching of political economy in schools because it is every child's right to know and be taught how wealth is created and managed in order to understand how and why our nation is going through certain political and economic problems."

But a snap survey conducted by THE SUNDAY MAIL last week showed that a number of teachers were in support of the formation of a union to replace the association which they said was not adequately representing them.

A primary schoolteachers from Mutare said the teachers' association had failed to serve the needs of the teachers from those qualified down to temporary and student teachers.

"A teacher awaiting training might serve for about eight years without being upgraded by the district officials and his skill might be better than a qualified teacher but Zimta has failed or does not want to have this issue rectified," said the teacher who refused to be named.

He said the employment of temporary teachers was being done for an indefinite period adding that the association had never stood up to challenge this practice.

Another teacher from Highfield accused the association of failing to take a stand on the issue of female student teachers who get expelled after falling pregnant while female students in other fields were allowed to continue with their professional training.

Most of the teachers felt that their conditions of service had not improved since the formation of the association. Some of the teachers professed ignorance of the association and what it was supposed to do for them.

*** Survey Shows 16-Percent Unemployment**

34000060c Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE
in English 1 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] A government survey has revealed that of a total labour force of over 3 million in 1986/87, 234,000 were unemployed—indicating an unemployment rate of 16 percent, excluding the communal sector.

The survey shows that all persons aged 15 years and above who were potential workers, 76 percent were in the labour force. The other 24 percent were not on the job market because of studies, household duties, ill-health, or old age.

Of the unemployed, 34 percent, or 81,000, held 'O' level certificates, and 22 percent, or 52,000, had up to grade 7 qualifications. Only a small proportion of those educated above Form 4 were unemployed.

The highest numbers of unemployed were among the urban labour force, with Harare having an unemployment rate of 17.4 percent of 54,000 potential workers. Over 50 percent of urban youths throughout the country were unemployed. The unemployment rates by province indicated that provinces with either large urban centres or a small farming sector had the highest levels of unemployment.

On employment, the survey found that there were just over three million people employed in 1986/87, 60 percent of them in communal farming. This showed that the actual number of people who were either self-employed or working for pay was 1.2 million, of which 72 percent were male.

About 69 percent of the total employed labour force was in the agricultural sector—the only industry in which females were in a majority—55 percent of the 2.1 million employees.

The industrial distribution shows that the next highest sectors were: community and social with 397,000 employees; the manufacturing industry with 167,000 employees; the wholesale industry with 129,000 employees; and the transport sector with 76,000 employees.

A further 51,000 workers were in the construction industry, 24,000 in finance, 17,000 in mining, 12,000 in electricity, while another 44,000 did not state their industries—giving a total labour force of three million.

However, the survey notes that due to the fact that the Labour Force Survey was a household and not an establishment-based survey, the sampling procedure might have omitted several mining areas, and hence the small number of workers recorded for that industry. It warns that the results of the mining sector have to be taken with caution.

The population not in the labour force (or inactive population) was about 980,000. These equalled about 23 percent of the total population aged 15 years and above.

The age structure revealed that young people constituted about 63 percent of those outside the labour force, the major reason for economic inactivity being academic studies and, to a certain extent, household duties, especially for females. The rest were either discouraged jobseekers, the sick, those too old to work, or the disabled.

A comparison between the 1982 census and the latest survey reveals that the labour force grew by approximately 30 percent in the period, and that the proportion of unemployed has fallen a little while the number of employed has increased slightly.

The number of communal farmers increased by about 70 percent, and there has been an increase in the total labour force of nearly 800,000 people. The unemployment rate decreased from 10.8 percent to 7.2 percent.

While Zimbabwe's unemployment rate was 7.2 percent in 1986/87, including communal farmers, the survey shows that the unemployment rate excluding communal farmers, was about 16 percent in 1986/87.

*** Water Shortage To Affect Sugar Production**

34000060d Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE
in English 8 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Triangle Limited has warned that sugar production "faces an extremely serious outlook" in the coming year or more, and ethanol production may be further reduced, due to the serious water shortage in Lake Kyle. On Wednesday this week, it was less than 12 percent full.

Mr J. M. Burton, Triangle's managing director, said this week that sugar cane yield has fallen by about 10 percent, and ethanol production will be no more than 65 percent of normal output this year.

Water for sugar irrigation had been reduced to 60 percent of normal in April this year, and garden water (a very small percentage of total used) has been cut to four hours a day.

Mr Burton said cane hectareage has been reduced and 1,000 ha—out of a total 12,000 ha—were currently fallow and will not be replanted until water supplies are secure.

Another 500ha were withdrawn from sugar irrigation in May this year, and "will be ploughed out" if the situation does not improve.

"The situation will be reviewed regularly through the rainy season and further cane taken out as necessary, with resultant reduction in ethanol and sugar production."

Without new water resources, Mr Burton saw no point in building the second ethanol plant, announced early this year by Mr Kumbirai Kangai, the Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Development.

Triangle was in the process of securing new water supplies from the Muzhwi Dam, now under construction near Mashava. However, he said this was already insufficient to assure the future of the sugar industry in the face of increased demands into the coming decade.

The water supplied by the proposed Tokwe-Mukorsi Dam was urgently needed to support the industry, as well as the obvious requirements for small- and medium-scale settlement in the province, said Mr Burton.

According to Mr Burton, the enforced current water savings would allow reduced sugar irrigation to continue until the end of November this year.

"After that time the crop will rely entirely on inflow into Kyle and on rain. The only solution is to seek new water resources—without which there will be no point in building another ethanol plant," he said.

Triangle at present employs a workforce in excess of 7,000, and more than 40,000 people rely on its sugar estate alone for their livelihood.

"While this company will not make any permanent employees redundant while it is possible to avoid this, it is obvious that sugar production based on Lake Kyle faces an extremely serious outlook for the coming year or more," said Mr Burton.

Meanwhile, an article published in the September 1 issue of the Masvingo Provincial Star newspaper said that as of August 28, the dam level was 78.73m, while water capacity was about 148.4m cubic metres.

It said the intention was to release 50m cubic metres of water down to Bangala Dam, to save river transmission losses and evaporation losses, and allow the continued operation of the electrical-power generating turbine at the dam.

By December, domestic water for Renco Mine, Triangle Village and Chiredzi township would have been released from Kyle for storage in Bangala, leaving only the balance of the Masvingo municipal allocation in the lake.

This allocation, according to the article, was 25m cubic metres as of October 1 last year, and was equal to two years' supply, including 30 percent losses. It is estimated that 13.5m cubic metres would remain as of December 31 this year, or 1 percent of Kyle's capacity.

Asked to state whether the municipality would be forced to ration water in the next few months, the town treasurer refused to comment and referred all questions to the regional Water Authority.

*** First-Quarter Manufacturing Up 8.3 Percent**

34000061a Harare THE HERALD-BUSINESS
HERALD

in English 31 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by Jethro Goko]

[Text] Despite the many problems affecting the economy, Zimbabwe's industries continue to grow. According to the latest Central Statistics Office figures, the country's manufacturing output increased by 8.3 percent in the first quarter of 1989 compared with the same period last year.

The chemicals and oil products and textile groups recorded the largest increases in output—12.5 percent and 10.2 percent respectively.

In the first three months of this year, mineral production went up by 7.5 percent compared to the same period last year.

Gold and copper had the largest increases—15.8 percent and 12 percent respectively. The unit value index rose by 29.7 percent. This, combined with the increase in volume, resulted in an increase of 34.4 percent in the value of output.

In agriculture, the first five months of this year saw the overall value of crop sales increase by 12.2 percent compared with the same period last year.

Sales from commercial areas increased by 14.5 percent while those from communal areas fell by 23.7 percent during the same period.

A comparison of crop deliveries between the first five months of 1988 and 1989 shows increase of 86.2 percent, 11.4 percent and 9.8 percent respectively for maize, cotton and flue-cured tobacco.

Although cattle slaughterings by the Cold Storage Commission fell by 5 percent over the same period, the value of slaughterings rose by 16.8 percent.

The figure shows that in the first two months of 1988, Zimbabwe recorded a trade balance surplus of \$76.5 million. Both exports and imports recorded increases of 26.8 percent and 2.6 percent respectively over the same period the previous year.

The major destinations of Zimbabwe's exports were South Africa, the U.S. and Britain with shares of 12.2 percent, 8.2 percent and 7 percent of the total value of exports respectively.

The main sources of imports were South Africa (although this went down in real terms when compared with the previous year), Botswana and West Germany, with shares of 18.8 percent, 9.1 percent and 8.8 percent respectively.

Flue-cured tobacco and ferro-alloys were the top selling commodities accounting for 23.5 percent and 11.8 percent of the total value of exports respectively.

Machinery and equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods were the major import commodity groups constituting 32.7 percent, 17.7 percent and 15 percent of the total value of imports respectively.

Between April and March this year, prices paid by higher income urban families and lower income urban families went up by 1.1 percent and 2.2 percent respectively.

The amount of electrical energy produced in the country last year was 3.7 percent more than that produced the previous year. Net imports of energy increased by 4.5 percent.

*** Maximum Cement Prices Fixed for First Time**

34000061b Harare THE HERALD in English
9 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Zimbabwe's three cement factories were yesterday given a 20 percent price rise with the Government fixing for the first time maximum retail prices for cement.

Until yesterday the Government had only fixed the maximum price of cement sold from the factories allowing wholesalers and retailers to use the same percentage mark-ups as they applied soon after independence.

But the Control of Goods (Cement Prices) Order 1989 gazetted yesterday also fixes the maximum wholesale price of cement delivered and the maximum retail price.

No retailer can now sell Portland cement from the Bulawayo and Harare factories for more than \$7.81 a 50kg pocket while cement from the Colleen Bawn factory cannot retail for more than \$7.31 a pocket.

Bulawayo's Portland blast furnace cement has a maximum retail price of \$6.49 a pocket and its early high strength Portland cement one of \$8.18. The other two factories do not sell these two grades.

*** 'Disinformation' on Beira Corridor Condemned**

34000061c Harare THE HERALD-BUSINESS
HERALD
in English 14 Sep 89 p 11

[Text] The Beira Corridor Group [BCG] has condemned shipping circles in Durban and Hamburg for spreading disinformation about the state of Beira Corridor.

According to a report in the latest BCG Bulletin, a Belgian business magazine had published misleading information. BCG has taken up the matter with the magazine and has assured importers and exporters that "the Zimbabwe and Frelimo armed forces continued to ensure the security of the corridor".

During June, transit operations were almost incident-free. In May there was a derailment caused by technical faults, which blocked the line for five days.

Since then, there had been a few security incidents affecting the railway line but these had usually been repaired on the same day.

The report said a derailment of a unit train in the northern half of the Corridor at the end of July blocked

the line for transit traffic and subsequently the line was sabotaged. Damage was quickly repaired.

The petroleum pipeline was also blown up but was repaired in mid-June.

Road conditions had been back to normal since late May with the road over the Pungwe Flats operating without delays. Road re-sheeting is continuing with expatriate assistance.

However, the flow of goods by rail and road to Beira has been predominantly from Harare with many wagons or trucks returning empty.

"While this imbalance has to be addressed, it is clear that the locomotive problem is placing increasingly severe constraints on this main transport option," said the report.

As a result, the Mozambican and Zimbabwean ministries of transport briefed road transport operators on a new transit coupon system.

Meanwhile, the Beira Corridor Authority [BCA] has said that Zimbabwe could save about \$1,000 on each container if it moved through Beira instead of the South African ports.

This emerged when the new managing director of BCG, Mr David Zausmer, and the general manager, Mr Kiri Chasi, recently visited the executive director of the BCA, Mr Rui Fonseca, and the project director of the Nordic team, Mr Erik Greby, to seek ways in which BCG and BCA could co-operate in increasing the use of the Corridor.

BCA pointed out that a temporary container terminal had been established after much lobbying from Zimbabwe to accommodate transit traffic while berths 2-5 were being reconstructed and the new container terminal was being established.

*** Horticultural Exports Make Good Progress**

34000061d Harare THE HERALD in English
14 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Flower exports from Zimbabwe are expected to more than double next year to around 6,000 tonnes, pushing up the earnings from all horticultural exports well above the present \$40 million a year.

In 1983 just 50 tonnes of flowers were exported. In the last season this had risen to 2,410 tonnes and the Horticultural Promotion Council [HPC] expects exports of 5,500 to 6,500 tonnes next year.

Addressing a post-harvest handling seminar which opened in Harare yesterday, the council's chief executive, Mr Bill Collett, said exports of flowers, fruits and vegetables now earned Zimbabwe more than \$40 million a year in foreign currency.

The HPC was now looking at ways of opening a direct link to the Middle East since their products were only getting there through Holland.

Mr Collett said prospects for sea freighting citrus fruit from the Beitbridge area looked good because a local company, Africa Produce Marketing, had developed a controlled-atmosphere container which ensured that produce reached Europe while still fresh. It takes about three weeks to ship citrus.

The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Cde David Karimanzira, who opened the seminar, said the Government intended to strengthen all aspects of the horticultural industry so that more jobs could be created.

He said the Government was considering granting more authority to the HPC to act on behalf of the whole horticultural industry and become the official link between the private sector and the Government.

On the general performance of the industry, the minister said the country had seen "spectacular growth in the horticultural industry, particularly in exports by air".

Cde Karimanzira also announced that approval would be given to four different air carriers to operate out of Zimbabwe between October this year and April 1990 to overcome shortcomings in airfreight capacity to move crops to markets.

He said high freight rates would most likely encourage exporters to produce high-value crops which could afford the higher transport costs.

He said flower exports had been promoted through overseas companies becoming involved in Zimbabwe and placing technical experts in the country for two or three years.

"The introduction of new production techniques introduced by these specialists, coupled with more efficient hot-house designs, have seen the quality of our flower crop increase significantly and with it prices received in the export markets."

However, climatic effects during the rainy season limited the quality and variety of produce. Consideration was, therefore, being given to production hothouses to ensure reliable and continuous supplies.

On fruit production, the minister said this was a long-term project which needed careful planning before orchards and plantations could be established.

Growers had to assess trends for up to 20 years ahead to ensure that what they produced would still be in demand.

Planting of deciduous fruit trees had expanded in the Eastern districts and a large apple crop in the next two years was expected, he said.

Beitbridge growers were also planning a 300 percent expansion in citrus exports in the next five to eight years.

Benin

* Kerekou Decries Economic Mismanagement

34190393 Cotonou EHZU in French
24 Aug 89 p 5

[19 August interview with President Kerekou by VOA reporter Mohamed Elbou; account by Leon Brathier]

[Text] In an interview granted Saturday to Mohamed Elbou, Voice of America correspondent for the Africa subregion, the chief of state drew up a critical balance sheet of our economic program that went into effect on 30 November 1972, explained the reasons for the adoption of a structural adjustment program and changes it implies for our country, and finally, addressed Benin's transit role and its cooperation with brother countries in ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and WASC [West African Students Confederation]. Freedom of the press in Benin was also discussed.

More than an exhaustive review of the economic policy followed in our country for 17 years, it was a critical, or rather self-critical, look at Benin's overall national economic program by President Kerekou.

Results Not on a Par With Means Deployed

When questioned about lessons to be learned from his two previous terms at the helm of our country, President Kerekou answered that if the first can be considered the term of doubt, then the second is that of assurance, and the third that of confirmation. This is how the chief of state explained his recent reelection to the presidency by the people's commissioners in the Revolutionary National Assembly (ANR), who, he said, are the worthy representatives of all the Beninese people.

The experience of the first two terms has enabled President Kerekou to emphasize the correctness of the basic guidelines of the new policy of national independence and construction and the economic platform drafted by all the live forces and officials of the Beninese nation and adopted on 30 November 1972, based on the fundamental needs of the masses.

The chief of state admitted, however, that despite total determination and action taken and although all necessary competencies were mobilized, the platform has not yielded the results anticipated with respect to effects of the economic crisis, deterioration of terms of trade, economic and social consequences of natural disasters, and, in particular, the poor performance of public and semipublic enterprises.

Moreover, this economic guide suffered from certain inadequacies, also recognized by President Kerekou, to wit: insufficient knowledge of the resources of our soil and the lack of any infrastructure enabling trained management personnel to gain a better grasp of the facts.

Inasmuch as the basic guidelines are sound, the chief of state said Benin does not regret the experience and has

now learned the necessary lessons. He said that all countries, even the more highly developed ones, go through periods of searching and difficulties in their national construction efforts.

Liberalization of Economy

Concerning changes occurring in the economic realm in recent years and those on the horizon, President Kerekou said that the structural adjustment program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is based on observations made before 1982 concerning the need for a qualitative change in management of the national economy. President Kerekou stated that it was not until 1984, after ascertaining the persistently mediocre management by upper level personnel despite new measures taken to correct mistakes, that an appeal went out to foreign experts. This led to negotiations with the two major international institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, in 1986 and Benin's current commitment to the application of a structural adjustment program.

This program implies liberalization of the economy, the privatization of unprofitable public and parapublic sectors, and the reorganization and establishment of private banks. It is a series of measures that the chief of state intends to pursue, while emphasizing the fact that upper level personnel must "put an end to empirical, irresponsible management in Benin."

War Against Absenteeism, Corruption, and Excessive Intervention

This irresponsibility in management was again emphasized by the chief of state, who said, in his response to a question about the image of integrity and efficiency that our administration must present to foreign backers, that the war on absenteeism, excessive intervention, and lack of professionalism has been under way since 1972. The president said that the anarchic manner in which our banking executives granted loans to government officials without adequate guarantees and to entrepreneurs of dubious morality was the undoing of the banking system.

President Kerekou, nevertheless, explained that misappropriations by officials are not the exclusive province of Benin. It is because the Beninese Government chose to wage a public war on such scourges that Benin's name has regularly appeared in the press, he explained.

Benin: Transit Country?

Concerning the economic importance of the autonomous port of Cotonou, the chief of state placed it within the framework of economic cooperation with such landlocked brothers and friendly countries as Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. These nations have zones that can be developed for handling their traffic at the port of Cotonou, and Benin is working to grant them preferential treatment. The chief of state said that Benin intends to expand its relations to include joint management, as in the case of Niger and the railroads. Benin's intention is,

therefore, he said, to turn COBENAM [Beninese Shipping Company] into an international concern. Another of the president's desires in the field of cooperation is to see the realization of Benin and Niger's ambition of extending the Cotonou-Parakou railroad to Niamey.

For an Integrated Economy in the Subregion

Speaking of relations with neighboring Nigeria, the chief of state emphasized the brotherly ties linking Nigerians and Beninese and ruling out any barrier between the two peoples, two peoples long linked by intense commercial trade. President Kerekou took up the example of joint companies: the Onigbolo Cement Works and the Sava Sugar Mill, exemplary forms of close cooperation between the two countries, cooperation that has been clearly manifested in the search for a solution to the problems of these two societies hit by the economic crisis, particularly deregulation of the sugar mill.

President Kerekou took advantage of the opportunity to praise the aid given by Nigeria to Beninese victims of the torrential rains.

Acting president of WASC, the chief of state painted a positive picture of the organization and said that the 13th Summit Conference that was canceled in April will probably take place before October.

Freedom of the Press in Benin

In the course of the interview, President Kerekou took up the problem of freedom of the press in Benin, recalling how the government, aware of its duty to inform the masses and because the Beninese is liberal-minded by nature, has allowed the emergence of a private press. He, therefore, lamented the fact that newsmen often forget this aspect of educating the masses and apparently prefer sensationalism, thus violating the conscience of the people. He explained that despite mistakes, the private press is free to exercise its trade of providing untrammelled information in Benin.

Ghana

*** Canada Provides Funds for Water Projects**

34000058a Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*
in English 12 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Rosemary Ardavio and Florence Akvaal]

[Excerpt] Ghana and Canada yesterday signed 45 million Canadian dollars (about C10 billion) agreement to implement a project which will strengthen the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) and also improve 40 urban water systems in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions.

Dr Kwesi Botchwey, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, signed for Ghana and Mrs Monique

Landry, the visiting Canadian External Relations and International Development Minister signed on behalf of her country.

Under the agreement, Canada will provide 27 million Canadian dollars through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Government of Ghana will also contribute C4 billion towards the project which spans over a six-year period.

Canada's contribution will meet most of the foreign exchange costs of the project including equipment, spare parts and technical assistance while Ghana's contribution will meet local costs associated with the project implementation and also ensure that the water systems are maintained over a long term.

In a brief address after the signing of the agreement, Dr Kwesi Botchwey said the venture is being undertaken at the right time since Tamale has had a recent disaster following the collapse of a dam in the centre of the town which has no proper drainage system.

He pledged that the government would make the adequate budgetary provision to support the venture and added that the work of GWSC would also be closely monitored through the Ministry of Works and Housing to ensure that it undertakes the project efficiently. [passage omitted]

*** Corporation Explains Maize Purchase Plan**

34000058b Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*
in English 8 Sep 89 pp 1, 8-9

[Text] The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) will buy about C2 billion worth of maize this season starting from the middle of the month.

In an interview with the Ghana News Agency in Accra yesterday, Mr M.K. Atta-Krah, GFDC's acting Managing Director, denied rumours that the corporation would not be able to buy maize this year because of the large stock it is still holding from last year's purchases.

He said new government policy has made it possible for the corporation to dispose of a substantial portion of last year's stock.

"Our warehouses will be empty in no time and all our drying bins have been serviced and made ready to receive the new maize. We are, in fact, ready for the farmers."

Mr Atta-Krah commended farmers for their positive response to the government's agricultural policy as a result of which maize has not been imported in the last three years.

Mr Atta-Krah said the corporation will, from the next purchasing season, adopt a new system—The flow concept—which will enable it to mop up greater after-shock surpluses in the system.

Under the new system, the corporation will not stop buying even after stocking its warehouses to the full. It will find market and try to sell off its excess purchases.

Mr Atta-Krah said the government has embarked on an expansion programme which will, by 1986, increase the corporation's storage capacity to 150,000 tonnes from the present 40,000 tonnes.

He said the corporation's new grading system is aimed at ensuring that high quality maize is produced by farmers.

A committee to be made up of the chief farmer, the corporation's purchasing clerk, and representatives of the CDRs [Committees for the Defence of the Revolution] and CDOs [chief district officer] will be set up at buying centres at the beginning of the season to ensure fair play.

Mr Atta-Krah said the committee is also expected to educate farmers on the grading of maize. GNA.

Liberia

Superpower Pressure for Ties to Taiwan Denied

AB0111213289 *Monrovia Radio ELWA in English*
2000 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] Vice President Harry Moniba has said that Monrovia's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Taipei was not prompted by pressure from any superpower as a result of the crushing of prodemocracy movement demonstrations by the government of the People's Republic of China last June. Dr Moniba, who was speaking today at his Capitol Hill office when journalists from the Information Ministry called on him to comment on his recent visit to Taipei, said the decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Taipei was in keeping with the nation's foreign policy of maintaining friendly ties with all peace-loving countries of the world. He further noted that the decision was not made solely for material gains, adding, although in friendship there are many other things that may come along, but the relations between the two countries, however, will be of mutual benefit.

On the questions of projects abandoned by the People's Republic of China, Vice President Moniba said Liberians will cooperate with the Republic of China in completing all projects abandoned.

Dr Moniba, at the head of a 15-man official delegation, recently visited Taipei, where a joint communique reestablishing full diplomatic relations, between Liberia and the Republic of China was signed. While in Taiwan, Dr Moniba visited the industrial city of Kushin and the second largest city in that country.

Taiwan Economic Team Holds Discussions

AB3111092489 *Monrovia Radio ELWA in English*
2000 GMT 30 Oct 89

[Text] A Taiwanese economic delegation, which arrived in the country last evening, has begun holding series of meetings today with appropriate Liberian Government authorities. Reports say the delegation is interested in food and vegetable processing as well as vehicle spares.

Senegal

Foreign Minister Views Conflict With Mauritania

AB0211225889 *Libreville Africa No 1 in French*
1830 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] The Senegalese foreign minister, Ibrahima Fall, has given a news conference in Paris. This provided an opportunity for Mr Ibrahima Fall to clarify the situation along the border with Mauritania, an explosive situation, is it not, Pierre Ndong Mve?

[Ndong Mve] The Senegalese foreign minister said the situation has become alarming because of the border incidents along the river separating Senegal and Mauritania. The minister blamed Mauritania for the impasse in the efforts to settle the dispute between the two countries. He confirmed that daily incidents have been taking place in recent days in the river region and said these incidents have left several people dead. [Words indistinct] demonstrated political willingness to settle this problem, he stated that this domestic matter between the two countries is gradually being [words indistinct] with a worsening of the situation that could lead to open conflict. The minister stressed that his country would never initiate an armed conflict with Mauritania but it is clear, he added, that his government will defend its territorial integrity at all costs, using force if necessary. Ibrahima Fall explained that the incidents along the border are due to the fact that some of the 48,000 Mauritania deported to Senegal by Mauritania come back across the river to recover their property. He added that to date, the Senegalese Army has not been implicated in these incidents, even though gunshots are heard from time to time on the Mauritanian side. Mr Fall also said his government got reports that Iraq has supplied weapons to Mauritania. He added that Dakar is trying to verify these reports.

Minister Interviewed in Paris

LD0211183789 *Paris International Service*
in French 1230 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] [Announcer] An increasing number of incidents on the northern bank of the Senegal River resulting from the return of civilians who have been driven off their land is confirmed today by Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahima Fall, who spoke to correspondent Jean Karim Fall.

[Begin recording] [Ibrahima Fall] I confirm that an increasing number of incidents are indeed taking place between Mauritians. This involves Mauritians who have been deported to Senegal, deprived of their families, property, houses, everything, even of their identity cards. Some of these deportees have no hesitation in crossing the river—sometimes at night—in spite of the bans imposed by the Senegalese authorities. They try to go to the other side of the river on the right bank, recover their property, and return with it. There are an increasing number of incidents between these deported Mauritians returning to Mauritania to recover their property and the Mauritanian security forces. Sometimes the incidents are fatal. According to my information, apparently there have been about 30 victims [fatalities].

[Jean Karim Fall] What is the attitude of the Senegalese Army in the face of the increase of these incidents along the river?

[Ibrahima Fall] The Senegalese Army is not involved in these incidents, that must be said very clearly. These incidents are between Mauritians and Mauritians. [end recording]

[Announcer] The Senegalese minister also defined his country's very precise position on the border dispute with Mauritania.

[Begin recording] [Ibrahima Fall] The border between Senegal and Mauritania is the one which resulted from the decree of 8 December 1933, a French decree as our two countries were French colonies then, and it is very clear: The border is on the right bank of the main arm of the Senegal River. The decree has been implemented.

[Jean Karim Fall] In Nouakchott, U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said the same thing as you. He said that the right bank of the Senegal River was Mauritanian. How did you receive this U.S. standpoint?

[Ibrahima Fall] It is a very important standpoint insofar as it confirms the point of view Senegal has unceasingly defended: In accordance with the decree of 8 December 1933, the border is on the right bank. This means the whole of the river and the islands situated on the river, with the sole exception of the island of (Aubois), which in accordance with the decree of 1933 falls to Mauritania, hence the whole of the river and the towns belong to Senegal, come under Senegalese sovereignty. [end recording]

[Announcer] That was the Senegalese minister of foreign affairs who was passing through Paris.

* SOPI Claims Press Censorship

34190005a Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
14 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by Abdoulaye Ndiaga Sylla: "SOPI on Trial"]

[Text] The dispute between the government and SOPI [the newspaper] following the latter's publication of the "true results of the presidential elections" had not yet subsided when a new brouhaha erupted with the arraignment of Mr Ousmane Ngom, vice president of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] parliamentary group; Cheikh Khoureysi Ba, managing editor of SOPI; Mamadou Oumar Ndiaye, editor in chief of the same publication; his assistant, Mbagnick Diop; and Khadre Fall, a free-lance journalist. The defendants were arraigned before Chief Magistrate Ahmed Tidiane Diakhate, who released them on bail. Mr Ngom, author of the editorial titled "President Collin," published in SOPI (No. 95), is charged with complicity in insulting the chief of state. Cheikh Khoureysi Ba is being prosecuted along with the principal author of the article on all the charges brought against the journalists as well as the charge of libeling a government minister. SOPI's editor in chief and his reporter, who signed the article titled "Unrest Among Senegalese Army Officers: 'Give Us the Resources'" that appeared in the 11 August SOPI (No. 94), are charged with "complicity in using the press to incite the military to depart from their duty and disobey lawful orders issued by their superiors in accordance with the laws and military regulations."

Khadre Fall is charged with "spreading false information of such a character as to discredit public institutions, and with complicity in insulting the chief of state." Fall, a free-lance journalist, was author of the article titled "Collin: A Case to Ponder," which appeared in SOPI on 1 September 1989 (No. 99).

The journalists were summoned by officers of the general affairs detachment of the court's criminal investigations division on 7 September 1989, the same day that SOPI—along with WAL FADJRI, CAFARD LIBERE and LE DEVOIR—received a letter from the office of the general manager of NIS [News Press of Senegal] demanding payment of all arrears (3,406,757 CFA francs in SOPI's case), "failing which NIS will be unable to print your next issue."

On Friday SOPI executives discovered NIS was not bluffing. Issue No. 101 of the paper, for which a 35,000-copy purchase order had been sent on 6 September—the plates were already prepared and ready to be run off—was not printed by NIS, which demanded liquidation of all arrears. NIS management denies the accusation that it took the action at the behest of Mr Jean Collin, who, according to SOPI, was annoyed by the journal's articles about him. "We are not censors, only a printing press. It was purely a business decision. Faced with the refusal of our transport agents and other suppliers to continue providing us with materials needed in production, the necessity of rebuilding our stocks of paper, and threatened with a cutoff of supplies if we do not satisfy our creditors, we have been forced to demand that our delinquent clients bring their accounts current. Good clients such as SUD HEBDO, DAN DOOLE, GESTU, and L'UNITE, who don't have outstanding obligations to NIS, are not affected by this measure," says a

spokesman for NIS management, Mr Cheikh Tidiane Diop (not to be confused with NIS's production manager).

Was there no possibility of a debt moratorium to help out clients with problems? "SOPI's officers have submitted no proposals to us, unlike the managers of other publications in the same situation. They preferred to content themselves with accusing us of having acted at the behest of the authorities," adds Mr Diop, who, moreover, rejects the accusation that NIS has kept hands off SOLEIL and the PS [Socialist Party] newspapers, even though they owe the printer a lot of money. "We have a different contractual relationship with SOLEIL," he said, "one which both sides respect. As for the PS papers, with the exception of SURSAUT, which was suspended for nonpayment, they do not have any outstanding obligations to NIS."

SOPI executives stand by their accusation. They say that "NIS received instructions to prevent Issue No. 101 from being printed." Only a coincidence? "Such things are always troubling," according to Mr Amadou Moctar Diop, SOPI general manager. While admitting that SOPI is in arrears to the printer, Mr Diop maintains that "SOPI had asked for and obtained from NIS a four-issue grace period," an unwritten but functioning arrangement whereby SOPI was allowed to pay for each issue after the fourth following issue was published. "In addition," he said, "after receiving the letter on Thursday 7 September at 1930 hours, we sent a check of 1,700,000 CFA francs to NIS. Even more, we made several offers to pay off the entirety of the arrears on Monday 11 September. Each time we were met with a refusal. In the end it was the chief executive officer of NIS himself who—before making himself scarce—gave the order to the chief of the rotary printing crew not to print SOPI."

"How are we to interpret such an obstructive attitude on the part of a printing press whose temporary cash-flow problems we have often helped resolve, but which in return has caused us so much harm?"

The rupture between SOPI and NIS seems to be final. Issue No. 101 of SOPI was printed by Cado-Presse, which publishes POLITICIEN. Some 16,500 copies were printed in two installments (6,500 on Monday and 10,000 on Tuesday) instead of the intended 25,000 copies at a cost of 1,300,000 CFA francs. Pending installation of its own printing facility, SOPI will continue to be printed on Cado-Presse equipment, probably on the basis of a service agreement.

According to SOPI's editor in chief, there is no question of going back to NIS, which since Monday has been under heavy security protection. A constabulary detachment is standing guard over the installations, whose presses turn out almost all of the newspapers and reviews published in Senegal. NIS management says the security measures are needed because of threats to sabotage the plant.

* MSU Party Established Following MSD Demise

34190005B Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
14 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by I. Fall: "The MSU Is Born"]

[Text] A new party, the Movement for Socialism and Unity (MSU), has emerged from the break up of the MSD [Movement for Socialism and Democracy], which occurred on 20 August as a result of fundamental differences between its two component parts, the former MDP [People's Democratic Movement] and the former LCT [Communist Workers League].

MSU'S general constituent assembly was held on Sunday, 3 September, at the home of its president, Mamadou Dia, the First Mawdo [translation unknown] of the party. Mr Mody Diagne was retained as national general coordinator, although several structural reforms were introduced. The national executive council was abolished, and from now on the administrative region will be the political region (previously the department was the political region). A decision was also made to create a political liaison committee that will coordinate, at the departmental level, the activities of the (CPP's or base cells) primary political committees within their area.

The policymaking bodies between congresses are the National Directorate, composed of members of the permanent political secretariat, the 10 regional coordinators, and the 10 political controllers, as well as the permanent 60-member political secretariat. The primary media organ of the party is still YAKAAR, which long before the MDP-LCT merger was run by supporters of Mamadou Dia.

* Public Debt Up 16 Percent Over 1988

34190005c Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
7 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Hassan Ba: "Hopes Dashed: Adjustment, 10 Years Later"]

[Excerpts] Good health for the West, misery for the South! In a nutshell that is what the first-quarter global economic situation looked like, at least according to macroeconomic indicators.

The gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States was growing at 4.3 percent. [passage omitted]

Oil prices in the first quarter were up 50 percent over the end of last year. The main reason was a production cut by OPEC member countries. The picture for other raw materials was mixed: grain and soy markets were up again, but coffee and cocoa were down. All these trends obviously affect the Senegalese economy. According to the Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Trends, higher markets for grain and oil are expected to cause Senegal's import bill to rise.

But the situation is not completely bleak! The increased level of imports is expected to be offset by unusually high

export earnings from groundnuts—50 to 55 billion CFA francs, compared to 34.9 billion in exports for 1978.

What about the internal economic situation? The agricultural campaign did not get off to a good start, despite adequate rainfall. For example, by the time the campaign opened, investment in groundnut seeds was still less than half the targeted level. CNCAS (National Agricultural Credit Fund) did not make things any easier by linking credit to debt repayment.

In cotton there was a "planters' revolt." The steep drop in the subsidies previously provided to peasants for purchase of inputs led to a doubling in the cost of fertilizer supplies. The tragic consequence: fewer hectares planted.

It is in this connection that we note that Senegal's external public debt as of 31 March 1989 stood at 1,044.6 billion CFA francs, up about 16 percent over the first quarter a year ago. This formidable increase is primarily due to increases in multilateral credits.

The budgetary situation is also very disappointing. As of 31 March 1989 revenue collected stood at 184.2 billion CFA francs. Customs revenue fell sharply by 1.7 billion compared to the first quarter of 1988. "The rate of collection for harbor fees was only 63.7 percent of the level called for in the financial program," according to the forecasting and economic trends directorate.

* Civil Service Reduction 'Should' Begin at Top

34190005d Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
7 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by Babacar Toure: "Initiatives"]

[Text] Is the Senegalese Government being victimized by some of its civil servants? The World Bank is not far from taking such a view of the contradiction between the projections of growth and the real economic recession our country is experiencing. We are far from convinced of the accuracy of the 4-percent growth rate claimed for the last 3 years. The real rate was probably close to zero, which means the economy is in recession. On balance it seems that the blame rests not only with those who concocted the figures, but also to varying degrees with those who accepted, certified, and submitted them to the financial donors. The purpose in faking the data may have been to obtain funds, but today one must wonder what became of all those resources that have already cost the taxpayer so dearly?

In this context, the cautious attitude of experts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is notable: the Bank has called for a reduction in force of 10,000 civil servants as a precondition for any negotiations with the Senegalese Government.

Who will have to go? Underlings, naturally: those public-sector employees earning the minimum wage, some of whom admittedly held artificial positions that serve no real purpose. All the same, they are the ones who will

have to pay the price for a situation they did not create. If reduction of the overall government payroll is deemed essential and unavoidable, one should take aim not at the employees as a mass but rather at the bevvies of "high-level" civil servants, "high" officials, members of the National Assembly's permanent bureau, ministers, and deputy ministers who, all by themselves, swallow up the state's resources. Innumerable trips abroad, allowances, and in-kind perquisites (which cost the taxpayers dearly), illicit favors, as well as conflicts of interest so costly and unproductive for our country—all this can be laid at the door of that special caste that is so quick to trample on its vows.

Is Senegal going through a time of turbulence? Most government ministers and high officials are on...vacation. Preferably out of the country. Were Senegal forced to defend its territorial integrity, its sovereignty and national independence, as President Abdou Diouf said, these ladies and gentlemen would never dream of breaking off their vacations and asking for instructions. The same phenomenon that was noted in the Socialist Party [PS] during the election crisis can be seen even more clearly now within the government. Once again Abdou Diouf finds himself alone, with a handful of loyalists, in the midst of a sea of troubles. Under these conditions, does one after all really need a 27-member government (22 ministers and 5 deputy ministers), with four deputies (OCI [expansion unknown], Data Processing, Parastatal Sector Reform, and Employment) having ministerial rank, a permanent bureau in the National Assembly consisting of 23 members who themselves also have ministerial rank, not to mention all the other parasites (national directors, project directors, etc.) whose pay and perquisites make their counterparts throughout the sub-region green with envy? A layoff of 10,000 people (and that is only the beginning!) would have little effect on the size of the government payroll, in comparison with the dimensions of the hypertrophied cost of maintaining what might be called the caste of the "200 families."

They are the ones, moreover, who brought the Senegalese banks to their knees and then allowed French banks to recolonize Senegal's banking and economic system. Was the president aware of all that was at stake when he made his 24 August speech to the nation, speaking in firm, determined tones about the external danger and defense of the nation's interests in a way that could not fail to influence public opinion? Will he be able to figure out what the political class is trying to do with his domestic initiatives?

At all events it is up to him—since he is in charge of running the country—to stir up a broad nationwide debate on the issues, major and minor, with which Senegal is confronted. If we were forced to go to war tomorrow, it would clearly be those who have suffered from the system, rather than those who have profited from it while contributing nothing to their country, who pay with their lives for the country's defense. The persistent internal crisis urgently calls for endogenous

solutions negotiated by the Senegalese people themselves; a weakened nation is an easy victim for any form of aggression. Senegal's enemies at least understand that much, even if they are fighting the wrong war at the wrong time.

*** Figures Conceal IMF Policy Failure**

34190005e Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
31 Aug 89 p 8

[Article by Hassan Ba: "Magic With Numbers: Adjustment, 10 Years Later"]

[Text] Has the Senegalese Government used technical ruses to manipulate the annual growth rate figures, in order to give a false impression of economic recovery?

It is a serious question, but one we must face. Many experts are openly questioning the reality of the figures (growth rates close to 4 percent every year for the last 3 years), which Senegalese officials hotly defend. There is so much doubt that a few months ago Senegal's minister of economic and financial affairs reportedly held a meeting with the technicians in his department to clear things up.

The directorate of statistics, which had wanted a clarification, had drawn conclusions that were catastrophic for the government: the annual growth rate in the GDP [gross domestic product] between 1982 and 1986 hovered around...0.9 percent. Given the demographic growth during the same period, the figures simply mean that during the adjustment period our country must have been in a terrible decline.

That decline, at any rate, is only too real. The IMF and the World Bank will never be the first to admit that the recession is real, because that would amount to admitting the patent failure of their policies.

While waiting for the IMF to reconsider, the Senegalese Government squanders its resources in sensational innovations, ill-fated experiments, and timorous backpedaling...

Customs duties are one example. It will be recalled that with the New Industrial Policy (NPI) the government began in July 1988 to dismantle the tariff structure, in order to encourage enterprises to become more competitive and to wage a more effective campaign against smuggling. The results were somewhat disappointing because the broader tax base on which the government had been counting did not function correctly.

The IMF, much more concerned about "short-term" stabilization objectives than the imperatives of industrial growth, insisted that the government start raising tariffs again in order to replenish the treasury. Even if it entailed jeopardizing the objectives of the NPI! The government has given in. In order to survive...

Again, for the sake of fiscal stability the government is getting ready to lay off 10,000 civil servants. The World Bank has made that a precondition for any further negotiations about the adjustment program. While it

may be true that budgetary revenue has in large part been absorbed by personnel expenditures, one cannot—and one must not—forget that 10,000 civil servants are responsible for 10,000 families. It is true that the government has worked cunningly and energetically to oppose this measure, which amounts to social and political suicide. But according to the latest report, it has once more given in. It would be more sensible to allocate resources judiciously and redistribute public-sector employees in accordance with the importance of the various ministerial departments. It is absurd for the Ministry of Tourism to employ only 97 civil servants at a time when the tourist sector has been a godsend, bringing in, according to the most recent estimates, 14.9 billion [CFA francs] in the first quarter this year! Ten years after the adjustment program went into effect, the time for a frank assessment has arrived—for everyone. A confidential document prepared by the research department of the World Bank is sitting today on the desk of the minister of economic and financial affairs. It is a shocking document, both for the Senegalese Government and for the World Bank itself.

One conclusion: between 1980 and 1986 net capital flows to Senegal from all sources averaged half a billion dollars a year! In other words, enough to give every Senegalese citizen 24,000 CFA francs, twice as much as his Sahelian neighbors!

"This generous external aid, combined with the limited economic progress, leads us to ask some fundamental questions about the effectiveness of the aid the World Bank is providing," the report states.

The World Bank alone has loaned Senegal an average of \$85 million annually in recent years. The Bank experts who wrote the report acknowledge (at last!) that although the adjustment policy may not reach its goals (an elegant way of saying that it has failed!), it is first of all because the Bretton Woods institution has persistently ignored the major problems and the major issues, minimizing them or assuming they have already been resolved. The result has been "unfounded optimism regarding prospects for the future" (sic)!

Throughout all the misguided schemes and groping about in the dark, Senegal has been the big loser. The report, in a passage that is stunning in its long overdue candor, admits that as a result of the abovescribed situation the World Bank has hardly given a thought to designing any long-term development strategy for the Senegalese economy.

So why should anyone be surprised that over the years the World Bank's conditionality extends into more and more domains and increasingly puts the government in a strait-jacket? At the time of the first adjustment loan there were 32 conditions: in the third loan, there will be 77!

The Bank has begun to take a critical look at its own actions, even if only by way of its research department, which does not have much policymaking authority. It remains for other players to cross the Rubicon, by reconsidering the macroeconomic model that underlies the adjustment program.

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